FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 03 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARYANN ROSE BROYLES, No. 14-16043
individually and as co-trustee of the
Maryann Rose Broyles Revocable Trust, D.C. No.
1:13-cv-00540-LEK-KSC
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC
and WELLS FARGO BANK, NA, as
Trustee for Banc of America Alternative
Loan Trust 2006-7 Mortgage Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2006-7,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
GORDON KELIKIPI CHARLE MOORE, No. 14-16049
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
1:13-cv-00506-DKW-RLP
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
COMPANY, as Trustee for Ameriquest
Securities, Inc., Assest Backed Pass-
Through Certificates Series 2003-ARD; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ANTONY TOLEDO and ANNIE No. 14-16056
TOLEDO,
D.C. No.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 1:13-cv-00539-DKW-KSC
v.
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
CORP., as trustee on behalf of the
certificate holders of the SWHEQ
Revolving Home Equity Loan Trust,
Series 2006-H; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
MICHAEL J. DIMITRION, individually No. 14-16205
and as Trustee of the Michael J. Dimitrion
Trust dated November 6, 1989, D.C. No.
1:13-cv-00125-DKW-BMK
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
TINA MARIE DIMITRION,
Plaintiff,
2
v.
MORGAN STANLEY HOME LOANS; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 13, 2017**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: SCHROEDER, D.W. NELSON, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Appellants each appeal from the district court’s dismissals of their
complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 Our appellate jurisdiction rests
on 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we AFFIRM. Defendant-Appellee Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC’s Motion to Supplement the Record and Request for Judicial
Notice is DENIED AS MOOT.
Appellants invoke diversity jurisdiction, which requires that they establish
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a). “In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1
These appeals have been consolidated for purposes of our disposition.
3
established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of
the litigation.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333,
347 (1977) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Appellants claim the amount in
controversy in these declaratory judgment actions is measured by the purchase
price of the property; the amount of the mortgage loan secured by the property; or
the fair market value of the property.
The claims at issue are not quiet title claims, and so the subject properties
are not the objects of the litigation. See Fed. Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. Kamakau, No.
CIV. 11-00475 JMS, 2012 WL 622169, at *9 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2012) (“[I]n order
to assert a claim for ‘quiet title’ against a mortgagee, a borrower must allege he has
paid, or is able to tender, the amount of indebtedness.”); see also Klohs v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 901 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 n.4 (D. Haw. 2012) (“Plaintiffs’
contention that they do not know to whom their debt is owed is not a basis to ‘quiet
title.’”). Appellants do not allege they have paid, or are able to tender, the amount
of indebtedness. Nor do they allege they own their properties free and clear of any
debt obligations. Appellants also do not allege that they are facing foreclosure or
have received competing demands for payment on the same loan. Thus, the district
court in each case correctly found the object of the litigation to be the value of
relieving Appellants’ uncertainty as to whom to send their mortgage payments.
4
Such relief “appear[s] to be intangible, speculative, and lack[s] the capability of
being translated into monetary value.” Jackson v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 538 F.2d 829,
831 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Even if Appellants’
subjective relief could be translated into monetary value, Appellants have not even
attempted to provide monetary estimates. The district court properly dismissed
these complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
5