Supreme Court of Louisiana
FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #050
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 18th day of October, 2017, are as follows:
PER CURIAM:
2017-B -0874 IN RE: C. MIGNONNE GRIFFING
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing
committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record,
briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that C. Mignonne
Griffing, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19601, be and she hereby is
suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. It
is further ordered that all but six months of the suspension
shall be deferred. Following the active portion of the
suspension, respondent shall be placed on unsupervised probation
for one year, subject to the conditions set forth in this
opinion. The probationary period shall commence from the date
respondent and the ODC execute a formal probation plan. Any
failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of probation,
or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds
for making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or
imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and
expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal
interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of
this court’s judgment until paid.
Retired Judge Hillary Crain assigned as Justice ad hoc, sitting
for Clark, J., recused.
JOHNSON, C.J., concurs in discipline assigned.
GUIDRY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
10/18/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2017-B-0874
IN RE: C. MIGNONNE GRIFFING
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
PER CURIAM *
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, C. Mignonne Griffing, an
attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDERLYING FACTS
Since 1990, respondent has been employed as an Assistant United States
Attorney (“AUSA”) for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division. At
all times relevant herein, respondent was primarily assigned to prosecute white collar
and public corruption cases.
During the course of her employment as an AUSA, respondent began and
maintained what the formal charges describe as an “intimate, romantic relationship”
with a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). 1 The FBI agent
was typically the lead investigating law enforcement agent on many of the criminal
prosecutions advanced by respondent. While his testimony at trial was not
consistently required, the FBI agent was often the principal witness in grand jury
*
Retired Judge Hillary Crain, assigned as Justice Ad Hoc, sitting for Clark, J., recused.
1
The hearing committee and disciplinary board reports do not contain much detail about the nature
of respondent’s relationship with the agent, who was married at the time. The agent is referred to
in the formal charges, and occasionally throughout the record, by his initials; however, in this
opinion he is simply referred to as “the FBI agent.”
presentations and at various hearings where respondent sponsored his testimony on
behalf of the prosecution. Respondent and the FBI agent worked to keep their
relationship confidential.
Counts I & II
Respondent, on behalf of her client the United States Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), initiated the prosecution of Monroe councilmen Robert “Red” Stevens and
Arthur Gilmore (Count I) and Ouachita Parish Sheriff Royce Toney (Count II). The
FBI agent was the lead investigative agent in both matters. At no time during either
prosecution did respondent disclose to the United States Attorney or the defendants
that the investigations were performed by the FBI agent, whose testimony she
sponsored. Respondent’s relationship with the FBI agent created a conflict or
potential conflict of interest which she was ethically bound to disclose to the United
States Attorney, but which she failed to do. Because the relationship with the FBI
agent could reasonably give rise to a basis for questioning the interest and/or
credibility of the witness by the defense, the existence of the relationship should
have been disclosed to the defendants, but respondent failed to do so.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.7 (a lawyer shall
not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest),
3.8(d) (the prosecutor in a criminal case shall make timely disclosure to the defense
of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigates the offense, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal), and 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
2
Count III
In connection with respondent’s prosecution of Sheriff Toney, as set forth in
Count II, the defendant’s attorney, A.M. “Marty” Stroud, III, was assured by
respondent that his client would not be indicted during the month of February, and
held the belief that his client, if indicted, would be allowed to self-surrender. Mr.
Stroud related respondent’s assurances to his client. Nevertheless, when respondent
learned that Sheriff Toney was believed to be “spreading rumors” regarding her
relationship with the FBI agent she called Mr. Stroud and threatened to have Sheriff
Toney arrested, handcuffed, and “perp walked” out of the Sheriff’s Office if he did
not refrain from spreading such rumors. Subsequently, Sheriff Toney was indicted
in February and was arrested, handcuffed, and led out of his office by law
enforcement, resulting in his termination of Mr. Stroud’s representation.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(d)
(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Count IV
During the course of the prosecutions described in Counts I and II, the United
States Attorney for the Western District of Louisiana was informed of the allegations
regarding respondent’s relationship with the FBI agent. Upon questioning by the
United States Attorney, respondent falsely denied and/or misled the United States
Attorney regarding the relationship.
