MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Nov 20 2017, 10:27 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ryan Patrick Rucker Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility Attorney General of Indiana
Carlisle, Indiana
George P. Sherman
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ryan Patrick Rucker, November 20, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
35A02-1705-CR-956
v. Appeal from the Huntington
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
35C01-1110-FA-217
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 1 of 4
Case Summary
[1] Ryan Patrick Rucker appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous
sentence. Because there is no error on the face of the sentencing judgment, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In August 2011, Rucker and his wife were visiting friends in Huntington
County. Rucker entered the bedroom of his friends’ sleeping eight-year-old
daughter, pulled down her underwear, and licked her vagina. The child awoke
and told him to stop.
[3] The State charged Rucker with class A felony child molesting. The parties
entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Rucker pled guilty, with his
sentence set at twenty-five years executed and no probation. During the March
2012 guilty plea hearing, the State established a factual basis, and the trial court
accepted Rucker’s guilty plea. In May 2012, the court issued a judgment
sentencing Rucker according to the terms of the plea agreement.
[4] In March 2017, Rucker filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, asserting
that his sentence was illegal and “the result of an illusory plea that propagated
an invalid plea of guilty made under a false pretense.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
at 57. The trial court denied Rucker’s motion, as well as his subsequent motion
to correct error. Rucker now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[5] We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct erroneous sentence using
an abuse of discretion standard. Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012). A motion to correct erroneous sentence is a statutory matter,
derived from Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15, which states,
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the
corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law
specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
The statute provides “prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process
for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.” Robinson v. State,
805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537
(Ind. 1991)). A motion to correct sentence is appropriate only when the
sentence is “erroneous on its face.” Id. at 786. This means that “a motion to
correct sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear
from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory
authority.” Id. at 787. “As to sentencing claims not facially apparent, the
motion to correct sentence is an improper remedy. Such claims may be raised
only on direct appeal and, where appropriate, by postconviction proceedings.”
Id.
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[6] Here, the judgment shows that Rucker was convicted of class A felony child
molesting and sentenced to twenty-five years executed, with zero years
suspended. The sentencing range for a class A felony is twenty to fifty years,
with an advisory term of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a). Thus, Rucker’s
sentence is within the term allowed by statute for his offense. In other words,
there simply is no error on the face of the judgment. Rucker’s arguments are
framed in terms of the face of the record or the face of the waiver or plea agreement
and seem to implicate the voluntariness of his plea. These arguments are not
properly presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous sentence. As such,
the trial court acted within its discretion in denying his motion. Accordingly,
we affirm.
[7] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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