NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: DEMAS WAI YAN, Esquire, No. 15-60019
Debtor. BAP No. 14-1266
______________________________
CRYSTAL LEI, MEMORANDUM*
Appellant,
v.
DEMAS WAI YAN, Esquire; CHEUK TIN
YAN,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Jury, Taylor, and Pappas, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Crystal Lei appeals pro se from the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying Lei’s motion to
sanction chapter 7 debtor Demas Wai Yan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions, and apply the same standard of
review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Boyajian v. New
Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not err by denying Lei’s request for attorney’s fees
incurred while defending against Yan’s state court actions asserting pre-petition
claims because Lei lacks standing to challenge violations of the automatic stay.
See Tilley v. Vucurevich (In re Pecan Groves of Ariz.), 951 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir.
1991) (the debtor and trustee are the only legal beneficiaries of the automatic stay);
cf. Magnoni v. Globe Inv. & Loan Co. (In re Globe Inv. & Loan Co.), 867 F.2d
556, 560 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that parties with interests adverse to the
bankruptcy estate do not have standing to enforce the automatic stay).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise its
inherent authority to sanction Yan based on his misconduct before another court.
See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991) (setting forth standard of
review).
The BAP properly concluded that bankruptcy courts lack authority to award
sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because bankruptcy courts are not “court[s] of
the United States” as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451. See Perroton v. Gray (In re
2 15-60019
Perroton), 958 F.2d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
Lei’s request seeking relief from this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, set forth
in her opening brief, is denied.
Lei’s motion for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 15) is also denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 15-60019