[J-29-2017]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.
JOSEPH B. SCARNATI, SENATOR AND : No. 3 MAP 2016
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE :
SENATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; JAKE : Appeal from the Order of the
CORMAN, SENATOR AND MAJORITY : Commonwealth Court at No. 579 MD
LEADER OF THE SENATE OF : 2014, dated December 30, 2015
PENNSYLVANIA; JAY COSTA, : (finalized on January 29, 2016).
SENATOR AND MINORITY LEADER OF :
THE SENATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, : ARGUED: May 9, 2017
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
:
TOM WOLF, GOVERNOR OF :
PENNSYLVANIA; RANDY ALBRIGHT, :
SECRETARY OF THE BUDGET; :
TIMOTHY A. REESE, STATE :
TREASURER OF PENNSYLVANIA; :
DENNIS M. DAVIN, SECRETARY OF :
COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC :
DEVELOPMENT; CINDY ADAMS DUNN, :
SECRETARY OF CONSERVATION AND :
NATURAL RESOURCES; JOHN H. :
QUIGLEY, SECRETARY OF :
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; :
CURTIS M. TOPPER, SECRETARY OF :
GENERAL SERVICES; KATHY :
MANDERINO, SECRETARY OF LABOR :
& INDUSTRY; MAJOR GENERAL JAMES :
R. JOSEPH, ADJUTANT GENERAL OF :
PENNSYLVANIA; JOSH SHAPIRO, :
CHAIRMAN OF THE PENNSYLVANIA :
COMMISSION ON CRIME AND :
DELINQUENCY, :
:
Appellees :
OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: November 22, 2017
In a petition for review filed in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, a
group of state senators (“the Senators”) challenged as unconstitutional the Governor’s
partial disapproval of the General Appropriations Act of 2014 (“GAA”)1 and the 2014
Fiscal Code Amendments (“FCA”).2 The Commonwealth Court denied the Senators’
request for summary relief. We agree with the Senators that the Governor’s attempted
partial vetoes of the proposed legislation failed to adhere to the requirements of Article
IV, Section 15, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. We therefore reverse the
Commonwealth Court’s decision denying the Senators summary relief on Count I of
their petition for review.
I. Background
The GAA and the FCA originated in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives
and ultimately passed both legislative chambers. On July 1, 2014, the General
Assembly presented the GAA to former Governor Tom Corbett for his consideration.
On July 9, 2014, the lawmakers similarly presented the FCA to the Governor for his
consideration. The House of Representatives adjourned that same day.3
1
H.B. 2328, 2014 sess. (Pa. 2014).
2
H.B. 278, 2014 sess. (Pa. 2014).
3
The Legislative Journal reflects that the House adjourned on July 9, 2014, and
reconvened on July 29, 2014. 2014 Pa. Legislative Journal—House 1234 (July 9,
2014), Reproduced Record (“R.R.”) 609a (noting that the House agreed to adjourn until
August 4, 2014, unless sooner recalled by the Speaker of the House); 2014 Pa.
Legislative Journal—House 1235 (July 29, 2014), R.R. 611a (reconvening).
We take judicial notice that the Legislative Journal also reflects that the Senate
was not in session from July 8, 2014, through September 15, 2014. 2014 Pa.
Legislative Journal—Senate 2124 (July 8, 2014),
(continued…)
[J-29-2017] - 2
The following day, July 10, 2014, the Governor approved in part and disapproved
in part the GAA and the FCA, utilizing the line-item veto. See PA. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
The Governor’s partial disapproval of the GAA, inter alia, reduced the amount
appropriated to the Senate for various expenses, including: salaries and personal
expenses of Senate employees; expenses of the office of the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate; Senate expenses for lodging, meals, and incidentals; items such as
furniture and technology upgrades; and the amount available for the caucus operations
account. In addition, the Governor reduced the appropriation for “Heritage and Other
Parks” by $500,000. Petition for Review, Reproduced Record (“R.R.”) at 279a.
With regard to the FCA, the Governor completely disapproved of seven
provisions that corresponded with the disapproved portions of the GAA. These included
Section 1724-J, which transferred funds from the Department of General Services to the
legislative branch for distribution upon approval by the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, the Majority Leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the Majority
Leader of the House. The Governor also disapproved of Section 1720-J of the FCA,
which provided that, from funds appropriated for Heritage and other parks, $500,000
“shall be used for the operation and maintenance of the Washington Crossing Historical
Park,” R.R. 21a, and Section 1716-J, which directed the allocation of funds to pay dues
“for fiscal years 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 to a commission of the Atlantic coastal
states that coordinates the conservation and management of near-shore fish species.”
Id. at 20a.
(…continued)
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/2014/0/Sj20140708.pdf (last viewed June 30,
2017) (noting that the Senate agreed not to be in session until September 15, 2014,
unless recalled sooner); 2014 Pa. Legislative Journal—Senate 2125 (Sept. 15, 2014),
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/SJ/2014/0/Sj20140915.pdf (last viewed June 30,
2017) (reconvening).
[J-29-2017] - 3
On July 10, 2014, the Governor returned copies of the bills and the Governor’s
objections to the House Parliamentarian. The Governor also delivered the signed GAA
and FCA, together with his line-item vetoes and several copies, to the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, and asked the Secretary to assign act numbers to the bills and to
retain the copies. The Secretary complied, assigning to the GAA the designation “Act
No. 2014-1A” and to the FCA the designation “Act No. 2014-126.” R.R. 18a.
Also on July 10, 2014, the Office of the Budget issued a press release
announcing that the Governor had signed the GAA and FCA, and detailing the various
line-item vetoes in each bill. R.R. 661-64. This press release was made publicly
available on the Commonwealth’s website. The House did not record the Governor’s
objections to the legislation in its journals and did not reconsider the GAA or the FCA.
Instead, the General Assembly adjourned sine die on November 12, 2014, and took no
further action on either bill.4
On November 4, 2014, the Senators filed a petition for review (“PFR”) against the
Governor and various executive-branch officials (collectively, “the Governor”) in the
Commonwealth Court.5 On March 9, 2015, the Senators sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of the Governor’s line-item vetoes of
the GAA and FCA. A brief review of the relevant provisions of the Pennsylvania
Constitution will aid in understanding the parties’ respective positions.
4
An adjournment sine die “end[s] a deliberative assembly’s or court’s session
without setting a time to reconvene.” Scarnati v. Wolf, 135 A.3d 200, 205 n.7 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2015) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 44 (8th ed. 2004)).
5
This action was filed by Senators Joseph Scarnati, Dominic Pileggi, and Jay
Costa, against former Governor Tom Corbett, former Budget Secretary Charles Zogby,
and former State Treasurer Robert McCord, et al. Following the November 2014
election and the January 2015 commencement of Governor Wolf’s administration, the
representative parties were changed where appropriate. See Pa.R.A.P. 502(c).
[J-29-2017] - 4
A general appropriation bill is one of the exceptions to the single subject rule of
Article III, Section 3. That section provides: “No bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general
appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof.” PA. CONST.
art. III, § 3. This exception is limited by the Constitution, which restricts the scope of a
general appropriation bill as follows: “The general appropriation bill shall embrace
nothing but appropriations for the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the
Commonwealth, for the public debt and for public schools. All other appropriations shall
be made by separate bills, each embracing but one subject.” Id. art. III, § 11. Article III,
Section 24 provides that:
No money shall be paid out of the treasury, except on appropriations
made by law and on warrant issued by the proper officers; but cash
refunds of taxes, licenses, fees and other charges paid or collected, but
not legally due, may be paid, as provided by law, without appropriation
from the fund into which they were paid on warrant of the proper officer.
Id. art III, § 24.
The Governor’s veto authority is provided in Article IV, Sections 15 and 16 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Section 15 sets forth the procedure by which the Governor
vetoes a bill, while Section 16 establishes the Governor’s line-item veto power. These
sections provide:
§ 15. Approval of bills; Vetoes
Every bill which shall have passed both Houses shall be presented to the
Governor; if he approves he shall sign it, but if he shall not approve he
shall return it with his objections to the House in which it shall have
originated, which House shall enter the objections at large upon their
journal, and proceed to re-consider it. If after such re-consideration, two-
thirds of all the members elected to that House shall agree to pass the bill,
it shall be sent with the objections to the other House by which likewise it
shall be re-considered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the members
elected to that House it shall be a law; but in such cases the votes of both
Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the
[J-29-2017] - 5
members voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journals of
each House, respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor
within ten days after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall
be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the General
Assembly, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall
be a law, unless he shall file the same, with his objections, in the office of
the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and give notice thereof by public
proclamation within thirty days after such adjournment.
§ 16. Partial Disapproval of Appropriation Bills
The Governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any
bill, making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items, and the
part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items of
appropriation disapproved shall be void, unless re-passed according to the
rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills over the
Executive veto.
Id. art. IV, §§ 15, 16.
