J-S71033-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES MORGAN VINSON,
Appellant No. 210 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 10, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-46-CR-0000811-2010
CP-46-CR-0004323-2009
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2017
Appellant, James Morgan Vinson, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his jury conviction of one count each of
aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of a crime, simple assault
(causing bodily injury), simple assault with a deadly weapon, and recklessly
endangering another person.1 We affirm.
The trial court aptly set forth the factual background of this case as
follows:
. . . Late on Thanksgiving night, November 26, 2009, Keith
Boynes (“victim” or “Boynes”) was walking with his girlfriend,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4), 907(a), 2701(a)(1), 2701(a)(2), and 2705,
respectively.
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Samantha Donini (“Donini”), back to Donini’s house on Fornance
Street in Norristown after delivering a plate of food to Boynes’
brother approximately five (5) blocks away on Willow Street. As
Boynes and Donini approached Donini’s house, both could see
something or someone crouched down between a car and the wall
next to Donini’s driveway. As first, Donini thought it was a dog
and expressed that opinion to Boynes. Boynes disagreed and
called out to the person. Although it was dark and the lighting
was poor, the couple could see the person was a male dressed in
dark clothing. As he charged at the pair, both Boynes and Don[i]ni
recognized the man as Appellant, Don[i]ni’s former live-in
boyfriend of approximately four (4) years. When Appellant
reached Boynes, he started stabbing at and hitting Boynes with a
knife in each hand. The victim took a defensive position trying to
block Appellant’s attack with his arms and began moving up the
hill towards Arch Street and away from Don[i]ni. Don[i]ni ran into
her house and told her girlfriend to call 911 and then ran back
outside to look for Boynes. Another friend drove Don[i]ni around
until they located Boynes on the porch of a house on Poplar Street
belonging to a friend of Boynes. As Boynes was bleeding profusely
and having difficulty breathing, they drove him to the emergency
room at Montgomery Hospital.
The victim suffered a total of six (6) stab wounds, including
defensive wounds to both of his arms as well as one stab wound
on the right side of his chest which punctured his lung and a stab
wound on the left side near his heart. Officer Lesley Gould, Officer
Matthew Wiley and Corporal David Brooke of the Norristown Police
Department responded to the emergency room at Montgomery
Hospital at approximately 12:20 a.m. on Friday, November 27,
2009. Officers took statements from Don[i]ni and Boynes, who
had trouble speaking due to his injuries. Both identified Appellant
as Boynes’ attacker. After performing a needle thoracostomy,
inserting a chest tube for a collapsed lung and stabilizing the
victim, the medical staff transported the victim to the Level 1
trauma center at Albert Einstein Medical Center. . . .
(Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/17, at 2-4) (record citations omitted).
The case proceeded to a jury trial on January 4, 2011. Relevant to the
instant appeal, during direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Boynes
to show the jury his fully healed scars from the wounds he sustained during
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Appellant’s attack. (See N.T. Trial, 1/04/11, at 55, 57). The court permitted
Boynes to show the scars, over Appellant’s objection. (See id. at 56-60). On
January 6, 2011, the jury found Appellant guilty of the above-stated offenses.2
The parties agreed to postpone sentencing until Appellant’s remaining open
cases were resolved.
On August 10, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
term of not less than four nor more than ten years’ imprisonment. The trial
court denied Appellant’s timely post-sentence motion on December 10, 2015,
following argument. This timely3 appeal followed.4
On appeal, Appellant raises one issue for our review: “Did the trial court
err by overruling trial counsel’s timely objection to the Commonwealth
exhibiting to the jury the wound scars of the victim, Keith Boynes?”
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4) (some capitalization omitted).5 Appellant maintains
that the Commonwealth’s showing of Boynes’ scars to the jury was prejudicial,
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2 The jury found Appellant not guilty of attempted first-degree murder and
aggravated assault under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life. (See N.T. Trial, 1/06/11, at 20).
3The trial court and this Court applied the prisoner mailbox rule to Appellant’s
pro se notice of appeal. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 8 n.10); see also
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 38 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 46 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).
