J-S53030-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
PADRAIC COUGHLIN
Appellee No. 3492 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order October 11, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011139-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J. and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2017
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth),
appeals from an order entered on October 11, 2016 in the Criminal Division
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that suppressed
evidence recovered following a warrantless search of the residence of
Padraic Coughlin (Appellee), as well as statements made by Appellee
following his arrest. We affirm.
On August 30, 2015, following reports that he discharged a firearm at
his Philadelphia residence, Appellee was arrested and charged with carrying
a firearm without a license in violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA),
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106, possessing instruments of crime (PIC), 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 907, and recklessly endangering another person, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
The VUFA charge was later quashed. Thereafter, Appellee filed a motion to
J-S53030-17
suppress and the trial court convened a hearing on October 11, 2016. The
court summarized the evidenced adduced at the hearing as follows:
According to the testimony of Commonwealth witness Police
Officer Paul Sulock, on August 30, 2015 at approximately 9:20
p.m., Officer Sulock together with his partner [] responded to a
radio call for a possible shooting [along] East Madison Street in
the City and County of Philadelphia. As Officer Sulock pulled up
to [] East Madison Street, two white females and a younger
white male flagged them down. One of the white females,
Jessica Cupps, told Officer Sulock that there was a white male,
dressed in all black, by the name of Pat, appearing “crazy,” and
shooting an assault rifle in the back of the property.
Officer Sulock and Officer Rebstock[] went to the back of Ms.
Cupps’ property [along] East Madison Street to obtain access to
[the] East Madison Street [property] where the alleged shooting
was reported to have occurred. When Officer Sulock got to the
back of Ms. Cupps’ property, he observed a seven (7) foot high
cement wall separating the back yard[s of adjoining East
Madison Street properties.] While Officer Rebstock gave Officer
Sulock protective cover, Officer Sulock straddled the wall, shone
a flashlight into the back yard of [Appellee’s] East Madison
Street [residence], noticed bullet casings, and [Appellee] came
out of the door at a fast pace. Officer Sulock drew his weapon,
ordered [Appellee] to the ground, [Appellee] immediately
complied, and Officer Sulock promptly placed [Appellee] in
handcuffs. Officer Sulock noted that [Appellee] was “very
compliant” with all of his commands. Once [Appellee] was on
the ground in handcuffs, Officer Sulock[] began to question
[Appellee] without advising him of his [rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Specifically, Officer
Sulock asked Appellee if he had a gun on his person and whether
anyone else was inside the property. Appellee responded that
he did not have a weapon but was inconsistent as to whether
others were present inside his residence. Initially, Appellee
stated there was someone inside the residence. When asked
whether there was an injured party inside the home, Appellee
responded that there was no one in the house. Appellee then
indicated that there might be someone inside the home.] At this
point, there were approximately four (4) or five (5) officers on
the scene while Officer Sulock stood in the back yard. At no
-2-
J-S53030-17
point did Officer Sulock hear or see evidence that anyone else
was in [Appellee’s] home. Notwithstanding the above, Officer
Sulock[, together with his partner and at least two other officers,
entered the property, swept the first and second floors, and
recovered a black assault rifle from the second floor.]
Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/17, at 1-2 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court granted
Appellee’s motion to suppress. Specifically, the court concluded that the rifle
recovered from Appellee’s residence should be suppressed since the
Commonwealth failed to show that exigent circumstances justified a
warrantless entry into the home. See id. at 7. The court also determined
that any statements made by Appellee after Officer Sulock placed him in
handcuffs were inadmissible because Appellee did not receive Miranda
warnings before questioning commenced. Id.
The Commonwealth filed a timely interlocutory appeal on November
11, 2016, certifying that the ruling issued by the trial court would terminate
or substantially handicap the prosecution in this case. Notice of Appeal,
11/8/16; Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (permitting interlocutory Commonwealth appeal
in criminal cases where notice certifies that challenged order will terminate
or substantially handicap prosecution). On the same date, the
Commonwealth also filed a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). This matter is now ripe for our review.
In its brief, the Commonwealth raises the following issue for our
review:
Did the [trial] court err by suppressing a firearm found during a
protective sweep where – after speaking to a next door neighbor
-3-
J-S53030-17
who said [Appellee] was shooting an assault rifle – police
observed fired bullet casings, saw [Appellee] quickly leave the
premises, and upon asking [Appellee] if anyone was inside,
received inconsistent answers.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 3.
The Commonwealth challenges an order suppressing evidence
recovered during a warrantless search of Appellee’s home. Its position on
appeal is that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to find that
exigent circumstances justified Officer Sulock’s entry into Appellee’s home
without a warrant. According to the Commonwealth, there were urgent and
immediate grounds for officers to enter Appellee’s residence without a
warrant because of the potential need to neutralize an ongoing threat or
render emergency aide to an injured party. To support its claim, the
Commonwealth points out that reliable eyewitnesses informed officers that
Appellee was “crazy” and had discharged an assault rifle, police observed
multiple shell casings in Appellee’s back yard, and Appellee made
inconsistent remarks about whether other individuals were present in his
home.
“Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is
the Commonwealth’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s
rights.” Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citation omitted). Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a
trial court’s order granting a suppression motion is whether the factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
-4-
J-S53030-17
drawn from those facts are correct. See Commonwealth v. Champney,
161 A.3d 265, 271 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “Where the [trial]
court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these
findings and may reverse only if the [trial] court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170, 173 (Pa. Super.
2016) (citation omitted). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the [trial] court.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073,
1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted) (noting that evidence elicited at trial falls
outside the scope of review). “When the Commonwealth appeals from a
suppression order, we . . . consider only the evidence from the defendant’s
witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in
the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted.” Commonwealth
v. Young, 162 A.3d 524, 527 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
The substantive scope of search and seizure law begins with the
Fourth Amendment, which provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Applying this provision to a warrantless police entry into a home, this
Court has previously said:
-5-
J-S53030-17
It is axiomatic that the “physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (quoting
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court of the United States
has long recognized that “searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” [Welsh,
466 U.S.] at 749 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
586 (1980)).
Accordingly, “[a]bsent probable cause and exigent
circumstances, the entry of a home without a warrant is
prohibited under the Fourth Amendment.” Commonwealth v.
Roland, 637 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa. 1994). In determining whether
exigent circumstances exist, the following factors are to be
considered:
(1) the gravity of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is
reasonably believed to be armed, (3) whether there is
above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause, (4)
whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is
within the premises being entered, (5) whether there is a
likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly
apprehended, (6) whether the entry was peaceable, and (7)
the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was made at night.
These factors are to be balanced against one another in
determining whether the warrantless intrusion was justified.
Id. at 270–271 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wagner, 406 A.2d
1026, 1031 (Pa. 1979)). We may also consider “whether there
is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, a likelihood that evidence will be
destroyed if police take the time to obtain a warrant, or a danger
to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.” Id. at
271. When considering these factors, we must remain cognizant
that “police bear a heavy burden when attempting to
demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless
searches or arrests.” Id. (quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at
749-750).
Commonwealth v. Wadell, 61 A.3d 198, 210-211 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Based upon our review of the certified record and pertinent case law,
including the factors that should be considered in determining whether
-6-
J-S53030-17
exigent circumstances are present, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in granting Appellee’s motion to suppress the rifle recovered during a
warrantless search of his residence. In particular, we conclude, under the
circumstances of this case, that the trial court acted within its discretion in
refusing to credit Officer Sulock’s plausible, but unsubstantiated, contention
that he entered Appellee’s home because he believed that an injured person
may have been present.
Here, the record reveals that Officer Sulock and his partner responded
to a radio call indicating that shots had been fired along East Madison Street.
Three eyewitnesses met the officers as they arrived on scene. One of the
witnesses, a white female, stated that a lone white male named Pat, who
was dressed in black, had fired an assault rifle in the rear of his property.
Upon entering the backyard of the East Madison Street property, Officer
Sulock observed several shell casings on the ground. Shortly thereafter, an
individual matching the description of the suspect emerged from the
residence. Officer Sulock promptly subdued the individual and placed him in
handcuffs. Officer Sulock entered the premises without a warrant after the
suspect gave inconsistent responses when asked whether anyone else was
present inside the home.
Application of the relevant factors listed above leads us to conclude
that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that exigent circumstances
were present. Although the crimes under investigation were serious and
-7-
J-S53030-17
there were substantial grounds to believe that Appellee was armed
previously, the facts show that Appellee was under custodial arrest before
officers entered his residence without a warrant. Thus, while there may
have been ample grounds for finding probable cause to initiate a search, we
need not consider whether the suspect remained within the premises or
whether there was a likelihood of escape. In addition, although the facts
reveal that entry was accomplished in a peaceful manner, it was undertaken
at night, which militates against the Commonwealth’s claim of exigent
circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Berkheimer, 57 A.3d 171,
178-179 (Pa. Super. 2013).
In support of Officer Sulock’s actions, the Commonwealth emphasizes
Appellee’s inconsistent responses to questions concerning the presence of
third parties within his residence. We are not persuaded, however, that
Appellee’s statements compel a finding of exigent circumstances. The
officers here responded to a call stating that an individual had discharged a
firearm in his backyard. They did not receive a report that the suspect had
targeted others, that injured persons were at the scene, or that anyone was
present within the suspect’s home. Upon arrival, the officers observed shell
casings1 on the ground outside Appellee’s residence but did not observe
____________________________________________
1 The presence of the shell casings supports the claims made by the
eyewitnesses but do not provide compelling grounds to conclude that an
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-8-
J-S53030-17
blood, hear screams, or see anyone inside Appellee’s home. On the record
before us, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing
to credit Officer Sulock’s contention that he entered Appellee’s residence
without a warrant in order to render emergency assistance to an injured
individual. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting Appellee’s motion to
suppress.
Order affirmed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Bender, P.J.E., joins this memorandum.
Ford Elliott, P.J.E., files a dissenting memorandum statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/15/2017
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
injured party remained inside Appellee’s home, given all of the surrounding
circumstances in this case.
-9-