In Count I of their PFR, the Senators alleged that the Governor’s attempted line-
item vetoes of portions of the GAA and FCA were invalid because the Governor did not
follow the procedure established in Article IV, Section 15. The Senators’ argument in
this regard was twofold. First, the Senators claimed that, pursuant to Article IV, Section
15, the Governor was prevented from returning the bills to the House on July 10, 2014,
because the House had adjourned on July 9, 2014. According to the Senators, this
temporary adjournment prevented the effective return of the bills and objections.
Second, the Senators asserted, because the House had adjourned on July 9, 2014, the
Constitution required the Governor to follow the filing and proclamation procedure of
Section 15, filing the bill and objections with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and
giving notice thereof by “public proclamation.” Id. art. IV, § 15. The Senators
maintained that the Governor failed to provide notice by public proclamation, rendering
the Governor’s line-item vetoes invalid, and causing the GAA and the FCA to become
law in the form submitted to the Governor.
[J-29-2017] - 6
In Count II of their PFR, the Senators alleged that the FCA was not subject to the
Governor’s line-item veto authority, which is limited to “any item or items” of a bill
“making appropriations of money.” PA. CONST. art. IV, § 16. The Senators argued that
the veto power granted by Article III, Section 16 is limited to bills authorizing the release
of money from the treasury, and cannot be extended to the corresponding fiscal code
amendments, which address the allocation of monies that have already been
appropriated from the treasury. According to the Senators, the FCA did not make
appropriations of money, and the Governor therefore could only approve or disapprove
of the FCA in its entirety, rendering his line-item vetoes of the FCA invalid. In their
request for relief, the Senators sought, inter alia, a declaration that the Governor’s
disapprovals of provisions of the GAA and FCA were null and void, and a declaration
that the GAA and the FCA, in their entirety, have become law.
The Senators filed an application for partial summary relief seeking judgment in
their favor on Counts I and II of their PFR (asserting that the line-item vetoes of both
bills were unconstitutional). The Governor filed an answer to the Senators’ application
for partial summary relief and preliminary objections seeking the dismissal of the PFR
for lack of standing.6
Addressing the Senators’ application for summary relief, the Governor asserted
that the House’s adjournment did not prevent the Governor from returning the vetoed
bills to the House via the House Parliamentarian. The Governor characterized the
return of the subject bills to the House Parliamentarian, whose office was open for
6
The Treasurer did not join in the Governor’s preliminary objections, and instead
separately filed an answer to the Senators’ PFR.
[J-29-2017] - 7
business during the adjournment of the House, as consistent with accepted past
practice. Arguing in the alternative, the Governor asserted that, if he was required to
give notice of the veto by public proclamation due to the House’s adjournment, see PA.
CONST. art. IV, § 15, then the Governor’s July 10, 2014 press release satisfied this
requirement. In this respect, the Governor maintained that the Constitution does not
specify the form or the substance of the public proclamation, leaving such details to the
Governor’s discretion. Regarding his line-item veto authority as to the FCA, the
Governor argued that he may invoke this authority to veto portions of any bill that directs
that a specific sum of money be spent for a particular purpose, including the FCA.
On December 30, 2015, the Commonwealth Court issued an opinion denying the
Governor’s preliminary objections and the Senators’ application for summary relief.
Addressing the Governor’s preliminary objection premised upon the Senators’ purported
lack of standing, the court concluded that the Senators had alleged sufficient legislative
interest to establish their standing to pursue this challenge to the Governor’s vetoes.
Scarnati v. Wolf, 135 A.3d 200, 210 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).7
Turning to the Senators’ application for summary relief, and examining the veto
return language of Article IV, Section 15, the Commonwealth Court observed that the
provision speaks of an adjournment of the “General Assembly,” not solely of the
originating chamber, as the Senators would have it. Id. at 213. According to the
Commonwealth Court, neither legislative chamber may, “without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days.” PA. CONST. art. II, § 14. The court observed
7
On appeal to this Court, the Governor has abandoned any challenge to the
Senators’ standing.
[J-29-2017] - 8
that consent for an adjournment in excess of three days is demonstrated by the
adoption of a concurrent resolution. 101 Pa. Code §§ 7.24(a), (b). Finding that it was
unable to conclude, upon the record before it, that the General Assembly had adjourned
by concurrent resolution, the Commonwealth Court held that it was not clear whether a
constitutionally sufficient adjournment occurred that could have prevented the Governor
from returning the bills and his objections to the House. Scarnati, 135 A.3d at 215. The
Commonwealth Court also addressed the Governor’s contention that there is a long-
standing practice of returning bills to the House Parliamentarian, and that an
adjournment precludes return of a vetoed bill only when the office of the House
Parliamentarian is closed. According to the Commonwealth Court, this question
implicated facts averred but not of record. Thus, the court refused to address it. Id. at
214, n.20.
Assuming, arguendo, that there was an adjournment of the General Assembly
that prevented the Governor’s return of the bills with objections, the Commonwealth
Court turned to the proclamation procedure required by Section 15. Specifically, the
Commonwealth Court addressed whether the Governor’s press release satisfied the
requirement for notice by public proclamation. The Commonwealth Court held that a
public proclamation is generally understood as providing public notice of governmental
matters of importance, and held that the Governor’s method of issuing a press release
through the Office of the Budget and making it publicly available on the
Commonwealth’s website satisfied the constitutional requirement for notice by public
proclamation. Scarnati, 135 A.3d at 217-18.
[J-29-2017] - 9
The Commonwealth Court next addressed the question of whether the FCA
constitutes a “bill, making appropriations of money” for purposes of the line-item veto
authorized by Article IV, Section 16. The Commonwealth Court agreed with the
Governor that resolution of this question was controlled by our analysis in Jubelirer v.
Rendell, 953 A.2d 514 (Pa. 2008), wherein this Court limited the items in an
appropriation bill that could be subject to the Governor’s line-item veto authority to “a
sum of money directed by the General Assembly to be spent for a particular purpose.”
953 A.2d at 534.
With this precedent in mind, the Commonwealth Court examined the nature of
the Fiscal Code amendments. The Fiscal Code defines the powers and duties of the
executive branch regarding the collection of all monies due to the Commonwealth and
the “disbursement or other disposition of all funds” belonging to the Commonwealth. 72
P.S. § 2. According to the Commonwealth Court, the Governor historically has acted
simultaneously upon general appropriation bills and the accompanying Fiscal Code
amendments. Scarnati, 135 A.3d at 223. The Commonwealth Court considered the
relationship between the GAA and the corresponding FCA to be interdependent, and
observed that the Governor’s disapprovals in the GAA and the FCA correlate. For
instance, in Subsection 210(7) of the GAA, the Governor reduced the appropriation for
Heritage and other parks by $500,000, and correspondingly disapproved of Section
1720-J of the FCA, which directed that $500,000 from funds appropriated to Heritage
and other parks shall be used for Washington Crossing Historical Park. The
Commonwealth Court found that similarly coordinated, symmetrical actions with regard
to the line-item vetoes in the FCA served to keep an agency’s or department’s actions,
[J-29-2017] - 10
as funded by the GAA, within the confines of the appropriation. The Commonwealth
Court therefore held that the Governor constitutionally had utilized the line-item veto to
disapprove of portions of the FCA.
Consequently, the Commonwealth Court denied the Senators’ application for
summary relief. On January 29, 2016, at the parties’ behest, the Commonwealth Court
issued an order certifying that its December 30, 2015 order was final, and that an
immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).
On appeal, the Senators raise the following issues for our resolution:
1. Under Article IV, Section 15 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, when
the Governor vetoes a bill and attempts to return it, with his objections, to
the [h]ouse where it originated, which is adjourned, does the adjournment
prevent the return of the bill?
2. When the Governor vetoes a bill and the [h]ouse where the bill
originated, by its adjournment, prevents him from returning it, does he fail
to comply with Article IV, Section 15’s alternative procedure for his veto to
become valid (“he shall file the [bill], with his objections, in the office of the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, and give notice thereof by public
proclamation within 30 days after such adjournment”) when, instead of
issuing a proclamation under his own signature and seal of the
Commonwealth, a cabinet official’s press office issues a press release in
which it mentions the vetoes without stating that the bill and vetoes have
been filed in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth?
3. Does Article IV, Section 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (giving
the Governor line-item veto power for a bill “making appropriations of
money”) apply to a bill that directs how agencies that receive
appropriations must spend the appropriated money, when those directives
would have no effect if appropriations had not been made to the agencies
by other legislation?
Brief for the Senators at 7-8.
[J-29-2017] - 11
The standard for granting summary relief turns upon whether the applicant’s right
to relief is clear.8 Summary relief on a petition for review is similar to the relief provided
by a grant of summary judgment. Pa.R.A.P. 1532, Official Note. Summary judgment is
appropriate where, after the close of pleadings, “there is no genuine issue of any
material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could
be established by additional discovery or expert report.” Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(a). The
record is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts
as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the
moving party. Albright v. Abington Mem. Hosp., 696 A.2d 1159, 1165 (Pa. 1996). In
reviewing the denial of summary relief, we may disturb the lower court’s order only
where there has been an error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. As to
questions of law, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Brittain v. Beard, 974 A.2d 479, 483 (Pa. 2009).
