NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 31, 2017
Decided November 1, 2017
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 17‐1211
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
v.
No. 1:16CR00011‐001
KEVRYN GAINES‐DUKES,
Defendant‐Appellant. Tanya Walton Pratt,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kevryn Gaines‐Dukes transported a 16‐year‐old girl from Indianapolis to
Cincinnati and then to Nashville, and in those cities prostituted her. Police arrested
Gaines‐Dukes as he was transporting the girl. He pleaded guilty to sex trafficking a
minor. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). His plea agreement included a waiver of his right to
appeal his conviction “on any ground,” and also a waiver of his right to appeal his
sentence if the judge sentenced him within or below the guidelines range. The district
court sentenced him to 156 months’ imprisonment, below the guidelines range of 168 to
210 months (based on his offense level of 33 and criminal history category of III), and
15 years’ supervised release. Gaines‐Dukes filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed
appellate counsel has concluded that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw
No. 17‐1211 Page 2
under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We invited Gaines‐Dukes to respond
to counsel’s motion, but he has not replied. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel’s supporting brief
explains the nature of the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind might be
expected to involve, and because the analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our
review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776
(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel represents that Gaines‐Dukes does not wish to challenge his guilty plea,
and thus the lawyer appropriately does not discuss the voluntariness of the plea or the
adequacy of Gaines‐Dukes’s plea colloquy. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; United States
v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71
(7th Cir. 2002). It follows, says counsel, that Gaines‐Dukes’s appeal waiver makes this
appeal frivolous. We agree with counsel; because an appeal waiver stands or falls with
the guilty plea, United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); United States
v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011), Gaines‐Dukes’s waiver must be enforced.
Moreover, counsel has identified no exception that would apply here, see United States
v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93 (7th Cir. 2014). Indeed, no element of Gaines‐Dukes’s
sentence exceeds a statutory maximum, see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2), and the judge did not
rely on any unconstitutional factor when imposing Gaines‐Dukes’s sentence.
The motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.