IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ISAIAH FIELDS, §
§ No. 236, 2017
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court of the
§ State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 1506013874 (S)
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: July 20, 2017
Decided: October 12, 2017
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
This 12th day of October 2017, upon careful consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the Superior Court record, it
appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Isaiah Fields, filed this appeal from the Superior Court’s
May 18, 2017 opinion summarily dismissing his motion for postconviction relief
and denying his request for the appointment of counsel. The State of Delaware has
filed a motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of Fields’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We
agree and affirm.
(2) The record reflects that, during the course of a narcotics investigation
conducted by the Governor’s Task Force in 2015, the Delaware State Police received
information that Fields, a Level II probationer, was transporting heroin in and around
the Millsboro area. On June 17, 2015, the police observed Fields driving a green
minivan in Millsboro, and knowing that Fields had a suspended driver’s license, the
police stopped the minivan. The police found $800 in Fields’ pocket and a cell
phone between the front seats of the vehicle. On the back seat, the police found a
black bag containing more than six grams of a substance that field-tested positive
for heroin. Later that day, when Fields admitted to the police during an interview
that he had more heroin at his residence, police and probation officers conducted an
administrative search of the residence and found another eight grams of the
suspected heroin, which brought the total amount of drugs seized to more than
fourteen grams.
(3) Fields was charged by Information with Aggravated Possession of
Heroin, Drug Dealing in Heroin—both class B felonies1—Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, and Driving while Suspended or Revoked. Each of the class B
felonies exposed Fields to a minimum of two years and up to twenty-five years in
1
16 Del. C. § 4752 (1), (3).
2
prison.2 Also, because he had prior convictions for at least two violent felonies,3 if
Fields was convicted of either of the class B felonies charged in the Information, he
faced the possibility of having the State move to declare him a habitual offender and,
if granted, the imposition of a life sentence.4
(4) On October 19, 2015, with the assistance of appointed counsel, Fields
entered into a plea agreement with the State. In exchange for Fields’ guilty plea to
the Drug Dealing in Heroin offense, the State agreed to dismiss the other charges in
the Information and to recommend that Fields be sentenced to no more than six years
of unsuspended Level V incarceration.
(5) Before accepting the guilty plea, the Superior Court engaged Fields in
a colloquy to ensure that he was entering the plea fully aware of the nature of the
charges against him and the consequences of entering the plea. After the colloquy,
the Superior Court accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and
sentenced Fields to twenty-five years of Level V imprisonment suspended after six
years for probation.
(6) Fields did not file a direct appeal from the guilty plea and sentence. He
did, however, file a motion seeking to reduce the agreed-upon six-year term of
2
11 Del. C. § 4205(b).
3
The record reflects that Fields had prior convictions for assault first degree, robbery first degree,
and drug dealing.
4
11 Del. C. § 4214(b).
3
unsuspended incarceration. By order dated February 1, 2016, the Superior Court
denied the motion on the basis that the six-year term was appropriate and was part
of the parties’ plea agreement.
(7) On October 25, 2016, Fields filed a timely motion for postconviction
relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.5 Fields filed amendments to the
motion on December 8, 2016 and February 9, 2017, and in the February 9
amendment, he requested the appointment of counsel.
(8) Fields’ postconviction motion as amended (hereinafter “the Motion”)
raised overlapping claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial
misconduct, illegal search and seizure, inadequate Miranda warnings, and
involuntary and defective guilty plea. After preliminary consideration of the Motion
and the record, the Superior Court denied Fields’ request for the appointment of
counsel and dismissed the Motion.6 This appeal followed.
(9) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for
postconviction relief under Rule 61 for an abuse of discretion.7 When deciding legal
or constitutional questions, we apply a de novo standard of review.8
5
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61.
6
See id. (e)(3) (Supp. 2017) (providing that the court may appoint counsel for an indigent movant’s
first timely postconviction motion in a guilty plea case); id. (d)(5) (providing for the summary
dismissal of a motion for postconviction relief if it plainly appears that the movant is not entitled
to relief).
7
Morris v. State, 2016 WL 7473827 (Del. Dec. 28, 2016) (citing Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 941
(Del. 2013)).
8
Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 40 A.3d 346, 353 (Del. 2012)).
4
(10) When dismissing the Motion, the Superior Court found that it plainly
appeared that Fields’ claims were procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) because
he failed to raise them during the guilty plea proceeding and did not demonstrate
“cause” in the Motion for the procedural default.9 Although a successful claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute “cause” under Rule 61(i)(3),10 to
prevail on such a claim within the context of a guilty plea, a movant must show that,
but for the alleged errors of counsel, the movant would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.11
(11) In this case, the evidence against Fields included more than fourteen
grams of heroin. If Fields had gone to trial on the charges in the Information and
been convicted of only one of the class B felonies, he risked the imposition of an
unsuspended prison sentence far greater than the six-year sentence imposed by the
Superior Court under the plea agreement. Under these circumstances, as reflected
in the record, Fields cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome
of his case would have been better for him if he had gone to trial rather than enter
into the plea agreement. We therefore conclude, as did the Superior Court, that the
9
R. 61(i)(3) (“Any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the
judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred, unless the
movant shows (A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and (B) Prejudice from violation
of the movant’s rights.”).
10
Cook v. State, 2000 WL 1177695 (Del. Aug. 14, 2000) (citing Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552,
556 (1990)).
11
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-60 (Del. 1988).
5
ineffective counsel claim is without merit and cannot serve as “cause” to avoid the
procedural bar under Rule 61(i)(3).
(12) To the extent Fields argues stand-alone claims of illegal search and
seizure, inadequate Miranda warnings, and prosecutorial misconduct, those claims
are waived by the guilty plea. Fields could have raised the claims at trial if he had
gone to trial, but he did not. Instead, he chose, for good reason, to enter into the plea
agreement. It is well-settled that a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea
waives a defendant’s right to challenge any errors occurring before the entry of the
plea.12
(13) In this case, having reviewed the transcript of the guilty plea
proceeding, the Court has no doubt but that Fields’ guilty plea was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. The Superior Court’s colloquy with Fields was thoughtful
and thorough. The court made sure that Fields understood the charges against him
and what the guilty plea would mean for him. Fields expressed no reservation
whatsoever when entering into the plea agreement. He indicated he understood that
he was waiving certain trial rights by pleading guilty, including his right to pursue
suppression of the evidence. He also indicated that no one had coerced him into
entering into the plea, and he expressed satisfaction with his counsel’s
12
Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004) (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258,
266–67 (1973) (reaffirming the principle that “a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of
events which has preceded it in the criminal process.”))).
6
representation. Fields acknowledged that he was pleading guilty to Drug Dealing in
Heroin because he was, in fact, guilty of Drug Dealing in Heroin, and when he was
asked by the court if he had anything to say before sentence was imposed, Fields
stated, “I just would like to apologize . . . and accept full responsibility for my
actions.”13 Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Fields is bound by
his sworn representations during the guilty plea colloquy.14
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
13
Hr’g Tr. at 10 (Oct. 19, 2015).
14
Palmer v. State, 2002 WL 31546531 (Del. Nov. 13, 2002) (citing Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d
629, 632 (Del. 1997)).
7