[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 24, 2005
No. 05-12256
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 01-04645-CV-JAL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED SEVENTY-THREE DOLLARS AND THIRTY-TWO CENTS
($1,449,473.32) IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY,
Defendant,
BARUCH JAIRO VEGA,
Claimant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 24, 2005)
Before BIRCH, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Baruch Jairo Vega appeals the district court’s denial of his Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for relief from the district court’s entry of default
judgment in the Government’s in rem forfeiture action, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461. We affirm the district court.
“[A] district court’s order under Rule 60(b) is reviewable only for abuse of
discretion.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 1332,
1338 (11th Cir. 1999). Rule 60(b) provides “the [district] court may relieve a party
or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b).
Rule 60(b)(1) “encompasses mistakes in the application of the law[,]”
including judicial mistakes. Parks v. U.S. Life and Credit Corp., 677 F.2d 838,
840 (11th Cir. 1982). Claims under Rule 60(b)(1) are required to be brought
within one year from the district court’s judgment. See Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply
Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 460 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1972).1 The one-
year limitation is not tolled by an appeal and cannot be circumvented by the use of
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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Rule 60(b)(6). See id. “‘[T]his Court consistently has held that 60(b)(1) and (b)(6)
are mutually exclusive. Therefore, a court cannot grant relief under (b)(6) for any
reason which the court could consider under (b)(1).’” Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
The district court did not err in construing Vega’s motion as filed pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(1) because the motion sought relief based on a decision of this Court
and alleged the district court misapplied then existing law when it entered the
default judgment. See Parks, 677 F.2d at 840. Vega’s motion was filed more than
one year after the entry of judgment, making it untimely as a Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
See Gulf Coast, 460 F.2d at 108. Because Vega’s motion relied on Rule 60(b)(1)
grounds, relief could not be granted under Rule 60(b)(6), nor could the one-year
timeliness requirement be subverted through Rule 60(b)(6). See id.; Cavaliere,
996 F.2d at 1115. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Vega’s Rule 60(b) motion.
AFFIRMED.
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