11/07/2017
DA 17-0161
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA Case Number: DA 17-0161
2017 MT 275
JOHN P. STOKES and PAMELA J. STOKES,
Petitioners and Appellants,
v.
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY OF MONTANA, INC.,
a Montana Corporation; and US BANK TRUST, N.A., as Trustee for
LSF8 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST,
Respondents and Appellees.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lake, Cause No. DV 14-223
Honorable James A. Manley, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
John Patrick Stokes, Pamela Jeanne Stokes, self-represented; Bigfork,
Montana
For Appellees:
Michael J. Lilly, Berg, Lilly & Tollefsen P.C.; Bozeman, Montana
Danielle A.R. Coffman, Crowley Fleck PLLP; Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 13, 2017
Decided: November 7, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
OPINION AND ORDER
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion and Order of the Court.
¶1 While the appeal in this matter was pending, Appellees First American Title
Company and U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (Appellees) filed a joint motion requesting an order
declaring Appellant John P. Stokes (Stokes) to be a vexatious litigant and requiring either
anything he files be pre-approved by the district court or, alternatively, certified by a
licensed Montana lawyer in good standing as meritorious under M. R. Civ. P. 11.
¶2 In the appeal, John and Pamela Stokes (Mr. and Mrs. Stokes) challenged an order
that had been entered by the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, Honorable
James Manley presiding, which dismissed their lawsuit against the Appellees. We affirmed
the District Court’s dismissal order in a memorandum opinion, issued in conjunction
herewith. Stokes v. First American Title Co., 2017 MT 274N, DA 17-0161. Mr. and Mrs.
Stokes were initially represented by counsel, who withdrew early in the case.
¶3 Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution guarantees every person access
to the courts of Montana: “Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy
remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character . . . Right and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.” However, the right to access
Montana’s legal system is not absolute, and may be limited with the showing of a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest. Peterson v. Great Falls Sch. Dist. No. 1 & A,
237 Mont. 376, 380, 773 P.2d 316, 318 (1989) (collecting cases).
2
¶4 The Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that litigants can be sanctioned for
frivolous or vexatious litigation conduct:
The supreme court may, on a motion to dismiss, a request included in a brief,
or sua sponte, award sanctions to the prevailing party in an appeal,
cross-appeal, or a motion or petition for relief determined to be frivolous,
vexatious, filed for purposes of harassment or delay, or taken without
substantial or reasonable grounds. Sanctions may include costs, attorney
fees, or such other monetary or non-monetary penalty as the supreme court
deems proper under the circumstances.
M. R. App. P. 19(5). We have previously cited Rule 19 in the imposition of pre-filing
orders for vexatious litigants. See, e.g., Hartsoe v. Tucker, 2013 MT 256, ¶¶ 14-18,
371 Mont. 539, 309 P.3d 39. Montana does not have a statute specifically authorizing the
imposition of restrictions upon vexatious litigants, but our common law includes such
authority.1 Motta v. Granite Cty. Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, ¶¶ 19-23, 370 Mont. 469,
304 P.3d 720. In Motta, we cited a five-factor test utilized by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeal to determine whether a pre-filing order is justified: (1) the litigant’s history of
litigation and, in particular, whether it has entailed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative
lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation; e.g., whether the litigant has an
objective good faith expectation of prevailing; (3) whether the litigant is represented by
counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed
an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions
1
Section 37-61-421, MCA, does provide that “[a]n attorney or party to any court proceeding who,
in the determination of the court, multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and
attorney fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”
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would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties. Motta, ¶ 20 (citing Molski v.
Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007)).2
¶5 Under the first factor, Stokes’ history of litigation in the district courts is significant
and has entailed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits.3 Stokes has been before this
Court ten times.4 In several of these cases, Stokes was represented by counsel, and there
was no assertion that the appeals had been taken unreasonably. However, Stokes’ pro se
appeals have repeatedly been found to be insufficiently presented, including a failure to
provide a sufficient record or a failure to raise cognizable arguments, and have usually been
affirmed in a memorandum opinion based upon the failure to meet the appellant’s burden.
