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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.D.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: LUZERNE COUNTY :
CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES :
:
:
: No. 143 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Orphans’ Court at No: Adoption No. A-8401
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.J.C., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: LUZERNE COUNTY :
CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES :
:
:
: No. 156 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Orphans’ Court at No: A-8400
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2017
Appellant, Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”),
appeals from the December 15, 2016 orders denying its petitions for the
involuntary termination of the parental rights of C.B. (“Mother”) and J.C.
(“Father”) with respect to their sons, N.D.C., born in May of 2015, and
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K.J.C., born in March of 2013 (collectively, “the Children”).1 Upon careful
review, we affirm.2
We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history as follows. In
December of 2013, CYS became involved with this family, at which time
Mother was in the eleventh grade and residing in her grandmother’s home,
along with K.J.C., who was approximately eight months old. N.T., 6/16/16,
at 146-147. The record does not reveal whether Father resided with Mother
and K.J.C. at that time. CYS received a report alleging that the nine-year-
old sibling of Mother was the victim of abuse in the grandmother’s home, the
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1 Importantly, we observe that the docket entries in the Court of Common
Pleas of Luzerne County do not comply with the rules regarding entry of
orders. See Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(1); Pa.R.A.P. 108(b); Pa.R.C.P. 236(b). We
caution the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas to comply with the
relevant rules for entry of orders so that appeal periods are triggered. See
Frazier v. City of Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1999) (citations
omitted) (“Thus, pursuant to the express terms of the rules, an order is not
appealable until it is entered on the docket with the required notation that
appropriate notice has been given”).
Because the subject orders were not entered on the trial court docket, the
appeal period in this case was never formally triggered. It would be, at this
juncture, a waste of judicial resources to remand the matter solely for the
filing of Rule 236(b) notice. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy,
we will regard as done what should have been done and address these
appeals on the merits.
2 The Guardian Ad Litem has filed a brief in support of the orders denying
the involuntary termination petitions.
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details of which are unspecified in the record.3 Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17,
at 3; N.T., 6/16/16, at 10. Upon investigation, CYS visited the residence
and found K.J.C. in the home, but Mother and Father were not present.
N.T., 6/16/16, at 10. Further, CYS found that Mother had left her
grandmother a note stating that she was leaving the house and not
returning. Id.
On December 6, 2013, the court placed K.J.C. in shelter care. Id. On
January 10, 2014, the court adjudicated him dependent. CYS placed K.J.C.
in kinship foster care with his maternal great-aunt and her husband, who
live in Langhorne, Bucks County, Pennsylvania.4 Id. at 109-110.
CYS established K.J.C.’s placement goal as reunification. N.T.,
6/16/16, at 11, 94. Mother and Father were required to satisfy Family
Service Plan (“FSP”) objectives to participate in a drug and alcohol
evaluation, to participate in parenting services and mental health services,
and to obtain safe and stable housing. Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 4;
N.T., 6/16/16, at 11-12, 16.
By the time N.D.C. was born, K.J.C. had been in placement for
approximately seventeen months. The court placed N.D.C. in shelter care
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3 To the extent the orphans’ court found that Father was accused of abusing
Mother’s sibling, there is no evidence in the certified record to support this
finding.
4 CYS did not approve Mother’s grandmother as a kinship care resource.
N.T., 6/16/16, at 106.
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the day after his birth in May of 2015. N.T., 6/16/16, at 10. On June 24,
2015, the court adjudicated him dependent. Id. at 94. N.D.C. has resided
in the kinship foster home with K.J.C. since September of 2015. Id. at 109-
110.
Likewise, CYS established N.D.C.’s placement goal as reunification.
N.T., 6/16/16, at 11, 94. Importantly, Mother’s and Father’s FSP objectives
remained the same. Id. at 12.
Throughout the Children’s dependencies, Mother and Father were
granted supervised visitation with the Children. At the time of K.J.C.’s
placement, they were granted visitation for two hours every Friday at the
CYS office and every Saturday at the maternal grandmother’s home for
three and one-half hours. N.T., 6/16/16, at 99. In August of 2014, their
supervised visitation was increased to three hours every Friday at the CYS
office. Id. at 99-100. In December of 2014, Mother and Father were
granted supervised visitation for two and one-half hours every Thursday and
Friday at the CYS office, and on alternating Saturdays at a shopping mall in
Langhorne, Pennsylvania, to be supervised by the kinship care parents. Id.
at 100. By the time the subject proceedings, Mother and Father were
granted supervised visitation in Langhorne, Pennsylvania, every Saturday
from 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., and no supervised visits at the CYS office.
