J-A28042-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CARLOS VALENTINE :
:
Appellant : No. 1002 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order March 7, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-46-CR-0003521-2011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and DUBOW, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2017
Appellant, Carlos Valentine, appeals from the Order entered in the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas dismissing as untimely his
second Petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.1 After careful review, we conclude that Appellant’s
pro se Petition was untimely and affirm.
____________________________________________
1 Appellant’s pro se Notice of Appeal erroneously states he is appealing from
an Order dated January 22, 2017. This Court issued a Rule to Show Cause
as to why the appeal should not be quashed as it appears to be from a non-
existent order. Appellant responded pro se without explicitly addressing that
question. It is apparent from his response, however, that Appellant was, in
fact, appealing from the PCRA Court’s March 7, 2017 Order and that his
Notice of Appeal filed March 21, 2017, was timely. Accordingly, we decline
to quash the appeal and we have amended the caption.
J-A28042-17
Following a non-jury trial, the court convicted Appellant of Aggravated
Assault, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, Disorderly Conduct and two
counts each of Simple Assault and Harassment.2 On August 15, 2012, the
court sentenced him to a term of three-and-a-half to ten years’
imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. His Judgment of
Sentence, thus, became final on September 14, 2012.3
On May 20, 2014, Appellant filed his first PCRA Petition pro se and
counsel was appointed. On September 10, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed
the Petition as untimely, and on April 8, 2015, this Court affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Valentine, 2874 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(unpublished memorandum).
On February 7, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se Writ of Habeas Corpus
contending his sentence was illegal. The PCRA court properly treated the
filing as a second PCRA petition4 and, after filing a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice,
dismissed it as untimely.
____________________________________________
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705; 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1); 18
Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1), respectively.
3 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (providing that a Judgment of Sentence
becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or the expiration of time for seeking the review.”
4 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466
(Pa. Super. 2013) (holding “[i]ssues that are cognizable under the PCRA
must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
(a) Whether the court abused its discretion to convert
Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum into a petition for post-conviction collateral
relief, when the plain language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545
prohibited such an action by anyone?
(b) Whether the court abused its discretion to convert
Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum into a petition for post-conviction collateral
relief knowing that relief would be barred specifically by
the PCRA’s time limitations which relief pursuant to state
habeas corpus would have been available?
(c) Whether the court erred in dismissing the issue
questioning the court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter; pertaining to a void judgment of sentence order,
when such a claim is nonwaivable and can be pursued at
any time?
(d) Can a claim of subject matter jurisdiction or void
judgment be time barred?
Appellant’s Brief at 6.
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must determine
whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the underlying PCRA petition. “The
PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may
not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
corpus petition. . . . [A] defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by
titling his petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.”) (footnote omitted).
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timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Pa.
2007). “Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the
PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the
exceptions thereto.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa.
1999). See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii) (setting forth timeliness
exceptions).
Here, Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence became final on September
14, 2012. The instant PCRA petition is, thus, facially untimely. Appellant
did not plead or prove any timeliness exception. Therefore, we lack
jurisdiction to consider the merits of his Petition. See Copenhefer, 941
A.2d at 648-49. Accordingly, we affirm the Order of the PCRA court
dismissing his PCRA petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/28/2017
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