The questions before us implicate: the constitutional requirements of the veto-
return process of Article IV, Section 15, in circumstances where the originating chamber
has adjourned; the constitutional requirements for the filing-and-proclamation procedure
of Article IV, Section 15; and the line-item veto authority granted to the Governor by
Article IV, Section 16. The fundamental rule of constitutional construction is that “the
Constitution’s language controls and must be interpreted in its popular sense, as
understood by the people when they voted on its adoption.” Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp.,
842 A.2d 919, 925 (Pa. 2004). We are not to interpret the Constitution in a technical or
8
Rule 1532(b) provides that “[a]t any time after the filing of a petition for review in
an appellate or original jurisdiction matter the court may on application enter judgment if
the right of the applicant thereto is clear.” Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b).
[J-29-2017] - 12
strained manner, but are to interpret its words in their “popular, natural and ordinary
meaning.” Commonwealth v. Harmon, 366 A.2d 895, 897 (Pa. 1976). Moreover, “[w]e
should also consider the circumstances attending its formation and the construction
probably placed upon it by the people.” Id. We have explained that, in interpreting our
Constitution, we may consider existing decisional law under the provision, policy
considerations, and, to the extent other states have identical or similar provisions, extra-
jurisdictional case law. Jubelirer, 953 A.2d at 525 n.12.
II. Prevention of the veto return by an adjournment of the General Assembly
Resolving whether the House’s adjournment prevented the Governor’s return of
the partially-vetoed bills requires us to construe the process in Article IV, Section 15 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution for returning vetoed legislation during a legislative
adjournment. According to the Senators, we should construe the language of this
section to mean that an adjournment of the legislative chamber in which a bill originated
will always defeat the Governor’s attempted return of a bill, and will trigger the filing and
proclamation procedure of Article IV, Section 15. When the members of a legislative
body are adjourned, the Senators believe that the body ceases to exist for the
transaction of official business, preventing the Governor’s return of a vetoed bill to that
adjourned chamber. Although there may be officers or employees who continue to work
through an adjournment, the Senators argue that the Governor may not effectuate a
veto return to such an officer or employee for the same reason: an adjourned legislative
body is, by definition, always incapable of accepting the return of a vetoed bill. In
advancing this argument, the Senators assert that Article IV, Section 15 is concerned
[J-29-2017] - 13
only with whether the chamber in which the bill originated has adjourned, not with
whether both chambers of the General Assembly have adjourned.
Responding to this argument, the Governor does not offer any insight upon the
question of how we might determine when an adjournment has occurred, or upon the
issue of which legislative chamber (House, Senate, or both) we are to concern
ourselves with when answering that question. Rather, it is the Governor’s position that
the issue of whether the chamber in which the bill originated has adjourned is simply
irrelevant inasmuch as the Governor can return the bills with his objections to an agent
or officer of that house. Return to the House Parliamentarian, according to the
Governor, is the method by which the Governor has returned a bill to the originating
chamber in accord with the long-standing practice of the executive and legislative
branches. As support, the Governor relies upon an affidavit to that effect attested by
Nicole Bordonaro, the Executive Deputy General Counsel for Legislation in the Office of
General Counsel. R.R. 659a. The Governor views the record as clear that the
Parliamentarian accepted the returned bills in keeping with this long-standing practice.
The Governor believes that the filing and proclamation procedure is triggered only when
there are no agents or officers of the originating chamber who are available to accept
the Governor’s return. Otherwise, adjourned or not, the Governor believes he may
return a bill and his objections thereto to the House Parliamentarian. Because the
Governor actually did so, he believes that it is unnecessary to engage in a hypothetical
discussion of whether there was an adjournment that prevented his return of the bills.
Because the Commonwealth Court declined to resolve whether the House’s
adjournment prevented the Governor’s return, and because the Commonwealth Court
[J-29-2017] - 14
found unresolved issues of fact that preclude this determination, the Governor believes
that the first issue before us is not ripe for review. In particular, the Governor asserts
that it cannot be determined, on this record, whether the House’s adjournment was
accomplished by concurrent resolution, or whether the practice of returning bills to the
House Parliamentarian precludes the return of a vetoed bill only when the office of the
House Parliamentarian is closed.
The text of Article IV, Section 15 controls the Governor’s approval of a bill, the
process by which he may veto and return a bill, and the alternative filing and
proclamation procedure. After a bill passes both chambers, it is “presented to the
Governor.” PA. CONST. art IV, § 15. If the Governor approves the bill, “he shall sign it,”
id., and the bill becomes law. If the Governor chooses instead not to approve the bill,
the Governor must follow the veto return process. That is, if the Governor “shall not
approve he shall return [the bill] with his objections to the House in which [the bill] shall
have originated.” Id. The originating chamber shall enter the Governor’s objections “at
large upon their journal, and proceed to re-consider it.” Id. If two thirds of the members
of the originating chamber agree to pass the bill over the Governor’s objections, the bill
is sent, with the Governor’s objections, to the other chamber for reconsideration. Id. If
two thirds of the members of that chamber likewise approve the bill, the Governor’s veto
is overridden, and the bill becomes law. Id. The votes of members of both chambers
“shall be entered on the journals of each House, respectively.” Id. If the Governor does
not return a bill “within ten days after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall
be a law in like manner as if he had signed it.” Id. However, if “the General Assembly,
by their adjournment” prevents the bill’s return, “[the bill] shall be a law,” unless the
[J-29-2017] - 15
Governor follows the filing and proclamation procedure, discussed more thoroughly in
connection with the next issue.9
By conferring upon the Governor the authority to nullify legislation that has
passed both legislative houses, Section 15 entrusts him with the obligation both to
examine the provisions of the legislation within the ten days allotted by Section 15 and
to either approve it or return it, disapproved, for legislative reconsideration. Disapproval
requires the Governor to furnish the legislature with his specific objections in order to
enable the legislature to fulfill its reciprocal obligations to record the Governor’s
objections upon the legislative journal and reconsider the bill. This procedure is
enshrined in our organic charter, and ensures that the legislature and the public receive
notice of the Governor’s veto and the resulting status of the legislation. The Governor is
thereby an “integral part of the lawmaking power of the state.” Commonwealth ex rel.
Attorney Gen. v. Barnett, 48 A. 976 (Pa. 1901). No bill may become law without first
being submitted to the Governor for approval or disapproval. Id. Although legislative
power is vested in the General Assembly pursuant to Article II of the Constitution, we
9
Article IV, Section 15 was adopted in its current form in the Constitution of 1874.
With the exception of the filing and proclamation procedure, this section is substantially
identical to Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of 1790, and Article I, Section 23 of
the Constitution of 1838. The two prior constitutions did not contain the filing and
proclamation procedure. Instead, the final sentence of what would become Article IV,
Section 15 provided as follows, with the italicized language in place of what is now the
filing and proclamation procedure: “If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor
within ten days after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like
manner as if he had signed it, unless the General Assembly, by their adjournment,
prevent its return, in which case it shall be a law, unless sent back within three days
after their next meeting.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 22 (1790); PA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1838)
(emphasis added).
[J-29-2017] - 16
have described the Governor’s authority to veto a bill as a form of “limited legislative
power.” Jubelirer, 953 A.2d at 529.
The Pennsylvania colony inherited the Governor’s veto power from the King of
England. Notably, the monarch’s frequent use of this lawmaking authority, which was
vested in him as a “constituent if not a controlling third body of the parliament, in which
he might and not infrequently did sit in person,” was set forth as first among the
grievances of the colonies in the Declaration of Independence. Barnett, 48 A. at 976-
77; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“He has refused his Assent
to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.”). From the colonies,
the veto power passed into nearly all of the American constitutions, state and federal.
Barnett, 48 A. at 977.10 However, “[u]nlike the royal prerogative,” the executive veto is
“exercised by a democratically elected leader pursuant to a clearly defined constitutional
procedure.” John Houston Pope, The Pocket Veto Reconsidered, 72 IOWA L. REV. 163,
202 (1986). Moreover, in Pennsylvania, the Governor’s veto power is more constrained
than that enjoyed by a number of his peers or by the President of the United States, in
that the Governor does not have the luxury of inaction. That is, if Pennsylvania’s
Governor fails to act upon a bill that has been passed in both houses, the bill becomes
law without his signature. The “pocket veto” enshrined in some state constitutions and
in the United States Constitution prevents a bill from becoming law if the legislature
“stands adjourned when the President’s consideration period comes to a close.” The
10
Although the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 omitted the executive’s veto
power, this omission was reversed in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. See John
L. Gedid, “History of the Pennsylvania Constitution,” in Ken Gormley, ed., THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, § 3.3[d][4]-3.4[a],45-
55 (2004 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
[J-29-2017] - 17
Pocket Veto Reconsidered, 72 IOWA L. REV. at 163;11 see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7;
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
The first issue before us requires us to resolve what is meant by the phrase
“unless the General Assembly, by their adjournment, prevent [the bill’s] return.” PA.
