J-S64020-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
BRADLEY AARON AVERY,
Appellant No. 76 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0000864-2016, CP-40-CR-0001507-
2016, CP-40-CR-0004056-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2017
Appellant, Bradley Aaron Avery, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on December 2, 2016, in the Luzerne County Court of
Common Pleas. Appellant’s counsel has filed an application to withdraw his
representation and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), which
govern a withdrawal from representation on direct appeal. Appellant has not
filed a response to counsel’s petition. After careful review, we grant
counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S64020-17
The criminal activities underlying the instant appeal occurred between
August of 2015 and February of 2016. The crimes charged at Luzerne
County Docket Number 4056 of 2015 stemmed from Appellant’s
participation in a theft and physical altercation at Custom Computers Store.
Affidavit of Probable Cause, 10/23/15. The charges at Luzerne County
Docket Number 864 of 2016 involved Appellant’s theft from Maines Food
Store of frozen lobster tails, valued at more than $300.00. Affidavit of
Probable Cause, 1/21/16. Finally, the crimes charged at Luzerne County
Docket Number 1507 of 2016 concerned Appellant’s participation in the
home-invasion robbery of an occupied house. In the home invasion,
Appellant and a cohort robbed the occupants at gunpoint, threatened to
shoot them, and bound their wrists and ankles prior to fleeing with firearms
they stole from the residence. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/17/16.
The trial court set forth the procedural history of this case as follows:
On September 9, 2016 [Appellant] pled guilty on number 1507
of 2016 to Count 1, Burglary, graded as a felony of the first
degree (F1); Count 2, Robbery, graded as a felony of the first
degree (F1); Count 3, Robbery, graded as a felony of the first
degree (F1); and Count 4, Conspiracy Burglary, graded as a
felony of the first degree (F1). Thereafter, on September 12,
2016, [Appellant] pled guilty on number 4056 of 201[5] to Count
1, Robbery, graded as a felony of the third degree (F3) and to
Count 1, Retail Theft, graded as a misdemeanor of the first
degree (M1) on Criminal Information No. 864 of 2016. On
December 2, 2016, [Appellant] was sentenced as follows:
On Criminal Information 1507 of 2016, Count 2,
Robbery, graded as a felony of the first degree (F1);
offense gravity score ten (10) and prior record score
zero (0), a standard range of twenty-two (22) to
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thirty-six (36) months. [Appellant] was sentenced to
a period of incarceration of not less than twenty-four
(24) months nor more than forty-eight (48) months,
plus, one (1) year probation.
On Criminal Information No. 1507 of 2016,
Count 3, Robbery, graded as a felony of the first
degree (F1); offense gravity score of ten (10) and
prior record score zero (0); standard range of
twenty-two (22) to thirty-six (36) months.
[Appellant] was sentenced to a period of
incarceration of not less than twenty-four (24)
months, nor more than forty-eight (48) months,
followed by one[-]year probation, consecutive to
1507 of 2016, Count 2.
On Criminal Information No. 1507 of 2016,
Count 1, Burglary, graded as a felony of the first
degree (F1); offense gravity score nine (9) and prior
record score of zero (0), standard range of twelve
(12) to twenty-four (24) months. [Appellant] was
sentenced to a period of incarceration of not less
than twelve (12) months, nor more than twenty-four
(24) months consecutive to 1507 of 2016, Count 3.
On Criminal Information No. 1507 of 2016,
Count 4, Criminal Conspiracy [to] commit Burglary,
graded as a felony of the first degree (F1); offense
gravity score eight (8); prior record score of zero
(0); standard range of nine (9) to sixteen (16)
months. [Appellant] was sentenced to a period of
incarceration of not less than twelve (12) months,
nor more than twenty-four (24) months concurrent
to 1507 of 2017, Count 3.
