FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 20 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10048
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:12-cr-00269-MCE-1
v.
JAMES PRATT, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 18, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, WALLACE, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
James Pratt appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction,
challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic
stop of his vehicle. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of
this case, we need not recount it here.
We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress de novo,
and we review the underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Bynum, 362 F.3d 574, 578 (9th Cir. 2004). Whether officers have reasonable
suspicion to make an investigative traffic stop is a mixed question of law and fact
we review de novo. United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.
2006). We affirm.
I
The district court properly denied Pratt’s suppression motion. Its factual
findings were not clearly erroneous, and it properly concluded that the traffic stop
was founded on reasonable suspicion.
A
The district court did not clearly err in finding Pratt was speeding in a
construction zone. The district court’s findings that the interstate highway was
under construction, had a reduced speed limit, and that Pratt exceeded the speed
limit are supported by the record. The officer’s in-dash video depicted
construction cones closing off one lane of the highway, as well as a Department of
Transportation sign announcing the interstate was under construction. Department
2
of Transportation traffic logs indicated the highway was under construction and
had a reduced speed limit of 55 mph at the time Pratt was pulled over. The
officer’s radar indicated Pratt was driving 65 mph.
B
The traffic stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it was
supported by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1095
(9th Cir. 2000) (“Under the Fourth Amendment, government officials may conduct
an investigatory stop of a vehicle only if they possess “reasonable suspicion . . . .”).
The officer relied on specific observations to determine Pratt violated California
law, which prohibits speeding on any highway under construction or where
Department of Transportation agents are performing road work. Cal. Vehicle Code
§ 22363. Based on his observations, the officer reasonably believed the interstate
was part of a construction zone and Pratt was exceeding the speed limit. Any
mistake as to that belief would be a reasonable mistake of fact given the
circumstances, and a reasonable mistake of fact does not undermine a reasonable
suspicion determination. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
The district court properly determined the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop
Pratt for a traffic violation and did not err in denying Pratt’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
3