The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct violated Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(c)
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
3
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In March 2013, Sheriff Toney filed a complaint against respondent with the
ODC. In March 2016, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent as set forth
above. Respondent answered the formal charges and admitted she had a personal
relationship with the FBI agent. She further admitted she had an obligation to
disclose the relationship to the United States Attorney and to the defendants;
however, she denied the relationship created a conflict of interest. Respondent
denied any misconduct relating to the allegations in Count III of the formal charges.
Formal Hearing
This matter proceeded to a formal hearing conducted by the hearing
committee on July 7-8 and September 27, 2016. The ODC called Mr. Stroud, Sheriff
Toney, and First Assistant United States Attorney Alexander Van Hook to testify
before the committee. Respondent called numerous character witnesses to testify
before the committee. She also testified on her own behalf and on cross-examination
by the ODC.
Prior to the hearing, the parties entered into factual stipulations, including the
following:
1. While employed as an AUSA, respondent and the FBI agent commenced and
maintained a personal, intimate relationship. There is no evidence to indicate
that the FBI agent’s testimony was anything other than truthful and supported
by the evidence, nor any evidence that it was influenced or colored in any way
by their personal relationship. Respondent and the FBI agent made an effort
to keep their relationship confidential because the FBI agent was married.
2. On behalf of the United States Attorney’s Office, respondent initiated the
prosecution of two Monroe city councilmen, Robert “Red” Stevens and
Arthur Gilmore. The FBI agent was the lead investigative agent. Although
4
the FBI agent was a witness before the grand jury and at trial, respondent did
not disclose the existence of the relationship to either her supervisors or the
defendants. Respondent acknowledges that the relationship could reasonably
have given rise to a basis for questioning the interest and/or credibility of the
FBI agent by the defendants and should have been disclosed.
3. On behalf of the United States Attorney’s Office, respondent initiated the
prosecution of Ouachita Parish Sheriff Royce Toney. The FBI agent was the
lead investigative agent. Although the FBI agent was a witness before the
grand jury and at a pre-trial hearing, respondent did not disclose the existence
of the relationship to either her supervisors or the defendant. Respondent
acknowledges that the relationship could reasonably have given rise to a basis
for questioning the interest and/or credibility of the FBI agent by the defendant
and should have been disclosed.
4. In connection with the prosecution of Sheriff Toney, respondent advised the
sheriff’s counsel, Mr. Stroud, that the sheriff would not be indicted in
February 2012 because that is what she had been told by her supervisors. The
next day, respondent was advised by her supervisors to present the Toney case
to the February grand jury. Though respondent told her supervisors of the
assurances she had given Mr. Stroud, respondent was instructed to proceed
with the case to the February grand jury. She was instructed that she was not
to tell Mr. Stroud until Sheriff Toney was arrested. To that end, respondent
wrote a letter to Mr. Stroud that she had hand delivered to him following
Sheriff Toney’s arrest. Sheriff Toney’s arrest was authorized by management
of the United States Attorney’s Office and executed by the FBI. Sheriff Toney
was arrested in the same place and in the same manner as his co-defendant
and subordinate who had been arrested several months earlier.
5
5. In June 2012, four months after Sheriff Toney’s indictment, Mr. Stroud
advised the United States Attorney’s Office that he believed respondent and
the FBI agent had an inappropriate relationship. When questioned by the
United States Attorney, respondent was not immediately and fully
forthcoming. Shortly thereafter, respondent advised the First Assistant of the
exact nature of the relationship.
6. The DOJ has completed its investigation into respondent’s conduct. In
accordance with DOJ policies, respondent was suspended without pay for
nineteen days. Respondent has already served this suspension. Respondent
has returned to her employment and is actively engaged as an appellate
attorney.