CONST. art. IV, § 15. The General Assembly is our bicameral legislature, and is
comprised of the Senate and the House of Representatives. PA. CONST. art II, § 1
(“The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”). By its plain terms,
the provision at issue necessitates an inquiry into whether the General Assembly has
adjourned, and whether that adjournment prevented the bill’s return. The resolution of
these questions determines the Governor’s obligation to effectuate a veto through the
filing and proclamation procedure.
Our Constitution does not define “adjournment.” However, we have little difficulty
agreeing with the Commonwealth Court that the adjournment with which Article IV,
Section 15 is concerned is that of the General Assembly, not merely the chamber in
which the bill originated and to which the Governor returns the bill. This distinction is
demonstrated by the language of Section 15 itself, which speaks of “both Houses,” of
11
The United States Supreme Court has characterized the phrase “pocket veto” as
a misnomer, as it “is misleading in its implications in that it suggests that the failure of
the bill in such case is necessarily due to the disapproval of the president and the
intentional withholding of the bill from reconsideration.” The Pocket Veto Case, 279
U.S. 655 (1929). Rather, as the United States Supreme Court has explained, the
“pocket veto” results from a congressional adjournment before the President has had
the time provided by the Constitution to consider the bill. “[W]hen the adjournment of
Congress prevents the return of a bill within the allotted time, the failure of the bill to
become a law cannot properly be ascribed to the disapproval of the President . . . but is
attributable solely to the action of Congress in adjourning before the time allowed the
President for returning the bill had expired.” Id.
[J-29-2017] - 18
“the House in which [the bill] shall have originated,” of recordation in the journal and
reconsideration by that “House,” of reconsideration and approval by “the other House,”
of recordation of the votes of “both Houses,” and of the journals of “each House.” PA.
CONST. art. IV, § 15. After employing these terms to distinguish between the roles of the
respective chambers (“Houses” in the Constitution’s parlance), the concluding clause
refers not to an adjournment by either chamber separately, or of the originating
chamber alone, but to an adjournment by “the General Assembly.” Id. Had the framers
sought to make the adjournment of “the House in which [the bill] originated” the
measure of whether the bill’s return could be prevented, they would have said so. See
Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 587 (1938) (construing “the Congress by their
adjournment” in the federal veto return provision to mean both legislative chambers
rather than solely the chamber in which the bill originated). Because this phrase is free
from ambiguity, we will not ignore its plain language.
Although our conclusion in this regard is consistent with the manner in which the
Supreme Court of the United States has construed the federal veto return provision, see
Wright, 302 U.S. at 587, it is not universal among our sister states. See, e.g., Opinion
of the Justices, 175 A.2d 405, 406 (Del. 1961) (construing Delaware’s veto return and
adjournment provision, and opining: “Of course, when the Constitution speaks of an
adjournment by ‘the General Assembly,’ it necessarily means an adjournment of the
originating house”); In re An Act to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act Concerning Public
Utilities,’ 84 A. 706, 710 (N.J. 1912) (holding that “unless the legislature by their
adjournment” as used in the New Jersey Constitution’s veto return provision is
[J-29-2017] - 19
“synonymous” with “unless the house of origin by their adjournment”). It is, however,
faithful to the language chosen by the framers of our Constitution.
Turning to what type of adjournment by the General Assembly is implicated by
Article IV, Section 15, the Commonwealth Court held in 2004 that it encompasses any
type of adjournment by both chambers of the legislature. Jubelirer v. Pa. Dep’t of State,
859 A.2d 874 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In Jubelirer, the legislature presented a bill to the
Governor for his approval and, the next day, the House and Senate adjourned in the
middle of the legislative session. Id. at 875. During the adjournment, the Governor
disapproved the legislation. Id. The Governor’s representative attempted to return the
vetoed bill to the House, but found the House offices closed. Id. Accordingly, the
Governor attempted to follow the filing and proclamation procedure established in
Article IV, Section 15. Id. Nevertheless, members of the legislature challenged the
validity of the Governor’s veto under that section. Id. On the facts before it, the
Commonwealth Court held that there was an adjournment by the General Assembly. In
reaching this conclusion, the Commonwealth Court rejected the argument that the
adjournment referred to in Section 15 means only an adjournment sine die, or a final
adjournment by both chambers without setting a date of return. Id. at 877 n.2.12
The reasoning of Jubelirer is sound, and we will not disturb it. Construing the
language of Section 15 in its “popular sense,” Ieropoli, 842 A.2d at 925, that section
12
The Commonwealth Court also concluded that, because the House offices were
closed when the Governor attempted to return the vetoed bills, this adjournment
prevented the Governor’s return. Jubelirer, 859 A.2d at 876. This circumstance
required the Governor to follow the filing and proclamation procedure. The
Commonwealth Court held that the Governor complied, thereby successfully vetoing the
bill. Id. at 877.
[J-29-2017] - 20
clearly and unambiguously is premised upon an adjournment by the General Assembly.
Accordingly, any adjournment by the General Assembly is a constitutionally significant
adjournment for the purpose of Article IV, Section 15. However, anything less than an
adjournment by the General Assembly is not an adjournment for purposes of Section
15. In this respect, an adjournment by the General Assembly is distinct from a
temporary adjournment by one chamber without the other. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. II,
§ 14 (providing that neither “House” shall adjourn for more than three days without the
consent of the other). For purposes of this opinion, in order to confine our analysis to
an adjournment by the General Assembly as Section 15 requires, we will refer to the
adjournment of only one chamber, either overnight or for a period of three days or
fewer, as a temporary recess of one chamber without the other. See generally Pope,
The Pocket Veto Reconsidered, 72 IOWA L. REV. at 164 n.9 (defining various types of
legislative adjournments as distinct from temporary recesses of one chamber without
the other for three days or fewer). Therefore, an adjournment for purposes of Section
15 is any adjournment by the General Assembly, but does not include a temporary
recess of one chamber without the other.
We recognize that, although Section 15 speaks of an adjournment by the
General Assembly, it also mandates that the chamber to which the bill is returned is the
chamber in which the legislation originated, which is then under the obligation to enter
the Governor’s objections onto the journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. If the
General Assembly has not adjourned, but the chamber in which the bill originated has
done so, there is a temporary recess by one chamber without the other, not an
adjournment as required by Section 15 as a prerequisite to the prevention of the return.
[J-29-2017] - 21
The phrase in Section 15 beginning with “unless the General Assembly, by their
adjournment” would be inapplicable. The practical means of return to the originating
chamber during a temporary recess by one chamber without the other is not before us.
See, e.g., Wright, 302 U.S. at 598 (holding that an adjournment by Congress was a
prerequisite to prevention in the federal veto return provision; and sanctioning return via
a proper agent during a temporary recess of one chamber without the other). This point
bears emphasis: it is the bicameral action of both chambers that distinguishes
unicameral action by one chamber from actions by the General Assembly as such.
Only an adjournment by the General Assembly constitutes an adjournment for purposes
of Section 15.
Having established that it is an adjournment by the General Assembly with which
Section 15 is concerned, rather than solely the originating chamber, we also conclude
that the General Assembly had, in fact, adjourned when the Governor sought to return
the bills and his objections on July 10, 2014. As reflected in the legislative journals,
both chambers of the General Assembly were adjourned on that date. See supra n.3.
The Commonwealth Court held that whether the General Assembly had
adjourned depended not upon whether both chambers were adjourned, but upon
whether their respective adjournments were accomplished by a concurrent resolution.
To reach this conclusion, the Commonwealth Court relied upon Article II, Section 14 of
the Constitution, which provides that “[n]either House shall, without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the
two Houses shall be sitting.” PA. CONST. art. II, § 14. Additionally, the Commonwealth
Court felt itself bound by 101 Pa. Code § 7.24(a), which provides that “[n]either house
[J-29-2017] - 22
may, without the consent of the other house, adjourn for more than [three] days. Such
an adjournment is accomplished by the adoption of a concurrent resolution.”
Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court concluded that an adjournment by the General
Assembly requires the consent of each chamber to the adjournment of the other, and
that consent can be demonstrated only by a concurrent resolution. This is incorrect, for
several reasons.
First, Article IV, Section 15 requires consideration of whether the General
Assembly was, in fact, adjourned. There is no factual dispute that the General
Assembly was adjourned on July 10, 2014, when the Governor attempted to return the
vetoed bills. See supra n.3. To answer the factual question before us, we need not
resolve whether one chamber adjourned with the consent of the other. Second, to the
extent consent is a factual predicate to adjournment, it is a reasonable presumption
that, when the legislative journals reflect that both chambers were adjourned in excess
of three days, it was by consent rather than in violation of Article II, Section 14 of the
Constitution.
Third, although Article IV, Section 15 requires an examination of whether the
General Assembly had adjourned, Article II, Section 14 is concerned with ensuring that
each chamber obtains the consent of the other chamber before adjourning unilaterally in
excess of three days. See Frame v. Sutherland, 327 A.2d 623, 626 (Pa. 1974) (“The
entire constitution[al] scheme is clearly predicated on the assumption that adjournment
[J-29-2017] - 23
[of more than three days] may not be a unilateral act on the part of one of the houses of
the General Assembly.”).13 We are not here faced with a unilateral adjournment.14
Our analysis now turns to the prevention aspect of Section 15: whether the
General Assembly’s adjournment prevented the Governor’s return. The wording of
Section 15 leaves unanswered the question of whether all adjournments by definition
prevent the return of a bill, or whether only certain adjournments may prevent the return.
