MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Dec 20 2017, 9:18 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as CLERK
precedent or cited before any court except for the Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Daniel J. Zlatic Sheri Bradtke McNeil
Rubino, Ruman, Crosmer & Polen Kopka Pinkus Dolin PC
Dyer, Indiana Crown Point, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jose Zavala and Antoinette December 20, 2017
Zavala, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A03-1706-CT-1250
Appellants-Plaintiffs,
Appeal from the Lake Superior
v. Court.
The Honorable Bruce D. Parent,
Judge.
James Poling and the City of Trial Court Cause No.
Crown Point, Indiana, 45D04-1612-CT-236
Appellees-Defendants.
Shepard, Senior Judge
[1] Jose Zavala and Antoinette Zavala appeal the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to the City of Crown Point, Indiana, and James Poling. We affirm.
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[2] On August 14, 2015, the Zavalas and Poling were involved in an auto accident
in Crown Point, Indiana, while Poling was carrying out his duties as a Crown
Point police officer. On August 27, 2015, Crown Point’s insurer, HCC Public
Risk Claim Service, Inc., sent the Zavalas a letter seeking information about the
accident. The Zavalas hired Illinois attorney Peter Vrdolyak, who faxed HCC a
notice of representation on September 1, 2015.
[3] Vrdolyak included in the fax a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II, p. 51. The Notice was titled, “NOTICE OF ATTORNEY’S LIEN
Under the Law of 1909 as amended.” Id. The document also contained a
caption for the State of Illinois, Cook County, and named the Zavalas as
plaintiffs and Poling, and the “Crown Point Police Department” as defendants.
Id. The Notice further provided:
PLEASE TAKE NOTE that Jose Zavala and Antoinette D.
Zavala have placed in my hands as their attorney to represent
them in suit or collection of claim, demand or cause of action
against you growing out of personal injuries sustained as a result
of an accident at South Court St. and Greenwood Ave [sic] in
Crown Point, Indiana on August 14, 2015.
Id. The document further stated Vrdolyak and the Zavalas had reached an
agreement that he would accept a percentage of any sums recovered, and
Vrdolyak was claiming a lien for attorney fees. Finally, Vrdolyak asked for
copies of any applicable insurance policies. As we discuss below, it is unclear
whether Crown Point and Poling also received the Notice of Attorney’s Lien.
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[4] The Zavalas sued Crown Point and Poling on December 22, 2016, alleging they
sustained injuries from the accident due to Poling’s negligence. They further
accused Crown Point of negligently hiring and training Poling. The defendants
moved to dismiss, arguing the Zavalas did not comply with the notice
requirements of the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The motion was
converted to a motion for summary judgment by agreement of the parties. The
trial court granted the motion following a hearing. This appeal followed.
[5] The Zavalas claim the court should have denied summary judgment because
they substantially complied with the ITCA. When reviewing the grant or
denial of summary judgment, our test is similar to that of the trial court:
summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Sedam v. 2JR Pizza Enters., LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174 (Ind. 2016); see also Ind. Trial
Rule 56(C). When a motion for summary judgment raises questions of law, we
review de novo. Megenity v. Dunn, 68 N.E.3d 1080 (Ind. 2017).
[6] The ITCA states that a claim against a political subdivision is barred unless
notice is filed with “the governing body of that political subdivision . . . and . . .
the Indiana political subdivision risk management commission . . . within one
hundred eighty (180) days after the loss occurs.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8 (1998).
The notice:
must describe in a short and plain statement the facts on which
the claim is based. The statement must include the
circumstances which brought about the loss, the extent of the
loss, the time and place the loss occurred, the names of all
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persons involved if known, the amount of the damages sought,
and the residence of the person making the claim at the time of
the loss and at the time of filing the notice.
Ind. Code § 34-13-3-10 (1998).
[7] Compliance with these provisions “is a procedural precedent which need not be
pleaded but may be raised as a defense in a responsive pleading.” City of
Indianapolis v. Satz, 268 Ind. 561, 584, 377 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ind. 1978).
Compliance with the notice provisions is “not a proper element for
consideration by the jury.” 268 Ind. at 585, 377 N.E.2d at 625. Failure to
comply with the ITCA subjects a claim to summary judgment. Boushehry v. City
of Indianapolis, 931 N.E.2d 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[8] The ITCA is strictly construed against limitations on a claimant’s right to sue.
Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702 (Ind. 2013). As a result, a notice of a
claim against a political subdivision will be deemed sufficient if it substantially
complies with statutory requirements. Boushehry, 931 N.E.2d 892. “What
constitutes substantial compliance, while not a question of fact but one of law,
is a fact-sensitive determination.” Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind.
1989). Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases, but
questions of law may be disposed of by summary judgment. Cunningham v.