Hearing Committee Report
After considering the testimony and the other evidence in the record, the
committee made the following findings:
Sheriff Toney’s original defense counsel, Mr. Stroud, testified that when he
was retained by Toney, he had a telephone conference with respondent in which he
stated that he wanted Sheriff Toney to be able to appear by citation versus being
arrested. Mr. Stroud testified that he received assurances from respondent that
Sheriff Toney would be able to surrender by citation. Mr. Stroud further testified
that he had had similar conversations with respondent in the past and that those
assurances in those prior matters had been honored. The committee found Mr.
Stroud’s testimony credible despite the fact that respondent testified she never
committed to self-surrender and would not have done so because she knew she
would not be the person making the decision as to self-surrender versus arrest.
There was another exchange between respondent and Mr. Stroud, via e-mail,
in which respondent committed to Mr. Stroud that Sheriff Toney would not be
6
indicted in February 2012. Respondent admits that commitment. The committee
concluded that respondent did not voluntarily break her commitment. According to
the testimony of Mr. Van Hook, the decision was made to proceed with a February
indictment based on certain acts by Sheriff Toney which were intended to intimidate
witnesses or otherwise obstruct the government’s investigation. Respondent was
ordered not to communicate to Mr. Stroud that, in fact, the indictment would be
occurring in February.
There was yet another telephone conversation that occurred between
respondent and Mr. Stroud. A call was made by respondent to Mr. Stroud during
which respondent advised Mr. Stroud that if Sheriff Toney did not stop spreading
rumors about her relationship with the FBI agent, she was going to have Sheriff
Toney arrested. Respondent testified that she was trying to deliver the message that
Sheriff Toney must stop trying to intimidate witnesses and obstruct the
government’s investigation. In her sworn statement, respondent testified that when
she had this telephone conversation with Mr. Stroud, she already knew that Sheriff
Toney was endeavoring to affect the outcome of the investigation by threats and
harassment. She further stated that she used her relationship with the FBI agent as
an “example” of Sheriff Toney’s misconduct. She stated that she was trying to
protect her witness (an employee of Sheriff Toney) and her witness’ husband and
therefore did not mention their names or the specific actions of Sheriff Toney
because he was not aware the witness was cooperating. However, the fact remains
that the only topic that respondent mentioned in her telephone conference with Mr.
Stroud was the issue of Sheriff Toney’s spreading rumors about her relationship with
the FBI agent. Respondent admits that she should not have made the call to Mr.
Stroud.
Mr. Stroud testified that respondent further told him that if Sheriff Toney did
not stop spreading rumors about her and the FBI agent, she would not only have
7
Sheriff Toney arrested, but that he would be “handcuffed and perp walked out of the
Sheriff’s Office.” Respondent denies that she made such threats, stating that it is
totally up to the FBI as to the method of arrest employed. The committee found Mr.
Stroud’s version of the conversation credible. The committee agreed with Mr. Van
Hook that respondent’s call to Mr. Stroud was an abuse of prosecutorial power and
involved conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice.
The committee further found clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s
actions caused the respect and confidence due the office of the United States
Attorney for the Western District to suffer in the Monroe, Louisiana area.
Finally, the committee found that the decision to indict Sheriff Toney in
February 2012 and to arrest him resulted in loss of business and damage to the
professional reputation of Mr. Stroud.
Based on these findings, the committee determined that respondent violated
Rules 1.7(a)(2), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
committee did not mention any of the other rule violations alleged in the formal
charges.
The committee found the following aggravating factors present: a dishonest
or selfish motive, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law
(admitted 1989). The committee found the following mitigating factors present:
absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary
board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, character or reputation, and
imposition of other penalties or sanctions.