During a legislative session, Section 15 requires the Governor physically to
return the bill with his objections to the legislature. PA. CONST. art. IV, § 15. The
originating chamber, in turn, accepts the returned bill and objections, enters the
13
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Baer highlights the factual
ambiguity regarding the General Assembly’s adjournment that may arise in other
scenarios. See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at 3 (questioning whether a short
break is an adjournment for purposes of Section 15, or whether a simultaneous
adjournment by both chambers without mutual consent is an adjournment for purposes
of Section 15). The broad construction endorsed by Justice Baer would encompass any
adjournment, of any duration, by both chambers. Id. at 5.
While we may agree with Justice Baer that the simultaneous overnight
adjournment by both houses may constitute a Section 15 adjournment in a case
presenting such a scenario, we need not resolve that factual scenario in this case.
Rather, the facts before us include an adjournment by the General Assembly in excess
of three days, as demonstrated by the respective journals. Although Justice Baer
opines that the adjournment of each chamber must have been accomplished with the
consent of the other in accord with Article II, Section 14, id. at 6, as explained above,
this provision is concerned solely with the unilateral adjournment of one chamber.
Frame, 327 at 626.
14
It bears noting that the Commonwealth Court’s reliance upon the Pennsylvania
Code’s requirement of a concurrent resolution to demonstrate consent was misplaced in
any event. Although a concurrent resolution would certainly be probative of a bicameral
adjournment, it is not dispositive. We are tasked solely with interpreting the language of
the Constitution. The Pennsylvania Code is not constitutional or statutory law, nor even
a regulation as such. It is rather a compilation of procedures published by the
Legislative Reference Bureau, a supporting agency of the General Assembly, “for
informational purposes only.” See Preface to Pa. Code tit. 101. As such, the Code
itself lacks binding effect. It does not control our interpretation of the Constitution.
[J-29-2017] - 24
objections upon its journal, and proceeds to reconsider it. Id. The Governor may return
the bill at any time within the ten days provided for his consideration, unless by reason
of adjournment of the General Assembly he is prevented from doing so. Id. Section 15
contemplates a collaborative process between the legislature and the executive, and
directs that, in the case of a veto, the product of the Governor’s deliberation, i.e., his
objections, must be shared with the legislature for recordation upon its journal and for
the legislature’s own deliberation and reconsideration.
Our construction of the phrase “unless the General Assembly, by their
adjournment, prevent its return” in Section 15 is informed by the specific purposes that
the veto return procedure is intended to serve. These purposes are manifest in the
language of Section 15: to provide the Governor with suitable time to consider the
legislation, to provide the public with notice of the status of legislation via the legislative
journal, and to provide the legislature with the opportunity to reconsider the legislation in
light of the executive’s objections.
Public notice of the status of legislation is achieved by the constitutional
command that, upon the Governor’s return, the chamber in which the bill originated
shall enter the Governor’s objections at large upon its journal, before it proceeds to
reconsider the legislation. The legislative journal is a record of the basic steps in the
legislative process, and the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that the legislature
record its official actions in the journal. See PA. CONST. art II, § 12 (requiring each
legislative chamber to “keep a journal of its proceedings”); PA. CONST. art III, § 8
(requiring the signing of bills to be entered on the journal); PA. CONST. art. III, § 5
(requiring votes on amendments to bills to be recorded in the journal); PA. CONST. art.
[J-29-2017] - 25
XI, § 1 (requiring proposed constitutional amendments to be entered in the journal).
The legislature constitutionally is required to make and preserve an accurate record of
its actions, a requirement that was codified with the creation of the Legislative Journal.
See 46 P.S. § 81.
Legislative journals provide a clear, accurate, verifiable, public record of the
legislative process by which a bill becomes law, and they demonstrate whether a bill
has been enacted by the legislature, has been vetoed by the Governor, and, if so,
whether the legislature has overridden the veto. The journal not only provides public
notice as to the status of legislation, it also puts the members of the chamber in which
the bill originated on notice that the Governor has vetoed the bill so that they can
determine whether to reconsider the bill. As the Supreme Court of the United States
has remarked, legislative journals create an official record, “giving public, certain and
prompt knowledge as to the status of the bill.” The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 685.
By the design of Section 15, when the General Assembly is in session, the chamber in
which the bill originated receives a returned bill from the Governor, provides a record of
the return and notice to the public about the state of the legislation by entering the
objections upon the journal, and proceeds to reconsider the bill.
In contrast, during an adjournment by the General Assembly, the chamber in
which the bill originated cannot exercise any of its constitutional functions. It can neither
enter the Governor’s objections upon its journal nor proceed to reconsider the
legislation. See Frame, 327 A.2d at 627 (by adjourning, a legislative chamber
“disabl[es] itself from the consideration of bills”). Because the originating chamber
cannot enter the return into its journal while the General Assembly is adjourned, public
[J-29-2017] - 26
notice of the veto is compromised until the General Assembly reconvenes. Until then,
nothing will alert the public about the bill’s status. Allowing the Governor to return a bill
to the originating chamber during an adjournment of the General Assembly would
deprive the public of prompt notice of the legislation’s status.
Under Section 15, the originating chamber can receive the bill only when the
General Assembly sits in an organized capacity for the transaction of business, the
originating chamber is able to enter the Governor’s objections upon its journal, and that
chamber is in a position to reconsider the bill. Only actual and public return to the
originating chamber while the General Assembly is in session can fulfill the Governor’s
return obligation and provide prompt public notice about the status of the bill.
Accordingly, we hold that, pursuant to Section 15, the Governor cannot return a bill to
the originating chamber when the General Assembly has adjourned.
It is the prospect that the public will not be informed promptly and properly about
the return of a vetoed bill by recordation of the Governor’s objections upon the
legislative journal that also drives our conclusion that return to an agent will not satisfy
the constitutional obligation of a return to the chamber in which the bill originated.
Without authority to accept the return, notify the legislature, and record the Governor’s
objections upon the legislative journal as required by Section 15, this agent would be
obliged to hold the Governor’s return in “a state of suspended animation,” The Pocket
Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 684, providing no record or notice of the receipt that Section 15
requires.
The Governor appears to argue that returning a bill during an adjournment to an
agent or representative of the originating chamber who has the authority to enter the
[J-29-2017] - 27
Governor’s objections upon the legislative journal would provide the constitutionally
required record of return, notice to the public about the status of the legislation, and
notice to the members of the originating chamber that the bill had been returned. We
reject this argument as too speculative. Were we to contemplate return to an agent
during a bicameral adjournment, a question would arise regarding who may accept the
Governor’s veto and record the Governor’s objections upon the journal. The vagueness
of authorizing delivery to an agent of the chamber suggests the constitutional infirmities
of this approach. How can we assess who may perform these functions on behalf of the
adjourned legislative chamber, and how is the Governor to know that his veto is
effectuated by return to this individual? Such vagaries suggest the weakness of this
argument.
The Governor offers the House Parliamentarian as the individual who may
accept the Governor’s veto. According to the Governor, it is consistent with long-
standing practice to make a veto return to the House Parliamentarian, whether or not
the House of Representatives is in session. We reject the Governor’s argument that the
procedure utilized for the return of a bill during a legislative session somehow dictates
the procedure to be used during an adjournment of the General Assembly. When the
General Assembly is in session, the originating chamber may accept the return via an
agent or representative, record the Governor’s objections in the legislative journal, and
proceed to reconsider the bill. Whatever practices the executive and legislative
branches utilize to facilitate a return during a legislative session, when the originating
chamber is capable of undertaking the obligations imposed by Section 15, are of little
[J-29-2017] - 28
guidance in discerning when an adjournment of the General Assembly may prevent the
Governor’s return.
Were we to presume that each chamber (or “House”) of the legislature may by
appropriate action confer upon certain agents the authority to receive a bill returned by
the Governor, we would have no basis upon which to presume that the House has
conferred such authority upon the House Parliamentarian. The House Parliamentarian
is a creature of statute, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
the commencement of each session of the General Assembly. See 46 P.S. § 36.15
This statute does not confer upon the House Parliamentarian the important
constitutional function of receiving veto returns from the Governor, entering the
Governor’s objections upon the journal, and retaining custody of them until the House
reconvenes.
Nevertheless, the Governor asserts that the record before us establishes that the
House Parliamentarian accepted the return in accord with the long-standing practice of
the Governor and the General Assembly. Governor’s Brief at 15. The sole basis for the
Governor’s argument is the affidavit of Nicole Bordonaro, Executive Deputy General
Counsel for Legislation in the Office of General Counsel. R.R. 657a-59a. Ms.
