[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-16738
September 30, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-00157-CR-BE-NE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HELENA VICTORIA ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(September 30, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Helena Victoria Anderson appeals her convictions, pursuant to a jury
verdict, for theft of U.S. postal money order forms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 500.
Anderson, a former U.S. Postmaster “relief person” whose duties included selling
money orders, was charged, by superseding indictment, with 61 counts of stealing
and converting to her own use U.S. postal money order forms. Following
Anderson’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court dismissed five
counts. Two counts were dismissed by oral motion by the government. On the
remaining counts, the jury found Anderson guilty as to Counts 1-2, 4-6, 8-16, 18-
19, 21, 23-26, 31, 42-43, 47, and 50-52, and acquitted her on Counts 7, 17, 20, 22,
27, 30, 32, 35-39, 41, 44-46, 48-49, and 54-61.
On appeal, Anderson argues (1) that the jury improperly returned a
compromised verdict because the government’s evidence as to each count alleged
in the indictment was the same, and (2) that because the government failed to
establish which of the 59 money orders she paid for, the district court should have
granted her motion for judgment of acquittal as to all counts. After thorough
review of the record and careful consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo.
United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1236 (11th Cir. 2001). “To uphold the
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we need only determine that a
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the evidence established the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we view “the facts and draw all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government.” Id.
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
To establish the crime of money-order theft or conversion, the government
must demonstrate that a defendant embezzled, stole, or, without the authority of the
United States, knowingly converted to her own use blank money order forms
provided under the authority of the U.S. Postal Service. See 18 U.S.C. § 500. At
Anderson’s trial, the government presented testimony that an employee, in a
“money kiting” operation, will issue out-of-sequence money orders to herself and
hide daily activity reports. One of Anderson’s supervisors testified that: (1)
Anderson had sold money orders out-of-sequence; and (2) Anderson admitted that
she had taken post office documents home. Postal Inspector Irving Wilbert, who
performs audits and financial investigations of postal employees, further testified
that (1) during an audit, he discovered that Anderson’s cash drawer was short
$939.59; (2) during a subsequent meeting, in which Anderson admitted that she
had “kited” money orders, Anderson gave him $207 in cash, but did not provide
him with an explanation of how she ended up with this money; (3) several of the
money orders were cashed for a greater amount than Anderson reported as being
sold; (4) many of the money orders were cashed before Anderson reported their
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issuance on her daily activity report; (5) most of the money orders contained
information that directly related to Anderson; and (6) Anderson admitted that she
had issued all of the money orders to herself without paying for them at the time of
issuance.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we are
satisfied the government presented ample evidence from which a reasonable finder
of fact could conclude that the evidence established Anderson’s guilt on some of
the counts, but not others, beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court did not err
by denying Anderson’s motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to some of
the counts.
As for Anderson’s argument that the jury returned a “compromise verdict,”
it is well-settled that a defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack his
conviction as inconsistent with a verdict of acquittal on another count. See United
States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68-69, 105 S. Ct. 471, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461 (1984)
(holding that jury verdicts are “insulate[d] from review” on the ground that they
are inconsistent); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S. Ct. 189, 76 L.
Ed. 356 (1932) (“Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. . . .The most that can
be said [of an inconsistent verdict] is that the verdict shows that either in the
acquittal or the convictions the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that
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does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.”). If a guilty
verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, the conviction is proper, even if the
verdict is inconsistent. United States v. Mitchell, 146 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir.
1998). As we have already concluded, the evidence was sufficient to establish
Anderson’s guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, on the counts of conviction.
Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by her argument that the jury returned a
compromise verdict.
AFFIRMED.
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