The committee did not specifically discuss the duties violated by respondent,
her mental state, or the harm caused by her misconduct, nor did it identify the
applicable baseline discipline. However, the committee did cite Standards 4.32 and
6.32 of the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Standard 4.32
provides suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of
8
interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and
causes injury or potential injury to a client. Standard 6.32 provides that suspension
is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in communication with an individual
in the legal system when the lawyer knows that such communication is improper,
and causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal
proceeding. The committee also cited In re: Jordan, 04-2397 (La. 6/29/05), 913 So.
2d 775, in which this court held that a prosecutor is “charged with a high ethical
standard [and] entrusted with upholding the integrity of the criminal justice system
by ensuring that justice is served for both the victims of crimes and the accused. …
Any intentional deviation from the principle of the fair administration of justice will
be dealt with harshly by this Court.”
Considering the foregoing, the committee recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six months, followed by a one-year period of
probation during which she should be required to obtain twenty hours of continuing
legal education (“CLE”) in ethics and twenty hours in professionalism, for a total of
forty hours, by the end of 2017.
Post-Hearing
Following the issuance of the hearing committee’s report, the ODC filed an
objection to the committee’s failure to address the applicability of Rule 3.8(d) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. The ODC also urged that the board revisit the
sanction recommended by the committee. Respondent likewise objected to the
report, contending that the committee failed to apply a clear and convincing standard
in weighing the evidence, erred in its factual conclusions in two instances, and
recommended a sanction that was too harsh.
On February 7, 2016, prior to any consideration of this matter by the
disciplinary board, the ODC and respondent filed a pleading captioned “Joint
9
Stipulations and Memorandum by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and
Respondent.” In this pleading, the parties agreed that respondent violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct as charged. The parties also agreed that the appropriate
sanction in this matter is a suspension of one year and one day, with all but six
months deferred, subject to a one-year period of unsupervised probation with
conditions, including the CLE obligations proposed by the hearing committee.
Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s
findings of fact are supported by the evidence and are not manifestly erroneous. The
parties stipulated to many of the facts prior to the hearing. Effect must be given to
these stipulations unless they are withdrawn. In re: Torry, 10-0837 (La. 10/19/10),
48 So. 3d 1038. To the extent that additional facts, not stipulated, were found by the
committee, the board adopted these facts as supported by the record. In addition to
the factual allegations, after the hearing the parties stipulated that respondent
violated Rules 1.7, 3.8(d), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). Likewise, these stipulations
must be given effect. Id.
The board determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to her
client, the public, and the legal system. Her assurances to Mr. Stroud relative to his
client’s indictment and arrest, and her phone call threatening the public arrest of
Sheriff Toney, were improper. These communications harmed the relationship
between Mr. Stroud and his client. Respondent’s personal interest in keeping quiet
her relationship with the FBI agent deprived her client, the United States through her
superiors, of information they needed to make informed decisions relative to the
representation of the government and disclosure obligations to defendants. Her
misconduct led to the government’s decision to relitigate the case against
Councilmen Stevens and Gilmore, caused harm in the form of the additional
10
expenditure of resources to retry the case, and adversely impacted the government’s
tendered plea bargain offered to Sheriff Toney. The potential for harm also exists,
as it is possible that the issue of the relationship may be raised in other cases
prosecuted by respondent in which the FBI agent testified. Furthermore, her actions
are the type that cause unfavorable opinion by the public towards the legal system
and especially, the United States Attorney’s Office in the Western District of
Louisiana. The applicable baseline sanction in this matter is suspension.
The board agreed with the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the
committee. Additionally, the board found remorse to be a mitigating factor. The
board found the mitigating factors in this case far outweigh the aggravating factors,
particularly the factors of character and reputation, imposition of other penalties or
sanctions, and remorse.
