NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE LUIS RODRIGUEZ-SORIANO, No. 15-73444
Petitioner, Agency No. A074-389-154
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Jose Luis Rodriguez-Soriano, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for
Temporary Protected Status and a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(A). Our
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law,
including due process claims, and review for abuse of discretion the denial of a
motion to remand. Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 921, 923 (9th
Cir. 2007). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
We reject Rodriguez-Soriano’s contention that the BIA applied an incorrect
legal standard in its denial of his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8
U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(A). See Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1570 (9th Cir.
1994) (“One general, analytical approach governs all decisions on whether to grant
discretionary relief.” (citing Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 586 (BIA
1978)); see also Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009) (the
agency applies the correct legal standard where it expressly cites and applies
relevant case law in rendering its decision).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying
Rodriguez-Soriano’s motion to remand, where he had the opportunity to present to
the IJ evidence on any matter relevant to discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)
(“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the
Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and
could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]”); Shin v.
Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008) (a motion to remand must show that
“if proceedings were reopened, the new evidence would likely change the result in
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the case” (citation omitted)); Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000)
(due process claims require showing that proceedings were “so fundamentally
unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). We reject Rodriguez-Soriano’s contentions
that the BIA engaged in speculation or impermissible factfinding as unsupported
by the record. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (“The Board may review questions
of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of
immigration judges de novo.”).
Rodriguez-Soriano’s contention that the BIA erred in assessing his
credibility under the REAL ID Act fails because the BIA concluded that the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination would not have been clearly erroneous even
under pre-REAL ID Act standards.
We lack jurisdiction to consider Rodriguez-Soriano’s remaining
unexhausted contentions regarding the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court lacks
jurisdiction to consider legal claims not presented in an alien’s administrative
proceedings before the agency).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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