Id. at 101, 103.
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On March 16, 2016, CYS filed petitions for the involuntary termination
of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to K.J.C. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On the same date, CYS filed petitions
related to N.D.C., at which time he had been in placement for approximately
ten months, wherein it requested the involuntary termination of Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and
(b).
On June 16, 2016, a hearing on the petitions occurred.5 CYS
presented the testimony of its caseworker, Lynn Lesh; Lenora Hermann-
Finn, Ph.D., clinical psychologist; Marisue Sack and Paul Dorang, case
managers at Family Service Association; Grace Tavaris, the case manager of
intensive family reunification services at Family Service Association; Raina
Cole, director of intake services at Northeast Counseling; and Alicia Singer,
senior clinician at Community Counseling Services. Mother and Father
testified on their own behalf.
By orders dated December 15, 2016, the orphans’ court denied the
petitions for the involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental
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5 The record supports the orphans’ court’s finding that CYS “withdrew the
allegation of unresolved drug and alcohol issue[s] as one of the reasons for
terminating Father’s parental rights” at the beginning of the termination
hearing. Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 4; N.T., 6/16/16, at 7.
Importantly, drug and alcohol abuse was not of concern to CYS in the
underlying matter with respect to either Mother or Father. Id.; N.T.,
6/16/16, at 105.
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rights. On January 17, 2017, CYS timely filed notices of appeal and concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The
orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 17, 2017.
On appeal, CYS presents the following issues for our review:
[1.] Whether the [orphans’] [c]ourt abused its discretion/erred
in not terminating the parental rights of the biological parents of
K.[J.]C. as the grounds pursuant to [23] Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2),
(5) and (8) were established by clear and convincing evidence
and such denial of the petition[s] to terminate parental rights
was against the weight of the evidence presented by [CYS] to
support the terminations[?]
[2.] Whether the [orphans’] [c]ourt abused its discretion/erred
in not terminating the parental rights of the biological parents of
[N.D.]C. as the grounds pursuant to [23] Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)
and (5) were established by clear and convincing evidence and
such denial of the petition[s] to terminate parental rights was
against the weight of the evidence presented by [CYS] to
support the terminations[?]
CYS’ brief at 2-3.
In this appeal, we apply the following standard of review:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614
Pa. 275, 284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)].
As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia
Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);
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Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa.
2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying
an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511).
“In termination cases, the burden is upon [the petitioner] to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are valid.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276
(Pa. Super. 2009). We have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and
convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting
In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
Instantly, in denying the involuntary termination petitions, the
orphans’ court concluded that CYS did not prove by clear and convincing
evidence that Mother’s and Father’s conduct warranted termination under
Section 2511(a)(2), (5), or (8), which provide as follows.6
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6 Pursuant to the requisite bifurcated analysis, the orphans’ court did not
analyze Section 2511(b), which provides:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
...
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); see also In re L.M., supra.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8).
In In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266 (Pa. Super. 2003), this
Court stated, as follows.
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to [Section]
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
...
In order for termination pursuant to [Section] 2511(a)(5) to be
proper, the following factors must be demonstrated (1) the child
has been removed from parental care for at least six months;
(2) the conditions which led to the child’s removal or placement
continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not remedy the
conditions which led to removal or placement within a
reasonable period of time; (4) the services reasonably available
to the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to
removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and
(5) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
...
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to [Section]
2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated (1) the
child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or
more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
Id. at 1272-1276 (citations omitted).
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With respect to Section 2511(a)(8), we further explained, “Section
2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy the
conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re A.R., 837
A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has been
established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led
to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith
efforts of CYS supplied over a realistic time-period. Id. The “relevant
inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have
been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is
imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super.
2009).