The board then turned to an analysis of this court’s prior jurisprudence. The
board acknowledged that there is no Louisiana case law which directly addresses an
intimate relationship between a government prosecutor and a law enforcement agent
called as a witness. Instead, the board relied upon cases involving assistant district
attorneys who received fully deferred suspensions with probation for engaging in
conflicts of interest and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in their
civil practices. See In re: Caillouet, 01-2461 (La. 11/9/01), 800 So. 2d 367, and In
re: Toups, 00-0634 (La. 11/28/00), 773 So. 2d 709. The board also cited In re:
Ruffin, 10-2544 (La. 1/14/11), 54 So. 3d 645, as an example of a prosecutor who
used her position to threaten someone in order to further a personal interest. In that
case, an individual had written a bad check to a friend of Ruffin’s and owed the
friend money. Ruffin threatened the individual with arrest and prosecution. For this
misconduct, balanced by the mitigating factors present, the court imposed a six-
month suspension, with all but thirty days deferred. Finally, the sole reported
Louisiana case addressing a violation of Rule 3.8(d) is In re: Jordan, 04-2397 (La.
11
6/29/05), 913 So. 2d 775, in which the prosecutor was suspended for three months,
fully deferred, subject to a one-year period of probation for failing to disclose
exculpatory evidence in violation of Rule 3.8(d).
Considering these cases, and the numerous mitigating factors present in this
matter, the board concluded that the appropriate sanction is a six-month suspension,
fully deferred subject to a one-year period of probation during which respondent
must obtain an additional ten hours each of continuing legal education in the areas
of ethics and professionalism. 2 The board further recommended that respondent pay
all costs and expenses of these proceedings.
The ODC filed an objection to the board’s report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).
DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
2
The board acknowledged that respondent and the ODC stipulated to a sanction which would
require respondent to serve an actual period of suspension, but stated that a fully deferred
suspension is consistent with the jurisprudence, and moreover, the board was not bound by the
stipulation in making its sanction recommendation to the court.
12
The underlying facts of this case are largely undisputed. Essentially,
respondent acknowledges that while employed as an AUSA, she commenced and
maintained a personal, intimate relationship with an FBI agent. Although there is
no indication that the agent’s testimony was influenced or colored in any way by
their personal relationship, respondent admits she failed to disclose the relationship
during her prosecution of two Monroe city councilmen and the Ouachita Parish
Sheriff. After the sheriff’s counsel raised the possibility of the relationship,
respondent was questioned by the United States Attorney and was not immediately
and fully forthcoming. In addition, the disciplinary board found respondent made
assurances to the sheriff’s counsel relative to his client’s indictment and arrest. This
conduct, and her phone call threatening the sheriff’s public arrest, were clearly
improper. These communications harmed the relationship between the sheriff and
his counsel. Based on these facts, the parties agree that respondent violated Rules
1.7, 3.8(d), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions.3 In determining
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
3
In the parties’ briefs, there is considerable discussion as to whether respondent is bound by the
stipulated sanction. While we have permitted the parties to enter into stipulations of fact and rule
violations, we question the wisdom of allowing stipulations regarding sanctions in the context of
a formal charge matter. The parties have an adequate procedure to propose sanctions to this court
by filing a joint petition for consent discipline in this court. See Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 20.
In any event, unlike the stipulations of fact and rule violations discussed in In re: Torry, 10-0837
(La. 10/19/10), 48 So. 3d 103, we now hold a stipulation by the parties as to sanctions is not binding
on the hearing committee, the disciplinary board, or this court. Should the parties stipulate to a
sanction in the course of a proceeding based on formal charges, the committee and the board may
consider the stipulated sanction along with the other evidence but are in no way bound to accept it
and remain free to formulate their own recommendation of discipline based on all relevant
considerations.
13
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
We have not previously had the opportunity to address directly the misconduct
of a government prosecutor who maintained an intimate or romantic relationship
with a law enforcement agent called as a witness. However, we have repeatedly held
that public officials – and prosecutors in particular – are held to a higher standard
than ordinary attorneys. See In re: Bankston, 01-2780 (La. 3/8/02), 810 So. 2d 1113
(an attorney occupying a position of public trust is held to even a higher standard of
conduct than an ordinary attorney); In re: Toups, 00-0634 (La. 11/28/00), 773 So.