In this matter, we conclude that Mr. and Mrs. Stokes’ appeal was taken without substantial
2
In Motta, we adopted a similar four-factor test to review the entry of a pre-filing order by a trial
court, which considered: (1) whether the litigant was given notice and a chance to be heard before
the order was entered; (2) whether the trial court has compiled an adequate record for review;
(3) whether the trial court has made substantive findings about the frivolous or harassing nature of
the plaintiff’s litigation; and (4) whether the vexatious litigant order is narrowly tailored to closely
fit the specific vice encountered. Motta, ¶ 20 (citing Molski, 500 F.3d at 1057-58). We utilized
that test and considered the findings entered by the District Court. Motta, ¶ 21. However, because
we are here not reviewing the entry of a pre-filing order in the trial court, but instead undertaking
initial consideration of the matter based upon the motion made in this Court, we will utilize the
five-factor test.
3
We are here only addressing John Stokes’ status as a vexatious litigant, and not Pamela Stokes.
Although Pamela has been involved as a co-party in much of John Stokes’ litigation, her status
was not raised as part of the motion and we do not consider it here.
4
See Amco Bldg. Sys. v. Stokes, No. 98-635, 2000 MT 66N, 2000 Mont. LEXIS 463; Stokes v.
State, 2005 MT 42, 326 Mont. 138, 107 P.3d 494; Anderson v. Stokes, 2007 MT 166, 338 Mont.
118, 163 P.3d 1273; Stokes v. State, 2007 MT 169, 338 Mont. 165, 162 P.3d 865; State v. Stokes,
No. DA 06-0629, 2007 MT 318N, 2007 Mont. LEXIS 568; State v. Skyline Broadcasters, Inc.,
2009 MT 193, 351 Mont. 127, 211 P.3d 189; Stokes v. Duncan, 2015 MT 92, 378 Mont. 433,
346 P.3d 553; Stokes v. State, No. OP 06-0647, Or. (Mont., Oct. 25, 2006); Stokes v. Anderson,
No. OP 06-0756, Or. (Mont., Nov. 29, 2006); and the memorandum opinion in the underlying case
here.
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or reasonable grounds. As noted in our memorandum opinion, their briefing lacked
citations to the record, citations to authority, and cognizable legal argument.
¶6 Further, the briefing asserted numerous serious and unsupported accusations against
party opponents, judges, and officials. With no citation to the record, Mr. and Mrs. Stokes
alleged fraud, fabrication, collusion, harassment, and intimidation by their bankruptcy
trustees; bias and prejudice by Judge Manley; and that Appellees were a “scam enterprise
and laundering front for the Drug Cartel . . . .” The brief also stated that John Stokes
personally removed a majority of the judges in Flathead County and implied a threat to
initiate a federal suit against Judge Manley in California. We find such serious and wholly
unsupported statements to be harassing and vexatious.
¶7 Appellees also attached complaints in four other suits brought by Stokes pro se, one
which was entitled “COMPLAINT FOR EMBEZLEMENT [sic], EXTORTION AND
DAMAGES.” They include outlandish allegations of a harassing and abusive nature.
Appellees quote from district court orders expressing frustration with Stokes’ litigation
tactics:
Stokes’ brief is a litany of confused “facts,” in which he attempts to
intertwine at least three separate lawsuits . . . Stokes wholly fails to respond
to the Plaintiffs’ argument that Stokes has pled no actual cause of action . . .
Once again, Stokes mixes motions, relies on outdated case law and in general
impermissibly attempts to re-litigate matters . . . Stokes seeks to add the
individual attorneys and the law firm as third party defendants. He alleges
that the individuals and the law firm have prepared false affidavits, have
withheld documents in a separate lawsuit, and have a financial interest in
continuing the litigation . . . Once again, the Court is faced with superfluous
pleadings, which have no basis in fact or law and which consume limited
Court resources.
