[J-12-2017] [MO: Baer, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C.D., A MINOR : No. 34 MAP 2016
:
: Appeal from the Order of the Superior
APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF : Court at No. 999 MDA 2014 dated
PENNSYLVANIA : September 11, 2015 Affirming the Order
: of the York County Court of Common
: Pleas at No(s). CP-67-JV-0000720-
: 2012 and CP-67-DP-0000166-2013
: dated May 12, 2014.
:
: ARGUED: March 8, 2017
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: October 18, 2017
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s position that it is an appropriate exercise
of a juvenile court’s discretion to terminate its delinquency supervision over a juvenile in
order to circumvent an admission criterion of a treatment center. I recognize this case
involved a fact-specific determination by the juvenile court, and I have no doubt that the
court had D.C.D.’s best interests in mind. I further agree with the Majority that when
assessing whether early termination should be granted pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. 632, a
juvenile court must consider the three aims of balanced and restorative justice that are
referenced in the Juvenile Act’s purpose. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(2). Nevertheless, I
conclude the termination of delinquency supervision for the sole purpose of bypassing
the conditions of acceptance into a program amounts to reversible error.
In its order and opinion granting early termination, the juvenile court considered
that the York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (CYF), was the lead
agency directing D.C.D.’s placement, rather than Juvenile Probation, and “anticipated
that the agency can continue to effectively supervise his treatment and ensure he is
appropriately placed in a facility that meets his needs and continues to rehabilitate him.”
Trial Ct. Op., 5/12/14, at 9-10. Likewise, the Superior Court acknowledged termination
removed Juvenile Probation from supervising D.C.D., but noted D.C.D. would still be
supervised by the court and CYF. See In re D.C.D., 124 A.3d 736, 744 (Pa. Super.
2015), appeal granted, 134 A.3d 50 (Pa. 2016). However, in my view, wholly divesting
Juvenile Probation of its authority and duty to supervise and provide input regarding
D.C.D.’s treatment is judicial overreach. Although Juvenile Probation was not the lead
agency, it nonetheless exercised concurrent supervision of D.C.D. and opposed the
motion to terminate delinquency. Indeed, the record confirms that despite the fact that
Juvenile Probation was not the lead agency, it was closely involved in the case and
made a number of referrals to different treatment centers after it was determined that
D.C.D. continued to act out sexually while at Sarah Reed and that it was no longer an
appropriate placement. See, e.g., N.T., 5/9/14, at 45-55 (testimony of Janna Emig of
CYF); accord 42 Pa.C.S. § 6304 (defining the duties of probation officers in juvenile
matters including making recommendations to the court and supervising and assisting a
child on probation). D.C.D.’s probation officer testified regarding his opposition to early
termination as follows:
As a juvenile probation officer, with the charges that [D.C.D.]
has before the [c]ourt, we wouldn’t terminate jurisdiction at
this time. I believe he needs, like Ms. Emig said, dual
adjudication, and he needs dependency, but we have a
couple of sex offense charges, that I don’t believe my
department would recommend discharging the adjudication
at this time.
Id. at 96.
It is clear that under the Juvenile Act, an adjudication of delinquency requires the
juvenile court to determine both that the child has committed a delinquent act and that
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the child is in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation. Commonwealth v. M.W.,
39 A.3d 958, 966 (Pa. 2012). Despite the authority of a juvenile court to terminate
supervision early, under Pa.R.J.C.P. 632, it is my view that when a child is adjudged to
have committed delinquent acts, here indecent assault against his five-year-old sister
and harassment by communication, has continued to violate the terms of his
supervision by acting out in sexually inappropriate and dangerous ways, and has been
found to be in need of treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation, compelling reasons
exist for continued delinquency supervision of the child. Moreover, unlike the courts
below, I have serious reservations that D.C.D.’s status as a dependent child guarantees
the aims of delinquency supervision will be satisfied or monitored. Although
dependency and delinquency may exist simultaneously, they are distinct adjudications.
In Pennsylvania a dependent child is one who, among other
things, is without proper parental care or control, or has been
abandoned by his parents or is without parents. On the
other hand, a delinquent child is one who is ten years of age
or over who has committed an act designated a crime, other
than murder and certain summary offenses. . . . It would be
unrealistic in the extreme to equate a dependent child with
one adjudicated delinquent. A delinquent child has
committed “a delinquent act” which is defined in the Juvenile
Act as an “act designated a crime under the law of this
Commonwealth, or of another state if the act occurred in that
state, or under a Federal law, or under local ordinances.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 6302. This must be compared with a dependent
child who most often has committed no offense and is
frequently a victim of the wrongdoing of someone else, or is
suffering because of events which are completely beyond his
control.
Matter of Welsh, 475 A.2d 123, 126–27 (Pa. Super. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
Based on the serious offenses D.C.D. has been adjudicated delinquent of, and
the subsequent concerns about his progress with respect to personal boundaries and
appropriate behavior, I cannot agree that terminating Juvenile Probation’s supervision to
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accommodate acceptance into a treatment program, which prohibits individuals who
have active adjudications of delinquency for sexually-based delinquent acts, is
appropriate. D.C.D. should remain under Juvenile Probation’s continued supervision as
he is indisputably in need of rehabilitation, supervision, and treatment. Accordingly, I
would reverse the order of the Superior Court. I respectfully dissent.
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