Bakker Produce, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
[9] Generally, a notice that is filed within the required time period, informs the
municipality of the claimant’s intent to make a claim, and contains information
which reasonably affords the political subdivision with an opportunity to
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promptly investigate the claim will satisfy the purpose of ITCA and will be held
to substantially comply. Boushehry, 931 N.E.2d at 895.
[10] Here, the Zavalas’ attorney faxed HHC a notice of representation by counsel
and a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 51. The
Indiana Supreme Court, by Justice Massa, has held that service of a purported
notice of a claim upon an insurer does not substantially comply with the notice
requirements of the ITCA. Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d 702.
[11] The Zavalas further claim they timely sent a copy of the Notice of Attorney’s
Lien directly to Crown Point, citing as evidence an affidavit by an employee of
Vrdolyak’s law office. He signed the affidavit over a year and a half after the
fact. The employee stated, “I sent a ‘Notice of Attorney’s Lien’ to the City of
Crown Point.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 28. The employee attached to his
affidavit a copy of the Notice, which states it was served by fax on “the above
party.” Id. at 32. The affidavit and Notice do not include the fax cover sheet,
which would have shown the recipient of the fax.
[12] Setting aside the fact that there were no “parties” in the weeks following the
accident, the Zavalas’ method of service did not substantially comply with
Section 34-13-3-8. That statute requires a notice of tort claim to be served upon
the “governing body” of the political subdivision and the Indiana political
subdivision risk management commission. Id. The Notice, by its plain
language, was supposedly served on the police department rather than the
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mayor’s office or other executive official and was not served on the Indiana
political subdivision risk management commission.
[13] Next, there is substantial evidence countering the assertion that the Zavalas’
attorney sent a copy to Crown Point. Crown Point’s City Attorney, to whom
all legal notices are routed, stated he never received the Notice. He further
stated he consulted with the Crown Point Police Department and the mayor’s
office, and neither of them had received the Notice or any other correspondence
from Vrdolyak Law Group. The city’s director of information technology
likewise stated the police department and mayor’s office did not receive a fax
from Vrdolyak Law Group on September 1, 2015. The city attorney further
stated the city did not receive any documents from the Zavalas or their lawyer
about the accident until the Zavalas filed their complaint for damages.
[14] Even if we were to take as true the Zavalas’ assertion that they served the
Notice of Attorney’s Lien on Crown Point, that document falls well short of
meeting the requirements for a tort claim notice as set forth in Section 34-13-3-
10. The caption of the Notice is confusing, as it appears to refer to an Illinois
proceeding. In addition, the document contains only a minimal reference to the
date and location of the accident, failing to explain what happened or why the
Zavalas thought the City and Poling were at fault. The Notice does not purport
to list the names of all persons involved, does not describe the extent of the
property damage or injuries, does not provide the amount of damages sought,
and fails to provide the Zavalas’ address. Whether a claimant has substantially
complied with the notice requirements of the ITCA is a question of law, not
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fact, and in this case the Notice is insufficient to constitute substantial
compliance. See Hasty v. Floyd Mem’l Hosp., 612 N.E.2d 119 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (attorney’s letter was not sent to governing unit, but even if it had been
sent to the correct recipient, the letter lacked sufficient information to
sufficiently comply with notice requirements); cf. Collier, 544 N.E.2d 497
(attorney’s letter substantially complied with notice requirements; listed
claimant’s name and address, persons involved in arrest, types of damages at
issue, and indicated amount of damages could not be ascertained at that time
but would be determined in the future).
[15] Considering the extensive record showing that Crown Point did not receive the
Notice of Attorney’s Lien and the substantial inadequacies of the Notice, the
trial court reasonably determined as a matter of law that the Zavalas failed to
establish substantial compliance with the ITCA.
[16] The Zavalas’ lawyer argues in the alternative that Crown Point and Poling are
estopped from claiming they failed to comply with the ITCA, stating that
Crown Point’s insurer failed to explain the ITCA’s notice requirements. Crown
Point and Poling correctly note the Zavalas did not argue estoppel to the trial
court. Issues not raised before the trial court on summary judgment cannot be
argued for the first time on appeal and are procedurally defaulted. Dunaway v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 813 N.E.2d 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[17] In addition, a governmental authority will not be estopped in the absence of
clear evidence that its agents made representations upon which the party
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asserting estoppel relied. Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown Cty. Area Plan
Comm’n, 819 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. 2004). Crown Point’s insurance adjuster did not
instruct the Zavalas or make any other representations that might have caused a
reasonable person to choose not to pursue all avenues of recourse. To the
contrary, the adjuster merely sent the Zavalas a request for information and
acknowledged receipt of their attorney’s letter of representation.
[18] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[19] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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