[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 28, 2005
No. 05-12806
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00285-CV-WS-B
DORIS B. SAMUELS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA,
RON ORI,
BETH RAMSEY,
SUE DEER,
CARTON BELLCASE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(October 28, 2005)
Before DUBINA, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Doris B. Samuels appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the University of South Alabama (“USA”) as to her claim that she was
terminated because of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Although Samuels raised a number of
claims in the district court,1 she only identified and briefed her termination claim
on appeal. Therefore, all remaining claims are deemed abandoned. See Access
Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]
legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed
abandoned and its merits will not be addressed”).
On appeal, Samuels argues that the district court erred in granting USA’s
motion for summary judgment on her claim that USA terminated her because of
her sex. She argues that the burden-shifting framework established by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93
S. Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-95, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207
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Samuels also filed claims of age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII, and a due process violation
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, against USA and four other USA employees. The
district court dismissed each of these claims.
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(1981), should not be followed in all cases and that, at the time of her termination,
she was performing her duties as an Ultrasonographer II in the Medical Center of
USA in a satisfactory manner. In response, USA argues that summary judgment
was appropriate because Samuels failed to state a prima facie case of
discrimination for two reasons. Samuels was not qualified to work as an
Ultrasonographer II, and Samuels failed to identify a similarly-situated male
employee who was treated more favorably.
We review a district court's order granting summary judgment de novo,
“view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2004). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Title VII prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where direct evidence of discrimination is
unavailable, “a plaintiff may [] present circumstantial evidence of discrimination
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sufficient to create a jury question.” Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d
1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001). For claims based on circumstantial evidence, the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id.
In evaluating discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence, we
use the three-part, burden-shifting framework set out by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792. First, a plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case of disparate treatment, which may be accomplished by showing that “(1)
she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment
action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her
classification more favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.” Wilson,
376 F.3d at 1091. If a plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case, the
second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework shifts “the burden of
production . . . to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions.” Id. at 1087. Third, the plaintiff may then attempt to demonstrate
that the proffered reason was, in fact, merely pretext for the defendant's acts. Id. at
1088. “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1093, 1095.
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Samuels satisfied the first two prongs of a prima facie case, in that she
belongs to a protected class and she was subjected to an adverse employment
action when she was terminated. However, she failed to establish that USA
treated similarly-situated male employees more favorably or that she was qualified
to continue as an Ultrasonographer II. Although Samuels referred to male
employees who were certified and employed as Ultrasonographers II, she failed to
show how those employees were treated more favorably. Moreover, Samuels was
not qualified for the position of Ultrasonographer II because she did not become
certified. Because Samuels failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden never shifted to USA to put forth a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, and therefore, there is no need to
address the second and third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Upon review of the record and upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
find no reversible error. The district court properly granted summary judgment to
USA as to Samuels’s sex discrimination claim for wrongful termination because
Samuels failed to establish that similarly-situated male employees were treated
more favorably or that she was qualified for the position from which she was
terminated. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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