NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HAROLD D. HARDEN, No. 16-17204
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00377-APG-PAL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MONNINGHOFF, Dr.; AGULAR, S/O at
NDOC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Harold D. Harden appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process
violation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the
district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary judgment. Guatay
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011).
We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
Moninghoff (erroneously sued as Monninghoff) because Harden failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Moninghoff personally participated
in the alleged rights deprivation. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
Cir. 2002) (liability under § 1983 requires showing of personal participation in the
alleged rights deprivation).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
Aguilera (erroneously sued as Agular) because it would not have been clear to
every reasonable officer that carrying out a transfer order was unlawful under the
circumstances. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (discussing
qualified immunity and noting that a right is clearly established only if “every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as without merit Harden’s contention that the parties reached a
settlement on which defendants later reneged.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
2 16-17204