J-S62003-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SUZANNE LUCY SCHOFF
Appellant No. 930 MDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 24, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0005312-2003
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2017
Appellant Suzanne Lucy Schoff, pro se, appeals from the May 24, 2017
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County (“PCRA court”),
which dismissed as untimely her serial petition for collateral relief under the
Post Conviction Relief Act (the “PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon
review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history underlying this case are undisputed.1
Briefly, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted—for her role in the
murder of her ex-husband, Frank L. Schoff III—of first-degree murder and
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 We need not recite the full facts giving rise to this appeal as they are not
relevant for purposes of disposition.
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criminal conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.2 On October 15, 2004,
the trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment without parole.3 Appellant
timely appealed to this Court. On November 2, 2006, a panel of this Court
affirmed her judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911
A.2d 147, 162 (Pa. Super. 2006). Appellant did not petition for allowance of
appeal. As a result, Appellant’s sentence became final on December 4, 2006.
On November 30, 2007, Appellant filed timely her first PCRA petition,
which the PCRA court denied on September 16, 2008. A panel of this Court
affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of her petition on November 20, 2009. See
Commonwealth v. Schoff, 988 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished
memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance
of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Schoff, 995 A.2d 353 (Pa. 2010).
On August 16, 2012, Appellant, pro se, filed her second PCRA petition,
which the PCRA court denied as untimely. On December 22, 2016, Appellant,
pro se, filed her third—the instant—PCRA petition, asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. The PCRA court appointed counsel who
eventually filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544
A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
Super. 1988) (en banc) and petitioned to withdraw from the case. The PCRA
court granted counsel’s petition on February 16, 2017. Thereafter, following
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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a) and 903.
3The trial court also sentenced Appellant to a consecutive term of 240 to 480
months in prison for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.
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the PCRA court’s issuance of a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss
the petition without a hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant PCRA relief on
May 24, 2017. Appellant timely appealed to this Court.
On appeal,4 Appellant presents two issues for our review, reproduced
here verbatim:
[I.] Did court err in finding attorney Korey Leslie failure to file a
Petition for Allowance with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court?
[II.] Has the P.C.R.A. Court erroneously determined that the
P.C.R.A. filed by appellant was untimely?
Appellant’s Brief at v (sic).
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the court erred in
dismissing as untimely Appellant’s PCRA petition. The PCRA contains the
following restrictions governing the timeliness of any PCRA petition.
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
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4“In PCRA proceedings, an appellate court’s scope of review is limited by the
PCRA’s parameters; since most PCRA appeals involve mixed questions of fact
and law, the standard of review is whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Pitts,
981 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
period provided in this section and has been held by
that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
presented.
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Section 9545’s timeliness provisions are
jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014).
Additionally, we have emphasized repeatedly that “the PCRA confers no
authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA
time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.”
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (citations
omitted).
Here, as stated earlier, the record reflects Appellant’s judgment of
sentence became final on December 4, 2006. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3);
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Because Appellant had one year from December 4, 2006,
to file her PCRA petition, the current filing is facially untimely given it was filed
on December 22, 2016, nearly a decade later.
The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a petitioner
alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA. Here, Appellant has failed to allege, let alone
prove, any exceptions to the one-year time bar. Accordingly, the PCRA court
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did not err in dismissing as untimely Appellant’s instant, her third, PCRA
petition for want of jurisdiction.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/15/2017
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