State v. Hayward - Case Law

[Cite as State v. Hayward, 2017-Ohio-8611.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-17-010

Appellee Trial Court No. 2015CR262

Walter L. Hayward, Jr. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: November 17, 2017

*****

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and
David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Stephen D. Long, for appellant.

*****

MAYLE, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Walter L. Hayward, Jr., appeals the April 25, 2016

judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm the trial court judgment.
[Cite as State v. Hayward, 2017-Ohio-8611.]

I. Background

{¶ 2} On January 14, 2016, Walter L. Hayward, Jr. entered a plea of guilty to one

count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, a violation of R.C. 2923.31(A)(1)(B)(1),

a second-degree felony; two counts of grand theft, violations of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1)(B)(2),

fourth-degree felonies; and 15 counts of theft, violations of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1)(B)(2),

fifth-degree felonies. The trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of eight years, and

ordered restitution in the amount of $87,359.99 to the various victims, all automotive

dealerships. Hayward appealed the trial court judgment and assigns the following error

for our review:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY

ACCEPTING THE APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT

ENSURING THAT THE PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY

AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED AND DID NOT STRICTLY

COMPLY WITH CRIM.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 3} In his sole assignment of error, Hayward claims that his guilty plea was not

entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court failed to strictly

comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) before accepting his plea. Specifically, Hayward

contends that the trial court failed to inform him that by entering his plea, he was waiving

his right to a jury trial.
{¶ 4} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) provides as follows:

In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a

plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest

without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the

following: * * * Informing the defendant and determining that the

defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to

jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the

state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at

which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or

herself.

{¶ 5} In other words, before accepting a plea of guilty, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)

requires the trial court to advise the defendant of the constitutional rights he is waiving by

entering his plea, which includes the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one’s

accusers, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to compulsory

process to obtain witnesses, and the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621,

¶ 19.

{¶ 6} The Ohio Supreme Court has made clear that strict compliance with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(c) is required. State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-Ohio-4130, 953

N.E.2d 826, ¶ 15, citing Veney at ¶ 18. To that end, the preferred method of informing a

3.
criminal defendant of his constitutional rights is to use the language contained in Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(c). Veney at ¶ 18. The failure to recite the language of the rule word-for-word

will not invalidate a plea agreement, however, so long as “the record demonstrates that

the trial court explained the constitutional right[s] in a manner reasonably intelligible to

that defendant.” (Internal quotations and emphasis omitted.) Veney at ¶ 27, quoting

State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981); Barker at ¶ 15.

{¶ 7} Here, Hayward executed a written plea agreement enumerating the rights he

was waiving by entering his plea. In it, he acknowledged: “I understand that I have a

right to have my case tried to a jury of my peers, or to this Court, sitting without a jury.”

The trial court also engaged in the following colloquy with Hayward before accepting his

plea:

The Court: Alright. Now, on the bottom of Page 6 and the top of

Page 7, there is a paragraph dealing with your constitutional rights and I

want to make sure that you understand the rights that you are giving up by

entering this plea today, alright?

The Defendant: Yes, sir.

The Court: Do you understand that you are presumed innocent of all

these charges. That presumption stays with you until the prosecutor proves

your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, understood?