4 Appellant filed a timely, court-ordered concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal on May 19, 2017. The trial court entered an opinion
on June 30, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
5 Although Appellant raised three issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement, he
abandons two of those issues in his brief. (See Rule 1925(b) Statement,
5/19/17; Appellant’s Brief, at 4, 8-11).
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inflammatory, and cumulative, in light of its presentation of other testimony
detailing Boynes’ injuries. (See id. at 9-11). He argues that the testimony
of Boynes, Donini, and the attending physician who treated Boynes for his
stab wounds was “more than sufficient to establish the elements of the
charges brought against [Appellant,]” and that showing the scars was
unnecessary. (Id. at 11; see id. at 10) (emphasis in original). This issue
does not merit relief.
[Q]uestions regarding the admission of evidence are left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and we, as an appellate
court, will not disturb the trial court’s rulings regarding the
admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of that discretion. An
abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; rather,
discretion is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or
the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result
of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence
or the record. . . .
Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712–13 (Pa. Super. 2017),
appeal denied, 2017 WL 4250172 (Pa. filed Sept. 26, 2017) (citations
omitted).
“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
law.” Pa.R.E. 402. “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.
As noted earlier, admissibility of evidence is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, but it depends
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on relevance and probative value. Evidence is
relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact
in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less
probable or supports a reasonable inference or
presumption regarding a material fact.
Evidence, even if relevant, may be excluded if
its probative value is outweighed by the potential
prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Yocolano, 169 A.3d 47, 59 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted).
However, [e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because
it is harmful to the defendant. [E]xclusion is limited to evidence
so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision
based upon something other than the legal propositions relevant
to the case. . . . This Court has stated that it is not required to
sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s
consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at
hand[.]
Commonwealth v. Kouma, 53 A.3d 760, 770 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
This Court has found that displays of fully healed scars to the jury are
not improper where the scars are relevant to the criminal events in question
and not likely to provoke the passions or prejudices of the jury. See
Commonwealth v. Glover, 401 A.2d 779, 782 (Pa. Super. 1979); see also
Commonwealth v. Coleman, 664 A.2d 1381, 1385–86 (Pa. Super. 1995),
appeal denied, 682 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1996) (concluding victim’s display of scar
to jury was appropriate demonstration of character and extent of injuries he
suffered and was not shown for purpose of arousing sympathy).
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Here, as noted, Appellant was charged with attempted first-degree
murder, which requires a showing of specific intent to kill,6 and multiple counts
of aggravated assault. The trial court determined:
Boynes’ scars on his arms and on the right side as well as
the left side of his chest demonstrated the character and extent
of his injuries and were undoubtedly relevant to the criminal
events as alleged. In particular, the scars near Boynes’ lungs and
heart demonstrated an intent to kill by the use of a deadly weapon
on vital parts of Boynes’ body. Notably, the jury ultimately
acquitted [Appellant] of the two most serious felony charges.
While Boynes and Don[i]ni had already testified to the
events at that point, showing Boynes’ scars to the jury lent
support to their testimony concerning the events and the injuries
suffered by Boynes. . . .
(Trial Ct. Op., at 12).
We agree, and discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision
to permit Boynes’ to show his fully healed scars to the jury. See Windslowe,
supra at 712–13; see also Glover, supra at 782; Coleman, supra at 1385–
86. Although the evidence was harmful to Appellant, it was relevant to his
criminal conduct, and was not “so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to
make a decision based upon something other than the legal propositions
relevant to the case.” Kouma, supra at 770 (citation omitted). In fact, the
record indicates that the jury carefully weighed the evidence before it and
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6 See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. Super. 2016),
appeal denied, 165 A.3d 895 (Pa. 2017) (“For a defendant to be found guilty
of attempted murder, the Commonwealth must establish specific intent to kill.
. . . [T]he use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient to
establish the specific intent to kill.”) (citations omitted).
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found Appellant not guilty of the most serious charges he faced. Therefore,
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/19/2017
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