J. S63037/17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
PATRICK EUGENE STOKES, : No. 550 WDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, March 7, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No. CP-20-CR-0001224-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2017
Patrick Eugene Stokes appeals from the March 7, 2017 aggregate
judgment of sentence of 21 to 60 months’ imprisonment imposed following
the revocation of his county intermediate punishment (“CIP”) sentence.
After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On June 19, 2016, appellant pled guilty to endangering the welfare of
children, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and the summary
offense of operating a vehicle without the required financial responsibility.1
These convictions arose out of an incident that occurred on December 11,
2015, when appellant fled from police with his three-year-old child in the
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3733(a) and 1786,
respectively.
J. S63037/17
backseat after police attempted to stop him for driving without a valid
inspection sticker. On August 26, 2016, appellant was sentenced to
60 months’ CIP, with the first three months to be served in the Crawford
County Correctional Facility, to be followed by three months’ house arrest
and the remaining balance on probation. Appellant was granted work-
release privileges during his incarceration. On September 27, 2016,
appellant was removed from the work-release program after he tested
positive for Suboxone.2 On March 7, 2017, the trial court held a Gagnon II3
hearing, during which appellant admitted to ingesting a pill given to him by
another inmate. (Notes of testimony, 3/7/17 at 12-14.)
Following the hearing, the trial court determined that appellant had
violated the terms of his CIP sentence. That same day, the trial court
vacated appellant’s August 26, 2016 CIP sentence and resentenced him to
2Suboxone, which is commonly known as buprenorphine, is classified as a
Schedule III controlled substance. See 35 P.S. § 780-104(3)(i)(11).
3 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Supreme Court
determined a two-step procedure was required before parole or probation
may be revoked:
[A] parolee [or probationer] is entitled to two
hearings, one a preliminary hearing [Gagnon I] at
the time of his arrest and detention to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that he
has committed a violation of his parole [or
probation], and the other a somewhat more
comprehensive hearing [Gagnon II] prior to the
making of a final revocation decision.
Id. at 781-782.
-2-
J. S63037/17
an aggregate term of 21 to 60 months’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file
a post-sentence motion to modify his sentence. On March 30, 2017,
appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On April 20, 2017, the trial court
ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed his timely
Rule 1925(b) statement on May 10, 2017. Thereafter, on June 1, 2017, the
trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the Trial Court error [sic] and abuse its
discretion because [appellant] did not receive notice
of the terms and conditions of the [CIP] sentence
prior to being violated [sic] on that sentence when
[appellant] took a single unproscribed [sic]
[S]uboxone pill?
Appellant’s brief at 3. Appellant maintains that the trial court’s purported
failure to notify him of the terms and conditions of his CIP sentence violated
his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at
3-4.)
Generally, the revocation of an intermediate punishment sentence is a
matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that court’s
decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or
an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 165 A.3d 1002,
1007-1008 (Pa.Super. 2017).
Our Court has held that the revocation of a county
intermediate punishment sentence is equivalent to
the revocation of probation:
-3-
J. S63037/17
An intermediate punishment sentence
imposed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 9763, Sentence of Intermediate
Punishment, may be revoked where the
specific conditions of the sentence have
been violated. Upon revocation, the
sentencing alternatives available to the
court shall be the same as the
alternatives available at the time of initial
sentencing. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9773,
Modification or revocation of
intermediate punishment sentence,
(b) Revocation. This rule of
resentencing is analogous to that set
forth for resentencing following
revocation of probation. Upon revocation
of probation a sentencing court
possesses the same sentencing
alternatives that it had at the time of
initial sentencing. Moreover, revocation
of probation occurs, as does revocation
of an intermediate punishment sentence,
where it has been found the defendant
has violated the terms of his sentence.
Commonwealth v. Melius, 100 A.3d 682, 685-686 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(internal quotation marks and some citations omitted; emphasis in original).
Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in revoking appellant’s CIP sentence after he violated the terms and
conditions of that sentence by unlawfully possessing and ingesting a
schedule III controlled substance while he was participating in a
court-ordered work release program. Appellant’s contention that he was not
properly notified of the terms and conditions of his CIP sentence is belied by
the record. The August 26, 2016 sentencing order expressly notified
-4-
J. S63037/17
appellant of the terms of his CIP sentence. Specifically, the sentencing order
states as follows:
Terms of Supervision:
While on Probation, Parole or under
supervision through an Intermediate Punishment
Sentence, you will comply with all of the general
rules and regulations set forth in Cra.R.Crim.P. 708,
as well as any additional rules imposed by the Adult
Probation Department.
Trial court sentencing order, 8/26/16 at 2; certified record at # 10.4
As recognized by the trial court,
Local Rule 708(A), titled “Probation/Parole/
Intermediate Punishment General Rules and
Regulations,” provides in relevant part that “[t]he
defendant shall obey the law and be of good
behavior generally,” and in particular, “to comply
with all . . . criminal laws” and to “abstain
completely from the use and possession of
controlled substances.”
Trial court opinion, 6/1/17 at 2 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
Undoubtedly, appellant’s possession and use of Suboxone expressly
violated Rule 708(A), and constituted criminal offenses under both 35 P.S.
§§780-113(a)(16) and (31). It is well established that a trial court may
revoke a defendant’s intermediate punishment or probation based upon his
or her commission of a new crime. See Commonwealth v. Nava, 966
A.2d 630 (Pa.Super. 2009) (explaining that the commission of new crime
4 We note that the trial court’s August 26, 2016 order does not contain
pagination; for the ease of our discussion, we have assigned each page a
corresponding number.
-5-
J. S63037/17
violates an implied condition of probation). Based on the foregoing,
appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s revocation of his CIP sentence must
fail.
Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s March 7, 2017 judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/25/2017
-6-