On appeal, CYS asserts that, in deciding not to terminate Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to the Children, the orphans’ court “failed to give
weight [to evidence] that [Mother and Father] failed to remedy the
circumstances that led to placement in a reasonable time and instead
focused solely on environmental factors as the reason for continued
placement.” CYS’ brief at 12. Specifically, CYS argues the record
demonstrates Mother and Father failed to complete their FSP objectives
including two parenting courses, a comprehensive family assessment,
mental health evaluations, and to follow all mental health recommendations.
Further, CYS argues the record demonstrates Mother and Father failed to
complete their FSP objectives to maintain consistent contact with the
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Children and safe and stable housing. As such, CYS argues Mother and
Father failed to remedy the conditions that led to the Children’s placement.
Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court first explained its
conclusion that CYS did not satisfy its burden of proof under Section
2511(a)(8) with respect to Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to K.J.C.
Specifically, the court found that CYS did not prove the second factor, that
the conditions which led to the child’s placement continue to exist with
Mother and Father. Further, the court found that CYS did not prove “that
there is little rational prospect of timely reunification” of Mother and Father
with him. Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 16. The court incorporated its
findings related to Section 2511(a)(8) in its analysis of Section 2511(a)(2)
and (5), and likewise concluded that CYS failed in its statutory burden to
terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to both K.J.C. and N.D.C.
Regarding their parenting services objective, the court emphasized the
testimony of Paul Dorang, the case manager at Family Service Association,
who worked with Mother and Father on their parenting skills from January to
April of 2015, when K.J.C. was two years old, and Mother was pregnant with
N.D.C. N.T., 6/16/16, at 43. Mr. Dorang testified that they successfully
completed the parenting program. Id. In fact, Mr. Dorang testified, “[a]s
far as looking at their interactions and their ability to care for their son, we
saw that there was no -- there were no issues. There were no concerns. . .
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. They both initiated play [with K.J.C.]. They both expressed love. They
both reinforced each other for boundaries because [K.J.C.] was doing some
things. . . .” Id. at 44.
With respect to their mental health objectives, the court emphasized
the testimony of Raina Cole, the director of intake services at Northeast
Counseling. Ms. Cole testified that Father obtained a psychiatric evaluation
at Northeast Counseling in March of 2014, which did not result in a
recommendation for outpatient mental health services. Id. at 65, 78.
Indeed, Ms. Cole testified that the evaluation revealed Father had “no
psychiatric issues” and “didn’t need any medications or therapy.” . . . Trial
Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 5-6 (citing N.T., 6/16/16, at 75-76).
Likewise, Mother obtained a psychiatric evaluation at Northeast
Counseling in 2014. During the hearing, it was disputed whether the
evaluation resulted in Mother being required to participate in outpatient
mental health services. The court explained as follows, which the
testimonial evidence supports.
Ms. Cole was asked to read the treatment recommendation on
cross-examination[,] which stated as follows: “medically
necessary to refer to SCAN, which stands for Services for
Children and Youth, and to learn anger management skills and
self-control. Follow-up is (sic) needed.” [Trial Court Opinion,
2/17/17,] at 67. On cross-examination[,] Ms. Cole testified that
Mother would have left with a follow-up [appointment] to SCAN;
however, Ms. Cole was not able to confirm that the follow-up
[appointment] was made. Ms. Cole did not provide any
documentation substantiating that a referral to SCAN was ever
made. Id. Upon cross-examination, Ms. Cole testified that the
psychiatrist and the patient determines whether a follow-up is
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needed for further treatment. Ms. Cole was not aware if either
the psychiatrist or the therapist ever made a follow-up request.
Id. at 69.
Mother testified that the doctor advised her to continue
treatment as needed[,] and she believed that meant “if she
needed it.” Mother testified that she was never contacted
regarding a program called SCAN, nor was she ever informed
that she had missed any scheduled appointments with respect to
that program. Id. at 154.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 6-7. Therefore, the court made a credibility
determination in favor of Mother and against Ms. Cole with respect to
whether Mother was required to participate in outpatient mental health
services at SCAN.
In addition, in the summer 2014, Lenora Hermann-Finn, Ph.D., a
clinical psychologist, performed a psychological evaluation of Mother and
Father. N.T., 6/16/16, at 20-21. With respect to Father, the orphans’ court
aptly set forth Dr. Hermann-Finn’s testimony as follows.