2d 709 (because the prosecutor is entrusted with great power and discretion in our
system of justice, he is also charged with a high ethical standard). In formulating a
sanction for respondent’s misconduct, some general guidance can be drawn from
cases dealing with conflicts of interest involving romantic entanglements. For
example, the case of In re: Ryland, 08-0273 (La. 6/6/08), 985 So. 2d 71, is
instructive. There the respondent entered into an intimate relationship with a client
during the course of a domestic representation. The respondent was suspended for
ninety days, fully deferred, considering that there was little or no actual harm.
Furthermore, the respondent was not a prosecutor and did not commit any other
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
In a case involving both a conflict of interest as well as deception such as
exists in this instance, the recent case of In re: Bullock, 16-0075 (La. 3/24/16), 187
So. 3d 986, is highly persuasive. The respondent failed to file a petition for damages
within the prescriptive period and then took steps to hide her malpractice from the
client when the duty owed was full disclosure. We determined that this conduct
warranted a suspension for one year and one day, with all but six months deferred.
There are strong parallels here inasmuch as respondent has a clear conflict of interest
under Rule 1.7 that should have been disclosed to the government and to opposing
14
counsel in her pending cases. When the issue did arise, respondent was deceitful
and falsely misrepresented the issue to her employer on not one, but two, separate
occasions.
Respondent acknowledged in her prehearing stipulations that the relationship
she had with the FBI agent could reasonably have given rise to a basis for
questioning the interests and/or credibility of the agent by the defendants and should
have been disclosed. Respondent stipulated prior to board panel argument that this
conduct violated Rule 3.8(d). In In re: Jordan, 04-2397 (La. 6/29/05), 913 So. 2d
775, we imposed a fully deferred three-month suspension upon a prosecutor who
failed to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense in violation of Rule 3.8(d).
Finally, respondent stipulated that she used her position as an AUSA to
threaten a criminal defendant she was prosecuting with arrest within his own office
if he did not refrain from spreading “rumors” regarding her relationship with the FBI
agent. This abuse of her authority as a prosecutor is similar in some respects to In
re: Ruffin, 10-2544 (La. 1/14/11), 54 So. 3d 465. There, Assistant District Attorney
Ruffin used her position to threaten with arrest and prosecution an individual who
had written a bad check to her friend. We determined that the nature of the
misconduct warranted a period of actual suspension and suspended Ruffin for six
months, with all but thirty days deferred.
When taken cumulatively, including the multiple violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and specifically considering respondent’s dishonesty and
misrepresentation to which she has stipulated, we find that the fully deferred
suspension recommended by the board is not appropriate and that respondent must
serve an actual period of suspension. We will impose a one year and one day
suspension, deferring all but six months of the suspension in light of the substantial
mitigating circumstances present. We further order that respondent serve a one-year
period of unsupervised probation, during which she shall obtain an additional forty
15
hours of continuing legal education, with twenty hours each in the areas of ethics
and professionalism.
DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is
ordered that C. Mignonne Griffing, Louisiana Bar Roll number 19601, be and she
hereby is suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. It is further
ordered that all but six months of the suspension shall be deferred. Following the
active portion of the suspension, respondent shall be placed on unsupervised
probation for one year, subject to the conditions set forth in this opinion. The
probationary period shall commence from the date respondent and the ODC execute
a formal probation plan. Any failure of respondent to comply with the conditions of
probation, or any misconduct during the probationary period, may be grounds for
making the deferred portion of the suspension executory, or imposing additional
discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against
respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest
to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.
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10/18/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2017-B-0874
IN RE: C. MIGNONNE GRIFFING
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
JOHNSON, Chief Justice, concurs in the discipline assigned.
1
10/18/17
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2017-B-0874
IN RE: C. MIGNONNE GRIFFING
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Guidry, J., dissents and would suspend the respondent from the practice of law for
a period of six months, fully deferred, subject to a one-year period of probation with
conditions.
In Re: C. Mignonne Griffing
Combined Opinion