Bordonaro stated that, after the Governor signed and partially vetoed the GAA and the
FCA, an employee of the Office of General Counsel, acting as a representative of the
15
The House Parliamentarian “advise[s] the Speaker on parliamentary questions
and legislative procedure, and . . . perform[s] such other duties in connection with the
house desk and house transcribing room as the Speaker and Chief Clerk of the house
shall direct.” 46 P.S. § 36. Additionally, “[b]etween legislative sessions, the
parliamentarian shall perform such duties for the Speaker, any committee of the house,
or any legislative commission, as the Speaker of the house shall prescribe.” Id.
[J-29-2017] - 29
Governor, delivered the partially vetoed bills to the office of the House Parliamentarian
“consistent with the established procedure for the return to the House by the Governor
of bills that he has vetoed pursuant to Article IV, Section 15, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, or that contain items that he has vetoed under Article IV, Section 16 of the
Constitution.” Id. at 658a-59a.
This affidavit does not address the House Parliamentarian’s authority to record
the Governor’s objections upon the legislative journal. Indeed, the Governor appears to
agree with the Senators that the House Parliamentarian can do none of the acts
required of the originating chamber upon the Governor’s return. See Governor’s Brief at
27 (“[T]he Parliamentarian can ensure that, when the House is next in session, its
members will learn of the veto and may, if they choose, seek to override that veto.”).
Indeed, when the Governor returned the bills and objections to the House
Parliamentarian, the House Parliamentarian did not enter these objections upon the
legislative journal. There are no entries upon the legislature journal during the time the
House and Senate were adjourned, and no entries thereafter reflecting the Governor’s
return of the legislation with objections. Without entry onto the journal, there was no
public notice concerning the status of the legislation as required by Section 15.
Accordingly, we reject the Governor’s argument that the House Parliamentarian was
capable of accepting the return on behalf of the House during an adjournment of the
General Assembly.
Attentive regard for the reasoning and experiences of our sister states and the
national government on both sides of this issue informs our conclusion that return must
be made while the General Assembly is in session, and cannot be made to an agent
[J-29-2017] - 30
during an adjournment of the General Assembly. These decisions are, on balance,
conflicting, due in no small part to different definitions of the constitutional requirement
of an adjournment, as well as variations in long-standing practices.
Perhaps the most well-known of the precedents is The Pocket Veto Case,
interpreting the veto return provision of the Presentment Clause of the United States
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, Cl. 2, which parallels our own Article IV, Section 15
in some respects. The clause provides that if the President, following the presentment
of a bill by the legislature, does not sign and approve the bill, “he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal and proceed to reconsider it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
7, Cl. 2. Further, “[i]f any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law,
in the like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.” Id. Faced with the question of
whether a congressional adjournment that began on the seventh day of the President’s
consideration of proposed legislation and continued through the tenth day prevented the
President’s return of the bill, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the
precise issue we now consider, i.e., whether Congress, by its adjournment, prevented
the President from returning the bill within ten days. 279 U.S. at 674. In no uncertain
terms, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the President could,
during a mid-session adjournment of Congress, return the bill to the originating chamber
via an appropriate agent, to be held by such agent and presented to the originating
chamber when that house reconvened. Id. at 674-75. Using broad language, the Court
[J-29-2017] - 31
explained that, during a congressional adjournment, the originating chamber would be
unable “to receive the return, enter the President’s objections on its journal, and
proceed to reconsider the bill.” Id. at 682. Therefore, the High Court concluded that no
return can be made during an adjournment of Congress. Id. at 683.
Rejecting the argument that return could be made during the adjournment via an
officer or an agent of the originating “House,” the Court held that delivery of the bill to
such an officer or agent, who could “hold it in his own hands for days, weeks or perhaps
months, . . . keeping the bill . . . in a state of suspended animation until the House
resumes its sittings, with no certain knowledge on the part of the public as to whether it
had or had not been seasonably delivered, and necessarily causing delay in its
reconsideration which the Constitution evidently intended to avoid,” would not suffice.
Id. at 684. Return to an agent was, the Court held, a “fictitious return,” unable to provide
the public with certain and prompt knowledge as to the status of the bill. Id. at 685.
Likewise, in Alabama, “[n]o congregation of the members of the house can, in a
constitutional sense, constitute the House . . . or exercise any of its constitutional
functions” during a legislative adjournment, nor can the return be made to any officer of
the originating house when the legislature is not in session. State v. Joseph, 57 So.
942, 944 (Ala. 1911). Similarly, in Connecticut, by custom and practice, the Governor
may only effectuate a veto return “by his hand for delivery in open house.” State v.
Town of S. Norwalk, 58 A. 759, 760 (Conn. 1904). In Connecticut, like Pennsylvania
and its federal counterpart, “[i]t is of the first importance that the people should know to
what law they are subject.” Id. Considering the importance of public notice, the
Connecticut court reasoned that the means of knowledge may only be had if the fact of
[J-29-2017] - 32
the return and the date of the return are readily ascertainable, which cannot occur
during a legislative adjournment. Id.; see also An Act Concerning Public Utilities, 84 A.
at 710 (rejecting the argument that return may be made during a legislative adjournment
by delivering the bill to an officer of the originating chamber); Opinion of the Justices,
175 A.2d at 409 (holding that an adjournment prevents the return of a bill, and
observing that “[d]elivery to an officer of the house involves not only a serious
constitutional question, but, as a practical matter, presents serious difficulties” such as
the lack of public notice); Illinois ex rel. Harless v. Hatch, 33 Ill. 9 (1863) (rejecting the
argument that the Governor could make a return during an adjournment via an agent of
the originating chamber, and holding that unless the legislature is in session, the
Governor cannot return a vetoed bill).
All of these decisions are driven by the recognition that an executive return
during a legislative adjournment (however that jurisdiction defines a constitutionally
significant adjournment) will, ipso facto, preclude public notice of the return, thereby
depriving the public of the ability to know by which laws the people are bound, a
constitutional infirmity that delivery to an agent cannot overcome.
In contrast, several other states have disregarded the public notice component of
the veto return process. Courts from these states have held that a mid-session
adjournment does not necessarily prevent a return because the Governor’s objections
may be delivered to officers, agents, or representatives of the chamber in which the bill
originated, to be held until that chamber reconvenes. Significantly, most of these
jurisdictions define “adjournment” for purposes of their veto return provision as a final
[J-29-2017] - 33
adjournment. In these jurisdictions, without a final adjournment, there could be no
question as to whether the adjournment could have prevented the Governor’s return.
For example, the Wisconsin, Louisiana, New Hampshire, Michigan, Minnesota,
and Tennessee courts have defined adjournment for purposes of their respective
constitutional veto return provisions to mean only an adjournment sine die. Anything
less is not an adjournment that prevents the Governor’s return. This stands in sharp
contrast to the law of Pennsylvania, which provides that any type of adjournment by the
General Assembly may prevent the Governor’s return. See Jubelirer, 859 A.2d at 876-
77. Based upon this interpretation, these state courts have held that a mid-session
adjournment does not prevent the Governor’s return, the constitutional provision
pertaining to an adjournment that may prevent the Governor’s return is not implicated,
and return to an agent or officer of the legislative body during a mid-session
adjournment does not, therefore, raise any constitutional implications. See State ex rel.
Sullivan v. Dammann, 267 N.W. 433, 436-37 (Wis. 1936) (unless the adjournment is
sine die, the Governor could effectuate the return of vetoed legislation by delivering it to
an officer or clerk to be held until the originating chamber reconvened); Opinion of
Justices, 45 N.H. 607, 610 (1864) (providing that return during a mid-session
adjournment may be made “to the speaker, or to the clerk, or some other proper
officer”); Johnson City v. Tenn. Eastern Elec. Co., 182 S.W. 587 (Tenn. 1916) (holding
that return may be made during a mid-session adjournment to the clerk of the
originating chamber); State ex rel. State Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Sec. of State, 27 So.
565 (La. 1900) (holding that only a final adjournment by the legislature may prevent the
Governor’s return); Wood v. State Admin. Bd., 238 N.W. 16, 19-20 (Mich. 1931)
[J-29-2017] - 34
(holding that only a final adjournment may prevent the Governor’s return of a vetoed bill;
otherwise, “return may be made to the proper officer”); State v. Hoppe, 215 N.W.2d
797, 804 (Minn. 1974) (holding that because a temporary adjournment of the legislature
does not prevent the return of the bill, the Governor was free to return the bill, with
objections “to any member or officer of the proper house of the legislature”).
Similarly, in Wright, the United States Supreme Court established that only the
Senate (the chamber in which the legislation had originated) had adjourned. Congress,
as such, had not adjourned. Thus, there was no constitutionally significant
adjournment, and it could not be that “Congress by their Adjournment prevent[ed]” the
bill’s return. Rather, the Court instead confronted a temporary recess of one chamber
without the other, and the prevention aspect of the veto return provision of the
United States Constitution was not implicated. 302 U.S. at 587 (citing U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 7, Cl. 2); id. at 597 (“[T]he words of paragraph 2 of section 7 [of Article I] are
inapplicable.”). From this premise flowed the Court’s conclusion that the President’s
return to the Senate during a temporary recess of the Senate could be made to the
Secretary of the Senate. The Court identified the concerns that drove the decision in
The Pocket Veto Case: uncertainty about the fact of delivery and prolonged uncertainty
about the status of the legislation. According to the High Court, these concerns were
absent in Wright and served to distinguish The Pocket Veto Case.