Dr. Finn testified that Father grew up in a household with an
alcoholic and drug addicted [m]other who would leave him alone
at home and go to a bar. Father was also left alone to raise his
younger siblings. Dr. Finn further testified that Father related to
her that he was physically and sexually abused by [his]
[m]other’s boyfriends. Father was also physically abused by his
adoptive parents. [N.T., 6/16/16,] at 26-27. Dr. Finn
recommended trauma counseling for . . . Father. The [c]ourt
notes that Dr. Finn does not reference in her testimony whether
Father ever received any type of counseling in his childhood.
The [c]ourt believes that Father did not provide that history to
Dr. Finn.
Father testified that from the time he was 10 years old until 12
years old, he received victims’ counseling once per week or at
times twice per week. Father testified that since that time until
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the present, he did not have any significant problems in his daily
life relating to problems he had as a child. Id. at 183-184.
The [c]ourt finds that Father had received trauma counseling for
two years in his childhood and there was no new evidence
presented to Dr. Finn to suggest that he needed to reengage for
past trauma for which he already received treatment. As stated
above, based on Dr. Finn’s testimony, it does not appear that Dr.
Finn was aware that Father had already received trauma
counseling between the ages of 10 and 12. Furthermore, the
evaluation report of Father [performed by Northeast
Counseling], indicated that there is no need for any further
mental health treatment.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 7-8. As such, in determining that Father did
not need further mental health treatment, the orphans’ court made
credibility findings in favor of Father and against Dr. Hermann-Finn.
With respect to Mother, Dr. Hermann-Finn diagnosed Mother with
borderline cognitive ability, and that she was a social introvert with
depressive disorder. Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, 6. Dr. Hermann-Finn
recommended that Mother continue in counseling.7 N.T., 6/16/16, at 24. In
addition, she recommended that Mother satisfactorily complete the
parenting education program with Father at Family Service Association,
which, as discussed above, Mother ultimately completed in April of 2015.
Id. at 21, 23.
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7 Dr. Hermann-Finn testified, “When I saw [Mother,] she had been for one
session with a counselor.” N.T., 6/16/16, at 24. The record does not specify
any details about the counselor whom Mother had seen at that time.
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Based on the foregoing, the orphans’ court found that CYS did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to the
placement of K.[J.]C., namely parenting and mental health issues, continued
to exist as to Mother and Father. In essence, the court determined that the
conditions did not exist at the time of N.D.C.’s birth in May of 2015.
Nevertheless, N.D.C. was placed, and CYS referred Mother and Father to the
intensive family reunification (“IFR”) services at the Family Service
Association. Ms. Lesh testified that the purpose of the referral was to “go[]
over caring for two children, [and] developmental stages of a newborn
versus a toddler. [Mother] did not have any prenatal care with [N.D.C.], so
we wanted . . . to make sure that [they] would know developmental things
[with N.D.C.] to look for if there [were] any that might come up.” N.T.,
6/16/16, at 116. The court concluded that the additional parenting program
was unnecessary and/or unwarranted, as follows.
[CYS] had referred the parents to another parenting program in
May 2015, despite the fact that there was no new evidence of
any allegations made regarding parenting concerns within that
month. Ms. Lesh, a caseworker for [CYS], testified the referral
was made due to the birth of N.[D.]C. and also because Mother
did not receive prenatal care during the pregnancy. [N.T.,
6/16/16,] at 116-117. Despite the fact that Mother did not
receive prenatal care during her pregnancy, N.[D.]C. was born a
healthy child. The [c]ourt further notes that while it is certainly
not condoned by this [c]ourt, there is no law which requires
Mother to receive prenatal care during her pregnancy.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 12. The testimonial evidence supports the
court’s findings.
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With respect to Mother’s and Father’s housing objective, Ms. Lesh
testified that, in May of 2015, when she became involved in the case, they
were being evicted from the home they rented. N.T., 6/16/16, at 126. The
orphans’ court disagreed and explained their housing circumstances as
follows.
