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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
JEFFREY R. RITENOUR, : No. 568 WDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order, March 30, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Criminal Division at No. CP-26-CR-0000209-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SOLANO, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2017
Appellant, Jeffrey R. Ritenour, appeals from the March 30, 2017 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County denying his first petition
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
After careful review, we affirm.
On direct appeal, a previous panel of this court provided the following
recitation of the facts:
The minor victim and Appellant are distant cousins
who have known each other for a long time. The
victim testified that on May 24, 2012, she and
Appellant went on a walk together. While they were
walking, Appellant asked the victim to have sex with
him; and the victim refused. Appellant then pushed
the victim to the ground, climbed on top of her, and
removed her shorts. Appellant touched the victim all
over her body, including her breasts and vaginal
area, and inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina.
The victim testified that she and Appellant walked on
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the same trail and engaged in nonconsensual sexual
intercourse on two other occasions, in June and July
of 2012. Appellant was fifty-one (51) years old at
the time of the offenses. The victim was fourteen
(14) years old at the time of the first assault, and
fifteen (15) years old at the time of the second and
third assaults.
The victim told her ex-boyfriend about the assaults.
The victim’s ex-boyfriend then told the victim’s
parents, and they contacted the police. At trial, a
Pennsylvania State Trooper testified that he went to
[appellant’s] residence as part of the investigation.
Appellant initially denied the assaults, but he
eventually confessed to the first assault, which
occurred on May 24, 2012. The trooper read
[appellant] his Miranda[Footnote 2] warnings, and
[appellant] repeated his verbal confession to the
trooper. At [appellant’s] request, the trooper wrote
down [appellant’s] statement, which [appellant]
signed.
[Footnote 2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
A jury convicted [appellant] on January 9, 2014, of
statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent
assault, corruption of minors, and simple assault.
On April 1, 2014, the [trial] court sentenced
[appellant] to three (3) to ten (10) years’
imprisonment, and informed [appellant] of his
lifetime registration requirement under the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”)[Footnote 3]. Appellant did not file any
post-sentence motions. Appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal on April 11, 2014. That same day,
the [trial] court ordered [appellant] to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and [appellant]
timely complied.
[Footnote 3] “[SORNA], commonly
referred to as the Adam Walsh Act,
became effective on December 20, 2012.
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By its terms, any individual who was
then being supervised by the board of
probation or parole was subject to its
provisions.” Commonwealth v.
Partee, 86 A.3d 245, 246 (Pa.Super.
2014). SORNA replaced Megan’s Law as
the statute governing the registration
and supervision of sex offenders. SORNA
designates a conviction for statutory
sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(b),
as a “Tier III” sexual offense, subjecting
a defendant to a lifetime registration
requirement. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9799.14(d)(3); 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9799.15(a)(3).
Commonwealth v. Ritenour, No. 581 WDA 2014, unpublished
memorandum at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed October 6, 2014).
The PCRA court provided the following procedural history:
A [PCRA] hearing was held in this matter on
February 2, [2017], at which time testimony was
presented relative to trial counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance relative to the following issues:
(1) Trial counsel’s failure to present [appellant’s] fuel
records, (2) Trial counsel’s failure to obtain
[appellant’s] employment records, (3) Trial counsel’s
failure to call a witness, (4) Trial counsel’s failure to
obtain a record of the victim’s Facebook account,
(5) Trial counsel’s failure to obtain photographic
evidence of [appellant’s] identifying marks, and
(6) Trial counsel’s failure to provide evidence of a
hernia scar.
[Appellant] was found guilty by a jury of
Statutory Sexual Assault, Aggravated Indecent
Assault, Corruption of Minors, and Simple Assault, 18
Pa.C.S. §§ 3122.1, 3125, 6301, and 2701,
respectively. He was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of three to ten years on April 1, 2014,
and his sentence was affirmed by the Pennsylvania
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Superior Court on April 28, 2015.[1] The trial
evidence established that [appellant] was fifty-one
years old at the time of the crimes, having been born
on July 22, 1961, and the victim, whose date of birth
is May [], 1997, was fourteen years of age at the
time of the first occurrence, fifteen when the other
incidents took place.
PCRA court opinion, 3/30/17 at 1-2.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding
defense counsel, Michael Garofalo, Esq.,
ineffective for failing to present [appellant’s]
fuel receipts at trial?
2. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding
defense counsel, Michael Garofalo, Esq.,
ineffective for failing to obtain [appellant’s]
employment records?
3. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding
defense counsel, Michael Garofalo, Esq.,
ineffective for failing to call Rusty Ritenour as a
witness?
4. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding
defense counsel, Michael Garofalo, Esq.,
1 This court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence on October 6, 2014.
Appellant filed a petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
which was denied on March 31, 2015. Commonwealth v. Ritenour, 113
A.3d 279 (Pa. 2015). A petition under the PCRA is timely if it is filed within
one year of the date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes
final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The PCRA defines the date that a
judgment becomes final as “the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review. Id. at § 9545(b)(3). The Supreme Court of the United States
requires that petitions for a writ of certiorari be filed within 90 days of the
denial of discretionary review by a state court of last resort. Sup.Ct.R. 13.
Therefore, appellant’s PCRA petition is timely filed.
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ineffective for failing to obtain a record of [the
victim’s] Facebook account?
5. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding
defense counsel, Michael Garofalo, Esq.,
ineffective for failing to provide photographic
evidence of [appellant’s] identifying marks?
6. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding
defense counsel, Michael Garofalo, Esq.,
ineffective for failing to provide evidence of
[appellant’s] hernia scar?
Appellant’s brief at 3 (capitalization omitted).
PCRA petitions are subject to the following standard of review:
“[A]s a general proposition, we review a denial of
PCRA relief to determine whether the findings of the
PCRA court are supported by the record and free of
legal error.” Commonwealth v. Dennis, 609 Pa.
442, 17 A.3d 297, 301 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).
A PCRA court’s credibility findings are to be accorded
great deference, and where supported by the record,
such determinations are binding on a reviewing
court. Id. at 305 (citations omitted). To obtain
PCRA relief, appellant must plead and prove by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) his conviction or
sentence resulted from one or more of the errors
enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2); (2) his
claims have not been previously litigated or waived,
id. § 9543(a)(3); and (3) “the failure to litigate the
issue prior to or during trial . . . or on direct appeal
could not have been the result of any rational,
strategic, or tactical decision by counsel[.]” Id.
§ 9543(a)(4). An issue is previously litigated if “the
highest appellate court in which [appellant] could
have had review as a matter of right has ruled on
the merits of the issue[.]” Id. § 9544(a)(2). “[A]n
issue is waived if [appellant] could have raised it but
failed to do so before trial, at trial, . . . on appeal or
in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” Id.
§ 9544(b).
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To be entitled to relief on an ineffectiveness claim, a
PCRA petitioner must establish: (1) the underlying
claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis
existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and
(3) he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127
(Pa. 2011) (employing ineffective assistance of
counsel test from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
A.2d 973, 975-976 (Pa. 1987).[Footnote 5] Counsel
is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.
Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa.
2010). Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 278 (Pa.
2006). Finally, because a PCRA petitioner must
establish all the Pierce prongs to be entitled to
relief, we are not required to analyze the elements of
an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if
a claim fails under any required element, we may
dismiss the claim on that basis. Ali, 10 A.3d at 291.
[Footnote 5] Pierce reiterates the
preexisting three-prong test for
ineffective assistance of counsel in
Pennsylvania and holds it to be
consistent with the two-prong
performance and prejudice test in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Pierce, 527 A.2d at 976-
977.
Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444-445 (Pa. 2015).
I.
Appellant avers that Attorney Garofalo rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel during trial because he failed to introduce appellant’s fuel receipts
and employment records into evidence. Specifically, appellant avers that if
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his “fuel receipts and employment records were presented at trial, they
would have supported his defense that he was traveling so often during the
time period of the alleged sexual assaults that there was no way that he had
the time to commit the offenses.” (Appellant’s brief at 9.)
During trial, appellant testified that on May 24, 2012, he had returned
home after working in Morgantown, Pennsylvania,2 and that upon exiting the
Pennsylvania Turnpike at Donegal between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., he
purchased fuel at the same time and that he had the receipts at home
establishing this alibi. (Notes of testimony, 1/8/14 at 54-55.) At no point,
however, did appellant furnish any sort of fuel receipt for May 24, 2012 to
either Attorney Garofalo or during collateral review. During the PCRA
hearing, appellant furnished several receipts documenting his purchases
during the course of his employment from April through July of 2012;
however, appellant failed to produce any receipts from May 24, 2012. (See
notes of testimony, 2/2/17 at 21, 30.) Moreover, Attorney Garofalo testified
that he never received the fuel receipts in question. (Id. at 42.)
Specifically, Attorney Garofalo testified to receiving only timecards and food
receipts from appellant. (Id.)
We agree with the PCRA court, which found that Attorney Garofalo was
not ineffective, “for not presenting to the jury any receipts that were not
given to him, nor can [he] be ineffective for failing to present a receipt from
2 Morgantown is approximately 240 miles away from Fayette County.
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May 24, 2012, that may not even exist.” (PCRA court opinion, 3/30/17 at
3.) Accordingly, we find that appellant’s first issue lacks arguable merit.
