Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-11947
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00291-CG-C-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STANLEY AUBREY BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(October 19, 2017)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 2 of 9
Defendant Stanley Baker appeals his 24-month sentence, imposed following
revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Defendant argues that his
sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After careful review, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2016, Defendant pled guilty in the Southern District of Alabama to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced him to 14 months’ imprisonment, followed
by 3 years of supervised release.
Defendant began serving his term of supervised release in the Southern
District of Mississippi on February 3, 2017. Less than two months later, the
probation officer filed a petition with the district court in the Southern District of
Alabama, asserting that Defendant had violated the conditions of his supervised
release.
According to the petition, Defendant had: (1) failed to notify the probation
officer of his change in residence; (2) left the judicial district without permission;
(3) possessed a firearm and ammunition; and (4) committed another felony
offense, namely burglary of a home. In particular, the probation officer alleged
that on or about February 14, 2017, Defendant burglarized the home of a woman
whom he was dating and stole a Ruger 9mm pistol, two televisions, and other
2
Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 3 of 9
electronic items. Defendant was apprehended in Houston, Texas on February 18,
2017, and found in possession of a Ruger 9mm pistol.
At the revocation hearing, the Government presented testimony from the
United States Marshal who arrested Defendant in Texas, as well as the woman
whose home Defendant burglarized. Based on the evidence presented at the
hearing, the district court determined that Defendant had violated the conditions of
his supervised release. The Government recommended that Defendant be
sentenced to the statutory maximum, noting the severity of the violations and
Defendant’s failure to follow court orders. Defendant countered that he had not
been charged with any of the crimes alleged in the petition.
The district court explained that the statutory maximum sentence was
appropriate because Defendant had shown that he could not comply with the
conditions of supervised release. Stating further that the Sentencing Guidelines
provisions governing supervised release violations were not appropriate in this
case, the district court sentenced Defendant to 24 months’ imprisonment. 1
Defendant objected to the sentence as unreasonable. This appeal followed.
1
Because Defendant’s original conviction for drug distribution was a Class C felony, the
statutory maximum sentence that could be imposed upon revocation of supervised release was
two years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
3
Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 4 of 9
II. DISCUSSION
We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir.
2006); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (explaining that we
apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing for reasonableness).
When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first look to whether
the district court committed any significant procedural error, such as
miscalculating the advisory guideline range, treating the Sentencing Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, 2 selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.
United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014). Once we have
determined that the sentence is procedurally reasonable, then we examine whether
the sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances
and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. The party challenging the sentence bears the burden
of showing that it is unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189
(11th Cir. 2008).
2
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
education or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission;
(9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution
to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
4
Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 5 of 9
A district court must revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release and
impose a prison term if the defendant violated his conditions of supervised release
by possessing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(2); United States v. Brown, 224
F.3d 1237, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds as
recognized in United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2014).
In contrast to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which provides for discretionary revocation, the
subsection governing mandatory revocation, § 3583(g), does not require the court
to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Brown, 224 F.3d at 1240–42 (“[W]hen
revocation of supervised release is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), the
statute does not require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.” (emphasis and
quotations omitted)). Section 3583(g) requires only that the term of imprisonment
not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment permitted under § 3583(e), which
in the present case is two years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)
(providing that where the offense that led to the initial term of supervised release is
a Class C felony, the maximum sentence permitted upon revocation of supervised
release is two years’ imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g).
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Defendant argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
district court failed to explain its chosen sentence. He also asserts that the district
5
Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 6 of 9
court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors.3
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), the district court must state in open court the
specific reason for imposing a sentence outside of the guideline range. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)(2); United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 993 (11th Cir. 2016)
(explaining that § 3553(c)(2) applies to sentences imposed upon revocation of
supervised release).4 When sentencing a defendant, the district court “should set
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The district court is
not required to specifically state that it has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors
or discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors, as the district court’s consideration of the
parties’ arguments pertaining to those factors and reference to the § 3553(a) factors
is sufficient. See United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir. 2009) (“It
is sufficient that the district court considers the defendant’s arguments at
sentencing and states that it has taken the § 3553(a) factors into account.”); United
States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that a sentence was
3
Although Defendant asserts that the district court’s failure to consider the § 3553(a) factors
renders his sentence substantively unreasonable, a district court’s failure to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors generally raises a procedural reasonableness argument. See, e.g., United States
v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Procedural unreasonableness includes . . .
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors.”).
4
We review an argument that the district court failed to adequately explain a sentence under
§ 3553(c)(2) de novo, regardless of whether the defendant objected below. See Parks, 823 F.3d
at 995–96.
6
Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 7 of 9
not procedurally unreasonable where the district court failed to explicitly state that
it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, but the record made clear that it had
considered facts relevant to those factors).
Because it appears that Defendant’s revocation was mandatory under
§ 3583(g)(2) based on his violation of supervised release for possession of a
firearm, the district court was not required to consider the § 3553(a) factors. See
Brown, 224 F.3d at 1240–42; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(2). Even assuming the district
court was required to consider these factors, the record indicates that the court
considered those factors and adequately explained its reasons for imposing a 24-
month sentence.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court listened to the parties’ arguments
regarding the appropriate sentence to impose, including Defendant’s argument that
he had not yet been charged with any of the crimes alleged in the revocation
petition, as well as the Government’s recommendation that Defendant receive a
24-month sentence based on the severity of the violations and Defendant’s inability
to comply with court orders. When imposing the 24-month sentence, the district
court stated that the Sentencing Guidelines provisions governing supervised release
(which include the advisory guideline ranges for supervised release violations)
were not appropriate and that the statutory maximum sentence was necessary
because Defendant had shown that he could not comply with the conditions of
7
Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 8 of 9
supervised release. Further, the district court indicated its skepticism that
Defendant would be able to complete another term of supervised release, but
nevertheless imposed a 12-month term of supervised release to help “ease
[Defendant] back into society.”
Although the district court did not specifically mention the § 3553(a) factors,
the record shows that it listened to the parties’ arguments, considered several facts
pertaining to the § 3553(a) factors, and had a reasoned basis for imposing a 24-
month sentence. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356; Dorman, 488 F.3d at 944. Accordingly,
Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the district court committed
procedural error.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Defendant also asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We
disagree.
Defendant’s 24-month sentence was supported by several § 3553(a) factors,
including the nature and circumstances of the offense, Defendant’s history and
characteristics, and the need to deter Defendant from committing future crimes.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2). Again, the district court emphasized that
Defendant had shown that he was unable to comply with the conditions of
supervised release. Indeed, Defendant committed a burglary, possessed a firearm,
and left the judicial district without permission within weeks of being released
8
Case: 17-11947 Date Filed: 10/19/2017 Page: 9 of 9
from custody on his original sentence for drug distribution. That the district court
apparently assigned less weight to Defendant’s mitigating circumstances—such as
his remorsefulness—than it did to other factors was entirely within its discretion.
See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The weight to be
accorded any given § 3553(a) factors is a matter committed to the sound discretion
of the district court.” (quotations omitted)).
Accordingly, Defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
9