5
Gardner v. Stokes, No. DV 07-0729(B) (Mont. 11th Judicial Dist. July 17, 2008). A
different district court judge stated, “Stokes has filed an incomprehensible motion,
accompanied by an equally convoluted brief . . .” and concluded it was “yet another
example of [Stokes’] blatant disregard of legal procedures and rules.” Anderson v. Stokes,
No. DV 01-023C (Mont. 11th Judicial Dist. April 28, 2008).
¶8 Stokes did not file a response to the motion seeking his declaration as a vexatious
litigant, but argued in his appellate reply brief that, by citing his filings in other cases,
Appellees have offered inadmissible evidence in support of their motion. However, this
Court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings, and we do so here.
M. R. Evid. 202. While it would be preferable for a pre-filing order to be entered by a trial
court upon fact-finding, we cannot ignore vexatious actions, particularly those that occur
in this Court. We conclude the first factor of the Motta test is satisfied.
¶9 Under the second factor, we find Stokes does not have an objective good faith
expectation of prevailing in the foreclosure matter that was the subject of his appeal. His
pro se motions and briefs were procedurally unrecognizable and lacking in proper legal
arguments. One federal judge commented: “Stokes is not an attorney, and while he
zealously argues his positions, the record of his unsuccessful results in litigation is uniform
and speaks for itself.” In re Stokes, No. 09-60265-11, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3030, at *52
(U.S. Bankr. D. Mont. Sep. 21, 2009).
¶10 The third factor, whether Mr. Stokes is represented by counsel, is an important
consideration here and affects the breadth of the remedy ordered. The vexatious behavior
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exhibited by Stokes has occurred prevalently while he was acting pro se, exemplified by
the present appeal, wherein his counsel withdrew and Stokes thereafter filed a number of
harassing pleadings while representing himself. Similarly, in Motta, we concluded that the
pre-filing order at issue, which restricted Motta’s pro se filings, was narrowly tailored and
appropriately entered. Motta, ¶¶ 17, 22.
¶11 Under the fourth factor, it is clear from the actions described above that Stokes has
caused needless expense to other parties and posed an unnecessary burden on the courts.
In the litigation at issue in this appeal, Stokes filed an action to prolong the foreclosure
process, and then later argued the court lacked jurisdiction to address the very action he
initiated, an effort that merely caused confusion and turmoil.
¶12 Finally, we conclude that sanctions other than a pre-filing order would be
inadequate. Stokes has previously litigated over significant debt and initiated bankruptcy
proceedings. A financial sanction of costs or fees would appear to give a litigant with
Stokes’ history little pause in pursuing further vexatious behavior in the courts. Indeed,
district courts have imposed such fees on Stokes in the past, with little or no discernible
impact. In his appellate briefing here, Stokes has already threatened future litigation
against the same parties and the presiding judge. Further, given the broad range of
litigation Stokes has brought in multiple judicial districts, we see no way to effectively
narrow the pre-filing order to a particular type of claim.
¶13 We conclude the applicable Motta test is satisfied and that the necessity of a
pre-filing order has been established when Stokes is litigating pro se. Consistent with the
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Montana Constitution, an order has a direct relationship to the state interest of protecting
other parties from the unnecessary expense of litigating against Stokes and protecting the
courts from the unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources. Therefore,
¶14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the joint motion to declare John P. Stokes a
vexatious litigant is GRANTED IN PART. Before Stokes can file any pleading pro se in
a Montana district court or the Montana Supreme Court, he is required to obtain pre-filing
approval from the court in which he seeks to file. The court may prohibit any such filing
upon a determination that the claims asserted are harassing, frivolous, or legally not
cognizable. This pre-filing requirement also applies to pro se filings by Stokes in cases
where his counsel, if any, has withdrawn from representation of Stokes. Although this
order does not apply to Pamela Stokes, courts should not permit John Stokes to engage in
vexatious litigation tactics under her name.
¶15 The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide copies of this Order to counsel of
record, all Montana district courts, and to John P. Stokes and Pamela J. Stokes, personally.
DATED this 7th day of November, 2017.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
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