Likewise, appellant claims that Attorney Garofalo was ineffective for
failing to present appellant’s employment records to the jury. Specifically,
appellant states that “Attorney Garofalo’s ineffectiveness prejudiced
[appellant] in that the evidence of [appellant’s] fuel receipts and
employment records could have convinced the jury that [appellant] had no
time to commit the alleged sexual assaults.” (Appellant’s brief at 9.) The
record, however, demonstrates that Attorney Garofalo examined appellant
extensively during trial regarding his employment-related travel to
Morgantown. During the PCRA hearing, Attorney Garofalo testified that
appellant’s timesheet from May 24, 2012, documented that appellant worked
for five and one-half hours in Morgantown. (Notes of testimony, 2/2/17 at
43.) According to Attorney Garofalo’s testimony, however, the timesheet did
not provide any indication as to when the work was specifically performed.
(Id.) Specifically, we note that the timesheet in question did not establish
when appellant was still in Morgantown, and we agree with the PCRA court’s
determination that Attorney Garofalo “had the timesheets and used them in
such a way as to be reasonably calculated to effectuate his client’s best
interests.” (See PCRA court opinion, 3/30/17 at 3.) Therefore, we find that
appellant’s claim that Attorney Garofalo was ineffective for failing to obtain
appellant’s employment records is without arguable merit.
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II.
Appellant next raises the issue of whether Attorney Garofalo was
ineffective for failing to call Rusty Ritenour as a witness. When evaluating
whether counsel was ineffective for failing to call a potential witness, we are
bound by the following standard:
When raising a failure to call a potential witness
claim, the PCRA petitioner satisfies the performance
and prejudice requirements of the Strickland test
by establishing that:
(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness
was available to testify for the defense;
(3) counsel knew of, or should have
known of, the existence of the witness;
and (4) the absence of the testimony of
the witness was so prejudicial as to have
denied the defendant a fair trial.
Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 927
A.2d 586, 599 (2007). To demonstrate Strickland
prejudice, the PCRA petitioner “must show how the
uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been
beneficial under the circumstances of the case.”
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d
1110, 1134 (2008); see also Commonwealth v.
Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 889 A.2d 501, 546 (2005)
(“Trial counsel’s failure to call a particular witness
does not constitute ineffective assistance without
some showing that the absent witness’s testimony
would have been beneficial or helpful in establishing
the asserted defense.”).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 536 (Pa. 2009).
Specifically, appellant contends that Ritenour’s testimony as to
conversations that he had with the victim on Facebook Messenger in which
she allegedly admitted to Ritenour “that her claim that she was sexually
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assaulted by [appellant] was false.” (Appellant’s brief at 11; notes of
testimony, 2/2/17 at 7.) Appellant satisfies the first three prongs of the
Washington test. There is undisputed evidence in the record that Ritenour
existed, was available and willing to testify on appellant’s behalf, and that
Attorney Garofalo knew of Ritenour’s existence.
Appellant, however, fails to demonstrate the fourth Washington
prong--that the absence of Ritenour’s testimony deprived appellant of a fair
trial. To the contrary, Ritenour’s testimony, if found to have been credible
by the jury, could have been fatal to appellant’s defense at trial. During the
PCRA hearing, Ritenour read the following transcript of a conversation he
had with the victim on Facebook Messenger:
A. . . . I said at 4:38 P.M., did Jeff really do what
the paper said he did because I honestly do
not see him ever doing that. [The victim] at
4:39 P.M., the cop changed everything around.
Everything I told him he made it sound
worser. [sic] Then I said at 4:40 P.M., but I
asked did he really do it. I mean he is my
uncle, I’ve known him all my life and I don’t
see him raping someone. [The victim],
4:41 P.M., not really. I tried to tell the cops
that but it’s still rape if you have sex with a
minor.
Q. Next message?
A. [The victim], 4:42 P.M., but did you willingly
do it or if so it’s not rape. [The victim],
4:43 P.M., kind of.
Notes of testimony, 2/2/17 at 15.
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Attorney Garofalo explicitly testified that his decision to not call
Ritenour as a witness was based on the contents of the Facebook Messenger
conversations.
A. . . . not to mention the fact that the latter
portion of the conversation discusses a
consensual encounter, without a specific date,
between my client, [appellant] and [the
victim]. It was a statutory sexual assault. It’s
still illegal. I didn’t want the jury to have
something concrete to say yes, there was a
sexual encounter. So I didn’t even try to
introduce that in the record as an Exhibit.
Q. So that was a decision of strategy.
A. Totally. Totally a strategic decision to avoid
having the jury have that where it admitted to
a consensual encounter.
Q. To go a step further, you were aware that half
of this conversation was Rusty Ritenour.
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And can you tell us why you did not call him as
a witness?
A. Again, the main reason was because the
conversation would confirm that there was at
least one sexual encounter between [the
victim] . . . , and I didn’t want anybody to put
a concrete definition to there being any sexual
encounter because [appellant] had told me the
entire time that there was never any contact.
