Case: 16-17222 Date Filed: 10/30/2017 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-17222
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cr-00048-MW-CAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DEREK LAMAR REDDICK,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(October 30, 2017)
Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 16-17222 Date Filed: 10/30/2017 Page: 2 of 7
Derek Reddick appeals his convictions for conspiracy to transport in
interstate commerce a person under 18 years of age to engage in prostitution, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), and enticing or transporting a minor in interstate
commerce to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421, 2422(a).
Specifically, Reddick challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence gained through an encounter with police and an arguably illegal
search of his hotel room. First, he argues that his encounter with police was not
consensual. Second, he argues that the independent source doctrine does not apply
to evidence discovered during the execution of a search warrant for his hotel room
after an initial warrantless entry into the room. After careful consideration of the
parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm.
A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of
law and fact. United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1312–13 (11th Cir.
2009). We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. at 1313. A clearly erroneous
factual finding occurs when we, “after reviewing all of the evidence,” are “left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States
v. Foster, 155 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998). We construe all facts in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below. United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d
1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 2011).
2
Case: 16-17222 Date Filed: 10/30/2017 Page: 3 of 7
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a seizure
has occurred “[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16 (1968). “If a reasonable person would
feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.” United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002).
A consensual encounter—a police-citizen exchange involving no coercion or
detention—does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186.
We consider various factors in determining whether an encounter was consensual,
including: if an individual’s path is blocked; if an individual’s identification is
retained by the police; the individual’s age, education, and intelligence; the length
of the detention and questioning; the number of officers present; any display of
weapons; any physical force or touching; and the tone and language used by the
police. Id.
Here, the district court did not clearly err when it found that Reddick’s
encounter with the police was consensual because a reasonable person in
Reddick’s position should have felt free to leave. The district court heard from several
officers and found their testimony credible. See United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289
F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Credibility determinations are typically the
3
Case: 16-17222 Date Filed: 10/30/2017 Page: 4 of 7
province of the fact finder . . . .”). The critical facts included: (1) only two officers
were near Reddick, (2) Reddick initiated the contact, (3) officers used a conversational
tone, (4) Reddick’s ID was only retained for a brief time, (5) the encounter lasted around
a minute, and (6) Reddick could have walked around the officers.
Reddick argues that the district court ignored several facts in its decision,
including that: the encounter occurred at night, the hotel had a cramped layout,
Reddick was aware of the presence of several other officers, and the officers were
armed. Although the district court may have been able to find these facts
persuasive, it did not. “Where the evidence has two possible interpretations, the
district court’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Foster, 155
F.3d at 1331. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err when it found that
the encounter was consensual.
Next, Reddick argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion
to suppress because it determined that the evidence seized after a potentially illegal
search of his hotel room was admissible under the independent source doctrine. 1
The independent source doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement.
It states that “evidence obtained from a lawful source that is independent of any
Fourth Amendment violation is admissible.” United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d
1
The government argues in the alternative that the independent source rule is not necessary
because Jasmine Davis had apparent authority to consent to the initial search of Room 212. We,
like the district court, need not decide consent on appeal because the independent source rule
provides an adequate exception to the warrant requirement.
4
Case: 16-17222 Date Filed: 10/30/2017 Page: 5 of 7
1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2012). It requires a two-step test. First, we “excise from the
search warrant affidavit any information gained during the arguably illegal initial
[search] and determine whether the remaining information is enough to support a
probable cause finding.” Id. Second, if the remaining information supports
probable cause, we determine “whether the officer’s decision to seek the warrant
was prompted by what he had seen during the arguably illegal [search].” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence seized under the warrant is
admissible if the officer would have sought the warrant even without the initial
illegal search. Id. at 1260–61. “This is a question of fact.” United States v.
Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d 409, 415 (11th Cir. 2016) .
In addition to containing references to evidence arguably seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, the search warrant affidavit also contained an important
misstatement—that Reddick paid for Room 211, the hotel room where a minor was
engaging in prostitution.2 A search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the
search excluded if the search warrant affidavit contained a statement made with
deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and the affidavit’s remaining
content does not establish probable cause. Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321,
1326 (11th Cir. 1997).
2
We agree with the district court that the statement regarding payment of Room 211 is the only
material misstatement contained in the affidavit. The other misstatements and omissions do not
need further analysis.
5
Case: 16-17222 Date Filed: 10/30/2017 Page: 6 of 7
Even if the affidavit could not establish probable cause without inclusion of
the misstatement, it was not made with deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth. The district court correctly pointed out that the “truth—that Reddick had
rented out Room 212 and [Christine] Thurman had rented out Room 211, and that
Reddick and Thurman were in some way together—was hardly less incriminating”
than the misstatement. The district court also credited Osborn, the officer who
wrote the affidavit, for his “forth-rightness in acknowledging the mistake.” See
Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 749. And Reddick failed to provide any evidence that
the misstatement was more than an innocent or negligent mistake. Thus, the
district court did not clearly err in finding that the misstatement was not made with
deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
The district court properly removed from the affidavit all references to
evidence arguably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This included the
minor’s Florida ID card and school identification card. The misstatement did not
need to be removed from the affidavit.
After all the necessary information is excised from the search warrant
affidavit, we must determine whether the remaining information is enough to
support a probable cause finding. Probable cause exists when “there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
6
Case: 16-17222 Date Filed: 10/30/2017 Page: 7 of 7
Here, the facts remaining in the affidavit include: (1) a minor was engaging
in prostitution in a room without any personal belongings, (2) the room and the
room across the hall were paid for by Reddick, and (3) Reddick’s phone was used
to place online ads for sexual encounters with the minor. We agree with the
district court that these facts support probable cause. See United States v. Albury,
782 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that although a probable cause
determination is subject to plenary review, we must give great deference to a lower
court’s determination that the totality of the circumstances supported a finding of
probable cause).
Finally, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that
the officers’ decision to seek the warrant for Room 212 was not prompted by what
he learned from the arguably illegal search. Officers made clear while
interviewing the minor—much of which occurred before the entry into Room
212— that they intended to get a search warrant for that room and any other room
in order to find evidence. Also, officers had probable cause before entering Room
212, as shown by the correctly excised affidavit. We cannot say that the district
court’s finding was clearly erroneous. Thus, the district court did not err when it
determined that the evidence seized after a potentially illegal search was
admissible under the independent source doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
7