To the extent any consistency can be ascertained from these cases, they support
the Senators’ position. In jurisdictions where only a final, sine die adjournment of both
legislative houses will prevent the executive’s return, during a mid-session adjournment
or a temporary recess of one chamber without the other, return to an authorized agent
[J-29-2017] - 35
or representative will suffice.16 In these jurisdictions, without the factual predicate of a
constitutionally significant adjournment, a mid-session adjournment could not, by
definition, prevent the executive’s return. However, in states that have construed the
adjournment requirement of their respective veto provisions to include all bicameral
adjournments as this Court has now concluded, return during an adjournment to an
officer or agent will not suffice.
As in the federal constitutional context, the adjournment of which our own
Section 15 speaks is any simultaneous adjournment by both chambers of the
legislature. It is the bicameral action by both chambers that distinguishes action by one
chamber. When the Governor seeks to return a bill and both chambers of the General
Assembly are in session, the Governor returns the vetoed bill to the originating
16
Chief Justice Saylor believes that our interpretation of “General Assembly” in
Article IV, Section 15 is problematic because, if the originating chamber has adjourned,
but the other chamber has not, the Governor can neither effectuate a return to the
originating house nor utilize the filing and proclamation procedure. While we agree with
the Chief Justice that we do not currently confront the scenario he imagines, it is worth
noting that other jurisdictions have dealt effectively with this dilemma. For instance,
pursuant to Wright, when the originating chamber has adjourned but Congress has not,
then return by the President to an appropriate agent of the adjourned chamber will
suffice. Wright, 302 U.S. at 592. Moreover, to the extent Chief Justice Saylor’s
dilemma imagines that the adjourned chamber has failed to appoint an appropriate
agent, at least one commentator has suggested that, in the absence of a legislative
adjournment, “evasion by the originating [chamber] of presidential return of a bill has a
counterpart in presidential evasion of congressional presentation of a bill. The factors
that inhibit the latter event may be applied to control the former.” Pope, The Pocket
Veto Reconsidered, 72 IOWA L. REV. at 199 n.336. Pope observed that there is an
implied constitutional duty on the part of the President to be reasonably available to
receive a bill from Congress. See Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337
F.2d 624, 630 (Ct. Cl. 1964). If the executive is constitutionally obligated to be available
for presentation from the legislature, then perhaps a reciprocal obligation would require
the originating chamber, in the absence of a legislative adjournment, to be reasonably
available to receive the return of disapproved bills. Pope, The Pocket Veto
Reconsidered, 72 IOWA L. REV. at 199 n.336. As the issue is not before us, we will
refrain from engaging further in hypothetical dilemmas.
[J-29-2017] - 36
chamber. When both chambers of the General Assembly have adjourned, the
Governor cannot constitutionally return a bill, and the Governor must turn to the filing
and proclamation procedure.
Resolving the constitutional limitations of the veto return process during an
adjournment by the General Assembly does not resolve whether the Governor
effectively vetoed the GAA and FCA. Because the General Assembly, by its
adjournment, prevented the Governor’s return, the Governor was obligated to comply
with the filing and proclamation procedure of Section 15 to effectuate his partial veto of
the FCA and GAA. Indeed, any factual ambiguity that may arise during the veto return
process can always be cured by the Governor’s compliance with the filing and
proclamation procedure to effectuate his veto. It is to this second issue that we now
turn.17
III. The filing and proclamation procedure
Our Constitution provides two alternative methods by which the Governor may
veto legislation. If the General Assembly is not adjourned, then, upon return, the veto is
17
Chief Justice Saylor suggests that, given the factual predicate of this case, we
need not resolve whether the General Assembly, as opposed solely to the originating
chamber, must be adjourned to prevent a gubernatorial return. While jurisprudentially
sound as a general principle, Chief Justice Saylor’s suggestion is inapt under the
particular circumstances of this case. The filing and proclamation procedure is
implicated only where there has been an adjournment by the General Assembly. It is
therefore necessary to answer the question of whether there has been such an
adjournment prior to considering whether the Governor complied with the filing and
proclamation procedure.
[J-29-2017] - 37
effective. If the General Assembly is adjourned, then the Governor must follow the filing
and proclamation procedure in order to effectuate his veto.18
According to the Commonwealth Court, the Governor complied with the public
proclamation requirement of Article IV, Section 15 by having the Office of the Budget
issue a press release regarding the Governor’s vetoes. The July 10, 2014 press
release was entitled “Governor Corbett Signs 2014-15 Budget and Fiscal Code, Vetoes
Specific Legislative Appropriations and Places Legislative Spending Initiatives into
Budgetary Reserves.” R.R. 661a-64a. Included in the press release were quotations
from the Governor purporting to have partially vetoed the legislation in order to balance
the budget for the benefit of the people of Pennsylvania in the face of the General
Assembly’s refusal to do so. Id. Although the Governor highlighted those aspects of
the legislation that advanced key administration priorities, he also was critical of the
General Assembly for its “failure to address critical challenges facing our state.” Id. at
661a. The press release took particular aim at the General Assembly’s allocation of
funds with which the Governor disagreed, targeting the General Assembly’s increase of
its own budget, and praising the use of the Governor’s line-item veto to eliminate these
spending provisions. After listing the vetoed provisions, the press release criticized the
General Assembly for failing to engage in pension reform and for forcing local school
districts to raise property taxes. The press release quoted the Governor’s call to the
citizens of Pennsylvania to join him in demanding action from the General Assembly on
pension reform. Id. at 662a.
18
There is no dispute herein that the Governor filed the bills and his objections with
the Secretary.
[J-29-2017] - 38
The Senators dispute the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the press
release was a public proclamation as intended by the Constitution. They assert that the
notice that is to be provided by the public proclamation is the fact that the Governor has
filed the bill and his objections with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, rather than a
generalized description of the vetoed provisions. The Senators observe that the press
release failed to include this critical information. The Senators further argue that the
informality of this press release undermines the conclusion that it could serve as a
public proclamation; indeed, formality is its defining feature.
The Governor argues that, because the press release provided notice to the
public about the Governor’s vetoes, it sufficed as a public proclamation. Addressing the
degree of formality required of a public proclamation, the Governor argues that the
Senators seek to enshrine formality for its own sake, without addressing the purpose of
the public proclamation. The Governor characterizes this purpose as an official
announcement to the public of matters of governmental importance. Noting that
formality is not constitutionally required, the Governor claims the discretion to decide
upon the form a public proclamation should take.19
Section 15 contains mandatory provisions to effectuate a veto when the General
Assembly’s adjournment prevents the Governor’s return directly to the chamber in
which the legislation originated. Although the filing and proclamation procedure has
19
The Senators also argue that, if the press release was a proclamation, then the
Governor did not issue the press release as Section 15 requires. Rather, the Office of
the Budget issued the press release. The Governor responds that the Office of the
Budget simply acted as the Governor’s representative in this regard by issuing the
public proclamation on the Governor’s behalf. Because we find the other arguments
dispositive, we need not and do not resolve this dispute.
[J-29-2017] - 39
been part of our Constitution since 1874, there is little evidence of the history regarding
its addition. Nor does the Constitution contain a definition of public proclamation. We
presume that the framers of the filing and proclamation provision carefully considered
the Governor’s veto power, an executive prerogative which must be exercised within the
time and manner provided in the instrument granting that prerogative. When the
Governor chooses to utilize his veto authority, no question should exist as to the
necessary factual predicates.
We have not had prior occasion to define a public proclamation.20 See In re City
of Pittsburg, 66 A. 348, 349 (Pa. 1907) (observing that, although the Constitution
requires the Governor to issue a proclamation to call the General Assembly together in
an extraordinary session, “no form of proclamation is to be followed”). In its “popular,
natural and ordinary meaning,” as commonly understood when adopted, Harmon, 366
A.2d at 897 (directing our interpretation of the words of the Constitution), a public
proclamation is a formal public announcement. See, e.g., 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1412 (1st ed. 1909) (defining proclamation as “a formal order or intimation
issued by the sovereign or other legal authority, and made public either by being
announced by a herald or by being posted up in public places”); 12 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989) (same); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining proclamation as “[a] formal public announcement made by the government”).
20
Section 15 is not the only provision of our Constitution to require proclamations.
The Governor must issue a proclamation to call a special session of the General
Assembly, PA. CONST. art. III, § 12, and to convene the Senate in an extraordinary
session, PA. CONST. art. IV, § 12.
[J-29-2017] - 40
These definitions encompass two aspects of what is commonly understood as a
public proclamation: public notice and formality. As understood in its ordinary meaning,
a public proclamation is intended to provide formal notice to the public of an official
governmental matter of importance.
