NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 1 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH LANCE WHEELER, No. 16-55595
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-03438-R-E
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICROBILT CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 5, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: MOTZ,*** M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Wheeler appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint alleging
claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the California Consumer Credit
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Reporting Agencies Act. We review de novo, Johnson v. Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015), and affirm in part and reverse
in part.
I.
Wheeler alleges that when he attempted to rent an apartment, the landlord
purchased a consumer credit report from Defendant-Appellee MicroBilt Corp., a
consumer reporting agency. The report stated that a civil judgment had been entered
against Wheeler in connection with an eviction proceeding in Pennsylvania when,
in fact, the judgment concerned another person. Swanson initially denied Wheeler’s
rental application, but after Wheeler successfully cleared his name, he was able to
rent the property.
Wheeler then filed this action against MicroBilt, alleging violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the California Consumer Credit Reporting
Agencies Act (“CCRAA”). The district court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice, holding that Wheeler failed to allege any facts to suggest that he suffered
actual damages from MicroBilt’s erroneous report. The court reasoned that Wheeler
“simply ma[d]e a conclusory allegation that . . . damages were suffered, without
pleading any facts.” Wheeler appeals.
II.
We first address Wheeler’s claim for actual damages. “To survive a motion
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to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Under the heightened pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff
must give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests,” and plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957)); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the
expense of discovery and continued litigation.”). Wheeler alleges that he suffered
economic harm (loss of work time and denial of a rental opportunity) and
reputational harm. Yet, as the district court recounts, Wheeler “not only fails to
allege any facts supporting these conclusory allegations, but rather admits that he
obtained the desired apartment, despite the initial confusion.” Although a complaint
need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must plead at least enough
facts to put the defendant on notice of the claim against it. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Wheeler has not done so here.
Wheeler also alleges that he suffered embarrassment and humiliation as a
result of Microbilt’s conduct. He claims that he was “embarrassed and humiliated
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by” the erroneous report, “given that [he] has never been evicted from an apartment.”
These allegations are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. While a plaintiff
need not provide “objective evidence of emotional distress,” Grigoryan v. Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2014), Wheeler’s
allegations rest on mere conclusions for which he provided no support. We therefore
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Wheeler’s claim for actual damages.
III.
Next, we turn to Wheeler’s claims for statutory damages and punitive
damages. Under the FCRA, statutory damages and punitive damages may be
awarded for a willful violation even when a plaintiff does not show any actual
damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a); see Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 503 (9th Cir.
2017). The CCRAA allows for the recovery of punitive damages for a willful
violation. Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.31.
Wheeler seeks statutory and punitive damages based on his allegations that
MicroBilt willfully violated the FCRA and the CCRAA. The district court did not
address these damages claims in its order dismissing Wheeler’s Second Amended
Complaint with prejudice. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court to
permit Wheeler the opportunity to amend his complaint to state with sufficient
specificity his claims for statutory and punitive damages for a willful violation of
the FCRA and the CCRAA.
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Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing Wheeler’s
complaint is
AFFIRMED in part REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
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