NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 1 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GARY DEAN MAXFIELD, No. 17-35023
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00564-RSM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
INDYMAC MORTGAGE SERVICES, a
division of Onewest Bank, FSB; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 23, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Gary Dean Maxfield appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim for rescission. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Maxfield’s action as time-barred
because Maxfield did not send a notice of rescission to defendants within three
years of consummation of the loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of
rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender
fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of
rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years
after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d
1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the
courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the
three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit Maxfield’s contention
that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of
documents filed with the county recorder’s office. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (court
may take judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute because
it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689
(9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and stating that court may take
judicial notice of matters of public record).
2 17-35023
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-35023