With regard to public notice, Section 15 provides that, when the General
Assembly’s adjournment prevents the Governor’s return of a veto, the veto will
nevertheless be effective if the Governor “shall file the same [i.e., the bill], with his
objections, in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and give notice thereof
by public proclamation.” PA. CONST. art. IV, § 15. The content of the public
proclamation is therefore dictated by the plain language of Section 15. The “notice
thereof” that is to be provided by public proclamation is notice that the Governor has
filed the bill and his objections with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Substantively,
this is the only requirement for the content of a veto proclamation provided by Section
15. We agree with the Senators that the press release issued by the Office of the
Budget failed to include the requisite notice that the Governor had filed the bill and his
objections with the Secretary.
Attempting to establish the July 10, 2014 press release as a public proclamation,
the Governor cannot overcome this substantive failing. Rather, the Governor’s
argument is that the public should be more concerned with the fact of a veto than with
his technical compliance with the filing requirement of Section 15. However, the
Governor’s argument about what the public is more likely to concern itself with cannot
overcome the plain language of the filing and proclamation procedure established by
[J-29-2017] - 41
Section 15. Pursuant to the substantive requirement for a public proclamation in this
context, the press release did not provide the notice required by Section 15.
The intent apparent in the public proclamation provision of Section 15 is to
ensure public notice about the status of legislation, just as this intent is apparent in the
veto return requirement that the legislature enter the Governor’s objections upon its
journal. In either scenario, the public ostensibly is apprised of the status of the
legislation. See The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 685 (observing the importance of
providing the public with “public, certain and prompt knowledge as to the status of the
bill”). The proclamation notifies the citizens of Pennsylvania that an event of legal or
constitutional significance has occurred, and directs that, should the public desire to
view the Governor’s vetoes, the bill and objections have been filed and are accessible
for inspection.
In addition, formality in this context puts the public on notice that the
announcement has official significance, and signifies the gravity of the information that
the announcement conveys. Clarity thwarts misapprehension regarding the act’s
significance. This clarity is achieved through formality, a principle that prevents the
attachment of constitutional significance to informal political communications conveyed
in sundry formats ranging from press advisories to impromptu media opportunities to
Instagram to tweets, and to many other scenarios limited only by what the human mind
and technological progress can conjure. Formality is a critical tool in distinguishing
political rhetoric and advocacy in its myriad forms from public notice of a constitutionally
or legally significant declaration. Such formality cannot be abandoned.
[J-29-2017] - 42
Indicia of formality historically have included official designations of an
announcement’s constitutional significance, whether by entitling it a proclamation or,
more recently, a notice of veto, or by affixing the Governor’s signature under seal of the
Commonwealth. Such indicia have characterized veto proclamations that the Governor
has issued since the filing and proclamation procedure was added to the Constitution of
1874. They serve to put the public on notice that there are important legal implications
to the official government action.
As reflected in an opinion of the Attorney General from 1915, “it has been the
universal custom for the Governor to make public proclamations of all bills vetoed after
the legislature has adjourned” in substantially the following form, which appears in the
Pamphlet Laws:
A Proclamation by the Governor.
In the name and by the authority of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Executive Department.
A Proclamation.
“I (name of Governor), Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
have caused this proclamation to issue, and in compliance with the
provisions of Article IV, Section 15, of the Constitution, do hereby give
notice that I have filed in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
with my objections thereto, the following bills passed by both Houses of
the General Assembly, viz., Senate Bill No. -, etc., etc.”
Recall of Bills Disapproved by the Gov., 24 Pa. D. 544, 547, 1915 WL 5000, at *4 (Pa.
Atty. Gen. 1915).
Additionally, proclamations are routinely published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin in
a similar format, with comparable indicia of formality:
[J-29-2017] - 43
PROCLAMATION
I, Dick Thornburgh, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
have caused this Proclamation to issue and, in compliance with the
provisions of Section 15 of Article IV of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
do hereby give notice that I have filed in the Office of the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, with my objections thereto, the following bills passed by
both houses of the General Assembly at the Regular Session of 1984, viz:
House Bill No. 971, Printer's No. 1098, entitled “An act exempting bonds
of municipalities and school districts of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania from taxation within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”
House Bill No. 386, Printer's No. 605, entitled “An act amending the act of
June 1, 1959 (P. L. 392), entitled ‘An act relating to the retirement of State
employes; amending, revising, consolidating and changing the laws
relating thereto,’ further defining the term ‘State employe’ and providing for
crediting of certain service in the Philadelphia retirement system to the
State system.”
GIVEN under my hand and the Great Seal of the Commonwealth, at the
City of Harrisburg, this thirtieth day of December, in the year of our Lord
one thousand nine hundred and eighty-four, and of the Commonwealth
the two hundred and ninth.
BY THE GOVERNOR: DICK THORNBURGH
Governor
William R. Davis
Secretary of the Commonwealth
101 Pa. Code § 19.363.21
Consistent with this practice, veto proclamations since 1874 have included the
express language that the Governor has filed the bill and his objections with the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, expressly have been designated as proclamations (or
lately, perhaps notices of veto), and have included the signature of the Governor under
21
We offer the Pennsylvania Code proclamation template and the 1915 opinion of
the Attorney General in order to illustrate the political branches’ historical understanding
of public proclamations, not to prescribe and mandate rote adherence to a specific
script.
[J-29-2017] - 44
seal of the Commonwealth. Although not binding upon the judiciary in our interpretation
of the Constitution, we afford “respectful consideration and persuasive force” to this
historical understanding and past practices of the executive branch, whose duty it has
been since 1874 to issue veto proclamations in accord with Section 15. See Renshaw
v. Mayor & Select & Common Councils of City of Phila., 93 A. 1080, 1082 (Pa. 1915).
This experience shows the executive’s traditional and historical understanding of a veto
proclamation.
This is not to say that the Governor may not, in his discretion, alter the form of a
veto proclamation from this traditional usage. What the Governor may not do, however,
is abandon the requirement that a veto proclamation include the Governor’s assertion
that he has filed the vetoed bill and his objections with the Secretary of the
Commonwealth. Nor may the Governor abandon the hallmarks of a public
proclamation: public notice and formality.22
Notwithstanding the necessity of formality, the means by which a proclamation is
delivered to the public may well evolve over time. Whether the Governor chooses to
22
To the extent that Justice Donohue would dispense with formality as a
constitutional requirement, we respectfully disagree. As explained above, a public
proclamation, as commonly understood in 1874, includes public notice and formality.
The requirement of formality is rooted in the Constitution’s language, interpreted in its
popular sense, as understood by the people when they voted for its adoption. See
Ieropoli, 842 A.2d at 925. We are not engrafting requirements onto the Constitution, but
are rather interpreting that charter, as we must.
To the extent that Justice Donohue agrees with the requirement of formality but
disagrees that formality is demonstrated by the announcement’s designation and the
Governor’s signature under seal, we emphasize that our holding today is not intended to
define and codify for all time the manner in which formality is established in every
instance. Instead, we intend merely to demonstrate the historical understanding of
public proclamations in our Commonwealth and to compare this understanding to the
lack of formality evident in the July 10, 2014 press release.
[J-29-2017] - 45
make the proclamation public by posting it online, by publishing it in a newspaper, or
through other reasonable means designed to effectuate public notice, the specific mode
of dissemination is not dispositive in our analysis of whether the item disseminated was
indeed a proclamation.
In addition to omitting a statement that the Governor had filed the bill, with his
objections, with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the July 10, 2014 press release
lacked any hallmarks of formality that would render it a constitutionally significant
pronouncement. Rather, it was an informal communication to the public via mass
media. Although it achieved the objectives of public dissemination, it lacked the
formality required to make the public aware that the announcement had legal and
constitutional significance. We agree with the Senators that the Commonwealth Court’s
acceptance of the press release as a veto proclamation “reduce[d] a constitutional
mandate to a negligible informality.” Senators’ Brief at 38. The July 10 press release
was, by its own designation, simply a press release. It was not a proclamation.
Accordingly, the Governor failed to comply with the filing and proclamation procedure of
Article IV, Section 15 to effectuate his vetoes of the FCA and the GAA. Those bills
became law in their entirety.
Having determined that the Governor’s purported partial vetoes of the FCA and
the GAA failed, we have no occasion to resolve whether the Governor’s line-item veto
authority of Article IV, Section 16 extends to the FCA. The veto was ineffective in its
entirety in any event. Accordingly, resolution of the last issue before us must await
another day.
[J-29-2017] - 46
We reverse the Commonwealth Court’s December 30, 2015 Opinion and Order
denying summary relief to the Senators. We hold that the Governor’s purported vetoes
of the FCA and the GAA were constitutionally deficient, and that the Senators were
entitled to summary relief on their petition for review.
Justices Todd and Mundy join the opinion.
Chief Justice Saylor joins Parts I and III of the opinion and the mandate
and files a concurring opinion.
Justice Donohue joins Parts I and II of the opinion and the mandate and
files a concurring opinion.
Justice Baer joins Parts I and III of the opinion and files a concurring and
dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Dougherty.
[J-29-2017] - 47
Scarnati, J.,et al, Aplts. v. Wolf, T.
Combined Opinion