On Criminal Information No. 4056 of 201[5],
Count 1, Criminal Conspiracy to commit Burglary,
graded as a felony of the third degree (F3); offense
gravity score of five (5); prior record score of zero
(0); standard range of [restorative sanctions “RS”)]
to nine (9) months. [Appellant] was sentenced to a
period of incarceration of not less than six (6)
months, nor more than twelve (12) months, followed
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by one (1) year probation, consecutive to 1507 of
2017.
On Criminal Information No. 864 of 2016,
Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Retail Theft, graded
as a misdemeanor of the first degree (M1); offense
gravity score of two (2); prior record score of zero
(0); standard range is RS. [Appellant] was sentenced
to a period of probation for one (1) year consecutive
to 4056 of 2017.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/17, at 1-3. These sentences resulted in an
aggregate sentence of five and one-half to eleven years of incarceration
followed by four years of probation.
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion that was denied on
December 12, 2016, and filed a timely notice of appeal on January 3, 2017.
Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).1
As noted, counsel has filed a petition to withdraw representation.
Before we address the questions raised on appeal, we must resolve appellate
counsel’s request to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d
____________________________________________
1 The record reflects that on January 23, 2017, the trial court ordered
Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on
appeal within twenty-one days. However, counsel for Appellant later alleged
that he was not aware of this order until May 31, 2017. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
Statement, 6/1/17, at ¶¶ 5-6. Counsel filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on
June 1, 2017, which the trial court accepted and addressed in a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 433 (Pa.
Super. 2009) (“If there has been an untimely filing [of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement], this Court may decide the appeal on the merits if the trial court
had adequate opportunity to prepare an opinion addressing the issues being
raised on appeal.”).
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1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). There are procedural and briefing
requirements imposed upon an attorney who seeks to withdraw on direct
appeal. The procedural mandates are that counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the brief to [Appellant]; and 3) advise [Appellant] that he or
she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional
arguments that [Appellant] deems worthy of the court’s
attention.
Id. at 1032 (citation omitted).
In this case, counsel has satisfied those directives. Within the petition
to withdraw, counsel averred that he conducted a conscientious review of
the record and pertinent legal research. Following that review, counsel
concluded that the present appeal is frivolous. Counsel sent Appellant a
copy of the Anders brief and petition to withdraw, as well as a letter which
is attached to the petition to withdraw. In the letter, counsel advised
Appellant that he could represent himself or that he could retain private
counsel.
We now examine whether the brief satisfies the Supreme Court’s
dictates in Santiago, which provide that:
in the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s
petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of
the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2)
refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for
concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate
the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes
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on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032 (quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361).
Counsel’s brief is substantially compliant with Santiago.2 The brief
sets forth the procedural history and facts of this case and outlines pertinent
case authority. We thus conclude that the procedural and briefing
requirements for withdrawal have been met.
Counsel presents the following issue for our review: “Whether the trial
court abused its discretion in sentencing Appellant[?]” Anders Brief at 1.
Appellant’s sole issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
It is well settled that there is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary
aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805 (Pa.
Super. 2006). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary
aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for
allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa.
Super. 2007).
As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.
Super. 2010):
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his
sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a
four-part test:
____________________________________________
2 We note that the Anders brief does not contain specific citations to the
record. However, we conclude that in this instance, the deficiency does not
pose an impediment to our review, and we shall proceed with our discussion.
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[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue
was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion
to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from
is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super.
2006)).
Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the
appropriateness of a sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis. Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.
2001). As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court does not
accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. Commonwealth v. Malovich,
903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). An appellant must articulate the
reasons the sentencing court’s actions violated the Sentencing Code. Id.
Herein, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met:
Appellant brought an appropriate appeal, raised the challenge in a post-
sentence motion, and included in his appellate brief the necessary concise
statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Therefore, we next determine whether Appellant raises a
substantial question requiring us to review the discretionary aspects of the
sentence imposed by the trial court.
