16-2185
Ma v. Sessions
BIA
Loprest, IJ
A205 240 453
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 19th day of December, two thousand
5 seventeen.
6
7 PRESENT:
8 DENNIS JACOBS,
9 PETER W. HALL,
10 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 JIANZHONG MA,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 16-2185
18 NAC
19 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III,
20 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Jianzhong Ma, pro se, Flushing,
25 NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal
28 Deputy Assistant Attorney General;
29 Andrew N. O’Malley, Senior
30 Litigation Counsel; Timothy G.
31 Hayes, Trial Attorney, Office of
32 Immigration Litigation, United
1 States Department of Justice,
2 Washington, DC.
3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
4 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
5 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
6 is DENIED.
7 Petitioner Jianzhong Ma, a native and citizen of the
8 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 26, 2016,
9 decision of the BIA affirming a March 10, 2015, decision of
10 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ma’s application for
11 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
12 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jianzhong Ma, No.
13 A205 240 453 (B.I.A. May 26, 2016), aff’g No. A205 240 453
14 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 10, 2015). We assume the parties’
15 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
16 in this case.
17 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
18 the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the BIA.
19 Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007); Xue Hong
20 Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.
21 2005). The applicable standards of review are well
22 established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v.
23 Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008); Y.C. v. Holder,
24 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013).
2
1 I. Adverse Credibility Ruling
2 The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
3 circumstances,” base an adverse credibility determination
4 on discrepancies between an applicant’s oral and written
5 statements and between an applicant’s statements and other
6 record evidence, and “any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.
7 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We
8 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless . .
9 . it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make
10 such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d
11 at 167.
12 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
13 credibility ruling. First, the agency reasonably relied on
14 a discrepancy between Ma’s testimony and his supporting
15 evidence regarding the name of the U.S. church he attended.
16 Ma argues that the church’s name can be translated in
17 different ways, and that blessing Christian Mission Church is
18 translated in Mandarin as Christ Grace Church. This argument
19 does not compel a different result. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430
20 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than
21 offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements
22 to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
23 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.”
3
1 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Neither Ma nor his
2 counsel objected to the interpretation, nor has Ma provided
3 any independent evidence to support his claim regarding the
4 translation. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n. 6
5 (1984) (assertions in a brief are not evidence).
6 This material inconsistency calls into question whether
7 Ma attended church regularly (or at all) in the United States,
8 which in turn casts doubt on whether he is a practicing
9 Christian. Cf. Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446
10 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006)(holding that even a single
11 material inconsistency can support an adverse credibility
12 determination).
13 The adverse credibility ruling is also supported by Ma’s
14 admission that he lied to U.S. immigration officials and
15 provided a false marriage certificate and employment records
16 in order to obtain a U.S. visa. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at
17 167; Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A]
18 single false document or a single instance of false testimony
19 may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of
20 the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”).
21 Although fraud in fleeing persecution may sometimes enhance
22 credibility, see Rui Ying Lin v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 127, 133
23 (2d Cir. 2006), Ma’s credibility is undermined because he did
4
1 not allege past religious persecution or press his political
2 opinion claim before the IJ, Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81. That
3 omission provided an additional basis for the adverse
4 credibility ruling, which Ma does not challenge. These
5 inconsistencies and Ma’s admission of use of fraudulent
6 documents provide substantial evidence for the agency’s
7 adverse credibility ruling. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167;
8 Xian Tuan Ye, 446 F.3d at 295-96; Siewe, 480 F.3d at 170.
9 Because Ma’s claims were all based on the same factual
10 predicate, the adverse credibility determination is
11 dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
12 relief. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir.
13 2006).
14 II. Well-founded Fear
15 Alternatively, we find no error in the agency’s
16 determination that Ma did not state an objectively reasonable
17 fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii);
18 Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).
19 Ma did not show that he would be singled out for
20 persecution, especially given his testimony that his wife
21 occasionally attended an underground church and had not
22 been harmed. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307,
23 313 (2d Cir. 1999). Nor did he establish a pattern of
5
1 persecution of Christians in China because the country
2 conditions reflected that treatment varied by region, and
3 Ma did not provide any evidence of persecution of
4 Christians in his home province. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)
5 (2)(iii); cf. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 159-
6 62, 174 (2d Cir. 2008).
7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
8 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
9 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
10 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
11 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
12 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
13 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
14 34.1(b).
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6