16-1284
Jacobo-Melendres v. Sessions
BIA
Straus, IJ
A205 412 174
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 17th day of October , two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 DENNY CHIN,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 GILDA JACOBO-MELENDRES,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 16-1284
17 NAC
18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Jon E. Jessen, Stamford, CT.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
26 Attorney General; Keith I. McManus,
27 Assistant Director; Jessica E.
28 Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel,
29 Office of Immigration Litigation,
30 United States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
4 DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
5 Petitioner Gilda Jacobo-Melendres, a native and citizen of
6 Guatemala, seeks review of a March 24, 2016 decision of the BIA
7 affirming a September 29, 2014 decision of an Immigration Judge
8 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
9 the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Gilda
10 Jacobo-Melendres, No. A205 412 174 (B.I.A. Mar. 24, 2016), aff’g
11 No. A205 412 174 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Sept. 29, 2014). We
12 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
13 procedural history in this case.
14 We have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by
15 the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.
16 2005). The applicable standards of review are well
17 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
18 Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). The agency did not
19 err in finding that Jacobo-Melendres failed to satisfy her
20 burden of proof for asylum and withholding of removal, but it
21 did err by failing to fully consider evidence material to her
22 CAT claim.
2
1 Asylum and Withholding of Removal
2 In order to demonstrate eligibility for asylum and
3 withholding of removal, “the applicant must establish that
4 race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
5 group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central
6 reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C.
7 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Matter of
8 C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010). To constitute
9 a particular social group, a group must be: “(1) composed of
10 members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2)
11 defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within
12 the society in question.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
13 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); see also Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509
14 F.3d 70, 72-74 (2d Cir. 2007)(per curiam). The agency did not
15 err in finding that Jacobo-Melendres’s proposed social group
16 of “unmarried Guatemalan young women who refuse to be the
17 victims of gang stalking and harassment and to enter into a
18 forced relationship with gang members” was not cognizable.
19 Pet’r’s Br., Addendum at 3.
20 Jacobo-Melendres failed to demonstrate that her proposed
21 group was socially distinct in Guatemalan society. The country
22 conditions evidence discusses widespread violence against
3
1 women in Guatemala, but it does not mention that unmarried women
2 who refuse the advances of gang members are perceived as a
3 distinct social group in society or are at greater risk than
4 anyone who refuses to comply with a gang member’s criminal
5 demands. See Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73 (“When the harm
6 visited upon members of a group is attributable to the
7 incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to
8 persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering those
9 people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the
10 INA.”); Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74-75 (BIA
11 2007) (holding that the group of “wealthy Guatemalans” failed
12 the social distinction requirement because it would not be
13 recognized as a group at a greater risk of crime, extortion,
14 or robbery). Moreover, Jacobo-Melendres testified that she
15 was harassed, stalked, and attacked because a gang member was
16 interested in having a relationship with her, but she did not
17 assert that he or anyone else targeted her based on her
18 membership in a group of similarly situated individuals who had
19 refused the advances of gang members. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26
20 I. & N. Dec. at 232 (“[A] ‘particular social group’ cannot be
21 defined exclusively by the claimed persecution, . . . it must
22 be ‘recognizable’ as a discrete group by others in the society,
4
1 and . . . it must have well-defined boundaries.”).
2 Nor did Jacobo-Melendres establish that she was targeted
3 on account of an imputed anti-gang political opinion. To
4 demonstrate that persecution or a well-founded fear of
5 persecution is on account of an applicant’s political opinion,
6 the applicant must “show, through direct or circumstantial
7 evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from
8 the applicant’s political belief,” rather than merely by the
9 persecutor’s opinion. Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540,
10 545 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). The persecution may be
11 on account of an opinion imputed to the applicant by the
12 persecutor, regardless of whether or not this imputation is
13 accurate. See Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir.
14 2005). Jacobo-Melendres did not assert a political opinion
15 claim in her asylum application, and she testified that the gang
16 member targeted her based solely on his interest in having a
17 relationship with her. Without any direct or circumstantial
18 evidence to support a claim that she was targeted or would be
19 targeted her on account of her political opinion, imputed or
20 otherwise, the BIA did not err in finding that she failed to
21 establish her eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal
22 on that ground. See Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545.
5
1 Accordingly, because Jacobo-Melendres failed to establish
2 that her past harm or fear of future harm were on account of
3 a protected ground as required for asylum and withholding of
4 removal, we deny the petition for review to this extent. See
5 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A).
6 Convention Against Torture
7 To receive withholding or deferral of removal under the
8 CAT, an applicant must “establish that it is more likely than
9 not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed
10 country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Unlike asylum
11 and withholding of removal, CAT relief does not require a nexus
12 to any ground. See id. “Torture is defined as any act by which
13 severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
14 intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by or . . . with the
15 consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
16 acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see
17 Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2007);
18 Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004)
19 (“[T]orture requires only that government officials know of or
20 remain willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach their
21 legal responsibility to prevent it.”).
22 The agency provided insufficient analysis for its
6
1 conclusion that Jacobo-Melendres failed to demonstrate a
2 likelihood of torture or that Guatemalan officials would
3 acquiesce in her torture. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d
4 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “we require a certain
5 minimum level of analysis from the IJ and BIA opinions . . .,
6 and indeed must require such if judicial review is to be
7 meaningful”). In assessing whether an applicant has satisfied
8 her burden of proof, the agency must consider all evidence
9 relevant to the possibility of future torture, including
10 evidence of past torture, “[e]vidence that the applicant could
11 relocate to a part of the country of removal where . . . she
12 is not likely to be tortured, . . . [e]vidence of gross, flagrant
13 or mass violations of human rights within the country of
14 removal,” and other relevant information on country conditions.
15 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).
16 In the context of denying CAT relief, the agency failed to
17 analyze any of the material evidence. That evidence included
18 the following: Jacobo-Melendres’s testimony that a gang member
19 in Guatemala stalked and harassed her almost daily for four
20 months and attempted to kidnap her on one occasion in 2012; her
21 testimony that the gang member continues to call her cell phone
22 (which she left with her mother in Guatemala); her testimony
7
1 that she did not trust the police to help her; letters from her
2 mother, sister, and sister’s father-in-law corroborating her
3 claim; and country reports reflecting that rape, sexual
4 offenses, and femicide are serious problems in Guatemala and
5 that impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes remains
6 extremely high because police are not equipped to investigate
7 or assist victims. Given the agency’s failure to explain its
8 CAT ruling or analyze any of this evidence, we grant the petition
9 to this extent and remand for further consideration of the CAT
10 claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c); see also Poradisova, 420
11 F.3d at 77.
12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
13 DENIED in part and GRANTED in part and REMANDED for further
14 proceedings consistent with this order. As we have completed
15 our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously
16 granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for
17 a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any
18 pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED
19 in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
20 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
21 FOR THE COURT:
22 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
8