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Appellant asserts that the sentencing court abused its discretion by
sentencing him at the “high-end” of the standard range of the sentencing
guidelines and by running some of the sentences consecutively. Anders
Brief at 6. However, as previously stated, we do not accept bald assertions
of sentencing errors. Malovich, 903 A.2d at 1252 (citing Commonwealth
v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2002)). “Rather, Appellant must
support his assertions by articulating the way in which the court’s actions
violated the sentencing code.” Id. Thus, to the extent Appellant’s claim is a
bald allegation that the trial court sentenced him at the high-end of the
sentencing guidelines, we conclude that he has not presented a substantial
question for our review. Additionally, it is well settled that claims based on
the imposition of consecutive, as opposed to concurrent, sentences do not
raise a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133
(Pa. Super. 2014). However, we point out that a substantial question may
be found where a defendant receives consecutive sentences within the
guideline ranges if the case involves circumstances where the application of
the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an excessive
sentence. Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1271 (Pa. Super.
2013). Nevertheless, Appellant did not assert that the consecutive nature of
the sentences resulted in an unreasonable or manifestly excessive sentence.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has failed to raise a substantial
question for our review.
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Assuming, arguendo, that Appellant had presented a substantial
question by asserting that the consecutive nature of the sentences resulted
in an excessive sentence pursuant to Dodge, we would determine that the
issue lacks merit. It is well settled that when imposing a sentence, a court is
required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the
character of the defendant. Moury, 992 A.2d at 171. Moreover, when the
trial court has the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”), we
can assume the court was aware of relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with any
mitigating statutory factors. Id. “Further, where a sentence is within the
standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Id. Additionally, the Sentencing
Code affords the trial discretion to impose sentences concurrently or
consecutively. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a).
In its opinion, the trial court noted that it had the benefit of a PSI, it
stated its consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, and it provided its
rationale for the standard-range sentence imposed:
THE COURT: Well, I’ve had the opportunity to
accept the guilty plea in this matter, the guilty plea
[w]as knowingly and voluntarily entered. I’ve
reviewed the presentence investigation, and -- and
[Appellant] has a zero prior record score. Up until
this period in his life, there was -- there was pretty
much nothing. And then, there was everything.
I appreciate that [Appellant] wants to apologize to
the homeowners, but they are not homeowners, they
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were victims. They’re sitting in their house, watching
TV, when a knock on their door leaves them with
individuals with bandanas over their mouth[s],
sunglasses, gloves; who come into the home and
terrorize them with weapons and tie them up and
taunts them. It’s just not homeowners. He did not
break into somebody’s home when they weren’t
there. They were victims of this horrific crime.
And then there are the victims of the robbery. When
[Appellant] and the Co-Defendants go into the --
store, to Custom Computers, and attempt to take
items and -- then leave and fight and go. And at the
least of it is Maine Source, where some frozen
lobster tails are shoved down someone’s pants. But
these crimes weren’t just crimes to property or to
empty homes, there were people involved.
(Sentencing Transcript, 12/2/16, p. 10-11).
Here, the Sentencing Court has clearly and expressly
complied with the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b) by
imposing a sentence that is consistent with the protection of the
public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on
the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of [Appellant]. Id. § 9721(b). The record
demonstrates a complete review of [Appellant’s] past, the crimes
committed and the impact on society.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/17, at 7.
After review, we conclude that the trial court properly reviewed the
PSI, the facts of the case, Appellant’s background, the factors to be
considered pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and explained its reasons for
the sentence imposed. Accordingly, had we reached this issue, we would
have concluded that there was no error of law or abuse of discretion in the
sentence imposed. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 662
(Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that a sentence was not manifestly excessive
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where the trial court considered the PSI, the details of the crime, and
explained its reasons for the sentence it imposed).
Lastly, we note that we have independently reviewed the record in
order to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues present in
this case that Appellant may raise. Commonwealth v. Harden, 103 A.3d
107, 111 (Pa. Super. 2014). Having determined that there are no
meritorious issues, we grant Appellant’s counsel permission to withdraw, and
we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Petition to withdraw as counsel is granted. Judgment of sentence
affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/20/2017
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