Jarvis v. United States

claim In the Um'ted States Court of Federal Claims No. l7-762C Filed October 18, 2017 NOT FOR PUBLICATION F| LED ) UCT 1 8 2017 DEREK N. JARVIS, ) U.s. coum OF ) FEDERAL CLA|MS Plaintiff, ) ) Pro Se; Rule 12(b)(l); Subject-Matter v. ) Jurisdiction; fn Forma Pauperis. ) THE UNITED STATES, ) ) Defendant. ) ) Derek N. Jarvi`s, Silver Spring, MD, plaintiff pro se. Delisa M. Sarzchez, Trial Attorney, Tara K. Hogan, Assistant Director, Robert E. K:`r.s'chman, Jr., Director, and Chac'lA. Reader, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Comrnercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant MEMORANDUM OI’INION AND ORDER GRIGGSBY, ludge I. INTRODUCTION ln this matter, plaintiff pro se, Derek N. Jarvis, challenges the United States District Court for the District of Maryland’s dispositions of several civil actions that plaintiff has filed before that court. See generally Compl. Speciflcally, plaintiff alleges that the actions of the district court violated, among other things, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 18 U.S.C. §§ 214-242; and 28 U.S.C. § 453. Compl. at im 4, 5, 31. The government has moved to dismiss this matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule lZ(b)(l) of the Rules of the United States Court of F ederal Claims (“RCFC”). See generally Def. Mot. Plaintiff has also moved to proceed in this matter iri forma paigperi.s'l See generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed fn Forma Pauperis. F or the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the government’s motion to dismiss and GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGR()UNDl A. F actual Background Plaintiff commenced this action on June 6, 2017. See generally Compl. Plaintiffs complaint is difficult to follow. But, it appears that the gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is a challenge of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland’s dispositions of several civil actions that plaintiff has filed before that court See generally Compl. As background, plaintiff has collectively filed approximately 36 cases in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the United States District Court for the District of l\/laryland since 2009. Def. l\/lot. at l. Approximately 17 of these matter have been filed by plaintiff in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. lal. ln the complaint, plaintiff alleges that several district judges for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and other district court personnel have “fraudulently denied [hirn] access to impartial justice as demonstrated in the order(s) in every one of plaintiffs cases.” Coinpl. at il l{). Plaintiff also alleges that the district court judges have routinely dismissed his cases, in violation of plaintiffs due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Compl. at 1{1[ 4-5, lS, 39~40. ln this regard, plaintiff contends that he vvas denied the right to proceed to the discovery phases of his litigation, and to trial, in many of these cases. Cornpl. at jill 27, 31, 78. And so, plaintiff contends that the judges presiding over those matters prejudiced him by allowing the defendants to “conceal evidence,” thereby depriving plaintiff of his civil rights Compl. at M 31, 52, 61, 76. As relief, plaintiff requests that the Couit: l) Appoint a Grand Jury and prosecutor to investigate RICO violations against the l\/laryland Court, 2) VOID all order(s) issued by the Court in Maiyland by the district court judges, 3) submit this brief to the U.S. Attorney‘s Ofl`ice for investigation and the DOJ, and 4) VOlD all ‘ The facts recited in this Mernorandum Opinion and Order are taken from plaintiffs complaint and the exhibits attached thereto (“Compl.”); the government’s motion to dismiss (“Def. l\/lot.”); plaintiffs opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss (“Pl. Resp.); the government’s reply in support of its motion to dismiss (“Def. chly”) and plaintiffs sur-reply (Pl. Sur.”). Except where otherwise noted, the facts recited herein are undisputed order(s) by the Corrupt federal judges in l\/laryland as the order(s) are Nullities, and were not based upon federal law. Compl. at il 80. B. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter on lone 6, 2017. See generally Compl. On .lune 6, 2017, plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis See generally Pl. Mot. to Proceed ln Forina Panperis. On August 7, 2017, the government filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)( l). See generally Def. l\/Iot. On August 23, 2017, plaintiff filed a response and opposition to the government’s motion to dismiss. See generally Pl. Resp. On September 5, 2017, the government filed a reply in support of its motion to dismiss See generally Def. Reply. On September l3, 20l'l, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply and a sur-reply. See generally Sur. Reply. On September lS, 2017, the Court granted plaintiffs motion for leave. See generally Order granting motion for leave. These matters having been fully briefed, the Court addresses the pending motions. III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Pro Se Litigants Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter pro se, without the benefit of counsel And so, the Court applies the pleadings requirements leniently. Berioni‘ v. GTE Lal)s., lnc., 535 F. App’x 919, 925-26 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing MeZea.l v. Sprinl Nexiel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, l356 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). When determining Whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, this Court affords more leeway under the rules to pro se plaintiffs than plaintiffs Who are represented by counsel See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 5 l9, 520 (1972) (holding that pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Maithews v. Unired Siaies, 750 F.3d l320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). But, there “is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which lthe plaintiffl has not spelled out in his pleadings.” Lengen v_ Unirecl Siaies, 100 Fedi Cl. 317, 328 (20l l) (brackets existing', internal quotation omitted). ln addition, while “a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, . . . the pro se plaintiff, nevettheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Riles v. Unilea’ States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (eiting Taylor v. Uniiecl Sra)‘es, 303 F.3d 1357, l359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). And so, the Court may excuse ambiguities, but not defects, in the complaint. Coll)ert v. Unitecl Srales, No. 20l4-5029, 20l5 WL 2343578, at *l (Fed. Cir. May l8, 2015); see also Denies v. Uniteal Stales, 52 Fed. Cl. 365, 368 (2002) (“[T]he leniency afforded pro se litigants with respect to mere formalities does not relieve them of jurisdictional requirements.”) (citation omitted). B. Jurisdiction And RCFC lZ(b)(l) lt is well-established that this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction must be established before the Court addresses the merits of a claim. Plains Coinrn. Bank v. Long Faniily Lancl & Catrle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 (2008) (citing Steel Co. v. Cilizensfor a Beiter Env’l, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1998) (stating that subject-matter jurisdiction is “a threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”)). When deciding a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the Court does not possess subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC l2(b)(l), this Court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Eriekson. v. Parclus, 55l U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also RCFC lZ(b)(l). But, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, and he must do so by a preponderance of the evidencel Reynola's v. Arniy & Air Foree Excli. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. l988) (citation omitted). And so, should the Court determine that “it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, it must dismiss the claim.” lanham v. anna scales 72 rea er 274, 273 (2006) nitng acre iz(h)(s)). ln this regard, the United States Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction and “possess[es] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v. Giiarclian Life lns. Co. of Ani., 51l U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The Tucl