NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL HUCUL, a Father with joint No. 17-55192
custody of his child or children, on behalf of
himself and those like him and as a parent D.C. No. 3:16-cv-01244-JLS-DHB
with joint custody of their child or children,
Plaintiff-Appellant, MEMORANDUM*
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Michael Hucul appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising from state court
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Maldonado v.
Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Hucul’s action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Hucul’s action
constituted a forbidden “de facto” appeal of prior state court orders. See Cooper v.
Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777-78, 781 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine
deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear direct and “de facto” appeals
from state courts, including a federal complaint that is “frame[d] . . . as a
constitutional challenge to the state court[’s] decision[]” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because
alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous
judgment” and the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that
the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).
Contrary to Hucul’s contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine does not apply because Hucul did not allege any facts showing
that any adverse party prevented him from presenting his claims in state court. See
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rooker-
2 17-55192
Feldman doctrine does not apply if extrinsic fraud prevented a party from
presenting his claim in state court).
We do not consider documents not presented to the district court. See
United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not
presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
Hon. Michael D. Washington’s motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry
No. 41) is granted.
Hucul’s motion to strike (Docket Entry No. 75) is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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