Notes of testimony, 2/2/17 at 44-45.
As noted above, trial counsel cannot be determined to have provided
ineffective assistance under the PCRA for failing to call a witness unless the
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petitioner demonstrates the failure to call the witness resulted in the
petitioner being deprived of his right to a fair trial. See Washington, 927
A.2d at 599. Attorney Garofalo’s testimony establishes that calling Ritenour
as a witness would have the opposite effect--that it would instead introduce
evidence of a consensual sexual encounter between appellant and the
victim--which would not have been beneficial to appellant’s defense given
the nature of the charges against him.
We, therefore, find that appellant has not met his burden under
Washington in establishing that Attorney Garofalo’s failure to call Ritenour
to testify deprived appellant of a fair trial. Accordingly, appellant’s third
claim is without arguable merit.
With respect to appellant’s fourth claim, we likewise agree with the
PCRA court’s finding that Attorney Garofalo’s decision to not introduce a
transcription of the victim’s conversations with Ritenour on Facebook
Messenger into evidence was a sound strategic decision. (PCRA court
opinion, 3/30/17 at 5.) As noted above, Attorney Garofalo decided against
introducing evidence that would confirm at least one sexual encounter
between appellant and the victim because Attorney Garofalo has a
reasonable basis for this strategic decision. Accordingly, appellant’s fourth
claim must fail.
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III.
Finally, appellant avers that Attorney Garofalo was ineffective during
trial because of his failure to produce photographic evidence of a mole in
appellant’s groin area and for his failure to provide any evidence of
appellant’s hernia scar. We agree with the PCRA court’s finding that both of
these claims are without merit.
We shall first address Attorney Garofalo’s failure to present
photographic evidence at trial of appellant’s mole. During trial, appellant’s
wife, Tekla Ritenour, testified for the purposes of attempting to impeach the
victim’s testimony. Specifically, Mrs. Ritenour testified that appellant had a
“hanging mole on the left inner groin that is impossible to have sex in any
position without feeling it any which way, shape or form. . . . Not only that,
you could feel it during intercourse no matter what position she used.”
(Notes of testimony, 1/9/14 at 76.)
During the PCRA hearing, Attorney Garofalo testified that he was of
the opinion that Mrs. Ritenour’s trial testimony alone was sufficient and that
photographic evidence of appellant’s mole was not required. Specifically,
Attorney Garofalo testified as follows:
Q. So even if you had a photograph of it would
you have presented it at trial?
A. No, I would have thought that the firsthand
testimony of his wife of, and I can’t remember
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how long she said they had been married,[3]
but the firsthand testimony of his wife
experiencing being able to see or feel the
mole, as it’s been called, would have been
sufficient without presenting photographic
evidence that the Court may never have
introduced anyway to the jurors.
Notes of testimony, 2/2/17 at 47.
In order for a PCRA petitioner to establish that a trial counsel’s chosen
strategy lacked a reasonable basis, it must be concluded that the
“alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater
than the course actually pursued.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d
1167, 1189 (Pa. 1999), citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 676 A.2d 1178,
1186 (Pa. 1996) (citation omitted). Here, appellant fails to demonstrate
that introducing a photograph of his mole to the jury offered any potential
for substantially greater success as required by Williams. We agree with
the PCRA court’s finding that Attorney Garofalo “articulated a rational
strategic reason” for not offering a photograph of appellant’s mole into
evidence, and instead choosing to rely on Mrs. Ritenour’s testimony to
discredit the victim’s testimony. The PCRA court’s finding is soundly based
in the record. Indeed, as noted above, Mrs. Ritenour testified that she
always felt appellant’s mole during sexual intercourse. Accordingly, we find
3Mrs. Ritenour testified that at the time of the trial, she and appellant had
been married for 27 years. (Notes of testimony, 1/9/14 at 76.)
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Attorney Garofalo’s reliance on Mrs. Ritenour’s testimony to be based in
rational strategic reason, and therefore, appellant’s claim is without merit.
Finally, we address appellant’s claim that Attorney Garofalo was
ineffective due to his failure to provide any evidence of appellant’s hernia
scar as a means of impeaching the victim’s testimony. This claim is without
merit, as there is no evidence in the record that Attorney Garofalo knew, or
should have known, of the existence of appellant’s hernia scar. Moreover,
appellant testified that he forgot about his hernia scar when he was being
questioned by Attorney Garofalo. (See notes of testimony, 2/2/17 at 33-
34.) Attorney Garofalo testified that appellant never told him about a hernia
scar, and that Mrs. Ritenour never testified about the existence of a hernia
scar during trial. (See id. at 45-46.) Based on the evidence of record,
appellant has failed to establish that Attorney Garofalo knew or should have
known of appellant’s hernia scar. Accordingly, this claim is without merit.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/28/2017
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