NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 13 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TINA LEEPER, No. 15-35184
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-05369-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2017**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit
Judges
Tina Leeper appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner
of Social Security’s denial of Leeper’s application for supplemental security
income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th
Cir. 2014), and we affirm.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly rejected the opinion of
examining psychologist Dr. Bartol regarding Leeper’s social functioning based on
specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence: inconsistency
with evidence in the record of Leeper’s activities and inconsistency with Dr.
Bartol’s own clinical findings. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169
F.3d 595, 600–01 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that inconsistency with daily
activities is a legitimate reason for the ALJ to reject the opinion of a treating
physician); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining
that the ALJ properly rejected a physician’s opinion that was inconsistent with the
physician’s own clinical notes and records). The ALJ noted Dr. Bartol’s findings
of a pain syndrome and GAF score of 50, and the ALJ reasonably included all
relevant limitations in the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). See Stubbs-
Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n ALJ’s assessment
of a claimant adequately captures restrictions . . . where the assessment is
consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony.”).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s interpretation of the medical
opinion of Ms. Cates, ARNP, and the ALJ reasonably included all relevant
limitations in the RFC. See id.
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The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons for finding Leeper’s
testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms
not credible, and the ALJ properly linked his reasoning to Leeper’s testimony
regarding how anxiety and pain would interfere with her ability to work. See
Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015) (requiring the ALJ to
link findings regarding credibility to specific claimant testimony). First, the ALJ
reasonably discredited Leeper’s testimony based on inconsistency with her
activities. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Second,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the objective medical
evidence is inconsistent with Leeper’s testimony regarding her physical and mental
health limitations. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012).
Third, the ALJ properly considered potential explanations for lack of treatment
before discrediting Leeper’s testimony based on lack of treatment for fibromyalgia
and other symptoms of pain. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113–14. Fourth, based on
the record as a whole, the ALJ reasonably discredited Leeper’s testimony
regarding her mental impairments based on evidence of improvement with
treatment. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2014)
(reasoning that the ALJ can discredit claimant testimony based on improvement of
mental health symptoms with treatment when ALJ relies on evidence that shows
improvement in the context of the record as a whole).
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AFFIRMED.
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