Mother and Father . . . had appropriate housing from August 14,
2014 to August 15, 2015. [N.T., 6/16/16,] at 193-194. Mother
testified that she was advised by the caseworker from [CYS] that
a banister was needed for the residence. Mother testified that
she purchased a banister and advised [CYS] of the same.
Mother testified that [CYS] made a few appointments for a visit
to the home; however, [CYS] never showed up at the residence.
The natural parents resided there for one year without [CYS]
ever coming to inspect the property. The landlord sold the
property and the parents were required to move out. [Mother
and Father] were never evicted from the residence. According to
Mother, she and Father found a residence but only resided there
for two to three months. Subsequently, they resided with
friends were approximately one month until they secured a
residence with . . . [M]other’s aunt.[8] Mother testified that she
[notified CYS] of her new residence with her aunt. Mother
testified that there is also adequate room for her children to
reside with them. [N.T., 6/16/16,] at 148-152.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 9-10. As such, by the time of the subject
proceedings, the court found that Mother and Father had appropriate
housing. To the extent that they were unable to find appropriate housing
from August of 2015, until February of 2016, the court found that it was
____________________________________________
8 Ms. Lesh testified that Mother and Father began residing at their current
residence in February of 2016, which was approximately one month before
the filing of the involuntary termination petitions. N.T., 6/16/16, at 98.
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beyond their control, due to their poverty, and that poverty is not a reason
to terminate their parental rights. Id. at 11.
Likewise, the orphans’ court found that it was beyond their control to
maintain consistent supervised visits with K.J.C. and N.D.C. The record
reveals that Mother and Father became inconsistent with attending their
visits at the CYS office in 2015. N.T., 6/16/16, at 98-99. In total, they
attended 72 out of a possible 138 supervised visits at the CYS office. Id. at
100-101. However, the orphans’ court found as follows.
[Mother and Father] . . . faced hurdles with visiting their children
in terms of transportation. [They] did not own a vehicle.
Originally[,] the visits with the minor children occurred at the
office of [CYS]. Then the children were placed in Langhorne,
Pennsylvania, which according to Father was a three[-]hour trip
since back roads were taken at the choice of the person
transporting. Further, Father testified that many times the rides
were canceled and that he and Mother had no means of
transportation and were not able to see their children. [N.T.,
6/16/16,] at 191. The Guardian Ad Litem indicated as follows in
her recommendation:
At this time, there seems to be major impediments to
visiting their children, such as the overall geographic
distance, ability to travel in the cost of travel, the inability
to call or send items to their children, and the ability to
visit with their children in an environment conducive to
interaction and fun, considering K.[J.]C. and N.[D.]C.’s
young ages.
(Report of Guardian Ad Litem)
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/17, at 10. The testimonial evidence supports the
court’s findings. In addition, although CYS provided bus passes to Mother
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and Father so that they could attend their supervised visitation, Ms. Lesh
testified on cross-examination by Mother’s counsel as follows.
Q. . . . Did [Mother and Father] ever live in an area or reside in
an area where there was no bus transportation?
A. They actually live in Hometown right now. And they had
reported to me that there was no bus transportation.
Q. Are you able to verify that there is no bus transportation in
Hometown?
A. I did verify that. . . .
N.T., 6/16/16, at 124-125.
For the foregoing reasons, the orphans’ court concluded that CYS
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s and Father’s
conduct warranted termination under Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). The
court found that Mother and Father remedied the conditions that led to the
placement of the older child, K.J.C., i.e., parenting and mental health issues,
by the time of N.D.C.’s birth. Further, the court found that the additional
parenting program required of Mother and Father after N.D.C.’s birth was
unnecessary and/or unwarranted. By the time of the filing of the involuntary
termination petitions and the hearing, the court found that Mother and
Father had suitable housing, and that there was no evidence that they could
not be timely reunified with K.J.C. and N.D.C. Finally, the court agreed with
the Guardian Ad Litem that the children residing in Langhorne, Bucks
County, with the kinship care parents, was a major impediment to Mother
and Father being able to visit them on a consistent basis.
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Upon thorough review, we conclude that the certified record supports
the factual findings and credibility determinations of the orphans’ court.
Further, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we
affirm the orders denying the petitions for the involuntary termination of
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to K.J.C. and N.D.C.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/14/2017
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