MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 20 2017, 9:37 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bradley K. Kage Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
North Vernon, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination December 20, 2017
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of J.R.J., Sr., Father, and Ja.R.J. 40A04-1706-JT-1276
and Je.R.J., and Ju.J., Minor Appeal from the
Children, Jennings Circuit Court
J.R.J., Sr., The Honorable
Jon W. Webster, Judge
Appellant-Respondent,
Trial Court Cause Nos.
v. 40C01-1602-JT-1
40C01-1602-JT-2
40C01-1602-JT-3
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
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Kirsch, Judge.
[1] J.R.J., Sr. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental
rights to his three minor children. Father raises one issue on appeal that we
restate as whether the juvenile court’s judgment terminating his parental rights
to the three children was clearly erroneous.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] For a period of time, Father and S.W. (“Mother”) were married, and they had
three children: a daughter (“Ja.J.”) born in 2004; a son (“Je.J.”) born in 2007;
and another son (“Ju.J.”) born in 2008 (collectively, “the Children”). In or
around 2009, when Mother and Father were no longer living together, the
Children began residing solely with Father, and in 2011 or 2012, he was
awarded legal custody of them. Mother abused drugs and was only
sporadically in the Children’s lives. At some point, Father remarried, and the
Children lived with Father and his wife (“Stepmother”), and Father was
engaged in dealing drugs, including in the home and in the Children’s presence.
[4] In early April 2014, Stepmother ingested methamphetamine that Father had
given her. As a result of taking the drugs, Stepmother was hospitalized and
died the next day. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
removed the Children from Father’s home on April 10, 2014 on allegations of
illegal drug use and domestic battery. On April 11, 2014, Father was arrested
on federal criminal drug charges; he has been continuously incarcerated since
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his arrest. After removal of the Children, DCS asked Mother and her live-in
boyfriend to take drug tests before placing the Children with her, but Mother
admitted that she would test positive for hydrocodone, and her boyfriend stated
he would test positive for methamphetamine. DCS filed a child in need of
services (“CHINS”) petition for each of the Children, and the Children were
placed with the Mother’s sister, A.W. (“Maternal Aunt”). The Children
remained with Maternal Aunt until September 2014, when she advised DCS
that she could not keep the Children any longer, due to responsibilities caring
for her ill father and her own children. DCS placed the Children together in
foster care.
[5] After a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition, the juvenile court
adjudicated the Children as CHINS in January 2015, and, in February 2015, it
issued a dispositional order and parenting participation order. Father remained
incarcerated, and Mother continued abusing drugs and failed to regularly
participate in treatment. The initial permanency plan for the Children was
reunification, but DCS asked the court to approve a concurrent permanency
plan of termination of parental rights, and the court-appointed special advocate
agreed with DCS’s request for a concurrent plan of termination. In June 2015,
the juvenile court changed the permanency plan to termination of parental
rights. After a November 2015 CHINS permanency hearing, the juvenile
court’s order noted that Father remained in federal custody and it was
“unknown . . . whether he has participated in the services ordered, if such were
available in any of the facilities in which he has been held” and that Mother had
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been released from incarceration in August 2015, had visited with the Children
in September and October 2015, but had not restarted individual counseling
and substance abuse treatment. DCS Ex. 1H. After a February 2016 CHINS
review hearing, the juvenile court’s order stated that the Children were
currently placed in a foster home “with a very large extended family where the
[C]hildren are provided opportunities to participate in family activities.” DCS
Ex. 1I. It also indicated that the Children were participating in extracurricular
activities.
[6] In January 2016, Mother died. In March 2016, Father was found guilty after a
federal jury trial of Conspiracy to Distribute 300 Grams or More of
Methamphetamine (Causing Death) and Distribution of Methamphetamine
(Causing Death). Father received two concurrent life sentences for the
convictions.1 On February 1, 2016, DCS filed a petition for termination of
Father’s parental rights. In August 2016, the Children’s ex-step-grandfather,
H.L.R., who had been married to the Children’s maternal grandmother until
they divorced in or around 2014, filed a petition for guardianship of the
Children.
[7] The juvenile court held a consolidated hearing on the termination of parental
rights petitions and the petition for guardianship. The hearing began on
1
Father’s appeal of his convictions and sentence was pending at the time of the termination hearing in
February and April 2017; however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and
sentence on August 4, 2017, before Father filed his Appellant’s Brief on August 24, 2017. United States v.
Maggard, 865 F.3d 960 (7th Cir. 2017).
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February 17, 2017, and, due to time constraints, was concluded on April 11,
2017.2 Father testified that after he was first incarcerated, and when the
Children were with Maternal Aunt, he spoke to them a few times on the phone,
but not since that time, and he had written to them a few times, but they had
not responded. Father testified to completing various programs while
incarcerated, including: Inside Out Dad; Challenge Program; and Balanced
Family Lifestyle. He was also participating in anger management classes, and
he had earned his G.E.D. Father recognized the trauma and difficulty that the
Children had experienced in their lives, and he expressed that he was “not
trying to block anything positive” for them and was “not trying to fight . . . my
kids going to a permanent home.” Tr. Vol. II at 14, 26. Father’s preference
would be that they be placed in guardianship with H.L.R. Id. at 35. He
indicated that H.L.R. was a grandfather to them, has “always been a sense of
security in their life,” his home was “right down the street” from Father’s, and
that “[t]hey love him.” Id. at 28, 35-36. Father explained that he did not want
the Children to feel that he had abandoned them, and he wanted to be able to
communicate with them, which H.L.R. had indicated Father could do if he
were given guardianship of the Children.
[8] DCS family case manager Debra Scatterfield (“FCM Scatterfield”) testified that
she became involved in the case in May 2014, after the initial removal and
2
We note that the juvenile court issued a separate order on the guardianship, denying H.L.R.’s petition, and
he filed a notice of appeal with this court. This court will address the guardianship appeal by separate
decision.
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assessment, and was the family case manager on the case until August or
September 2015, when family case manager Ryan Matern (“FCM Matern”)
took over the case, but FCM Scatterfield remained on the case as his supervisor.
FCM Scatterfield described that Ja.J, the daughter and oldest of the three
children, was very resilient, a good student, very “motherly” toward her two
brothers, and “pretty stable” as of the date of the hearing. Id. at 44. FCM
Scatterfield stated that Je.J. had “acting out” behaviors and issues with school,
was diagnosed with ADHD, and after starting medications, had improved. Id.
FCM Scatterfield said that the youngest, Ju.J., “has struggled the most.” Id.
He was diagnosed with ADHD and reactive attachment disorder (“RAD”).
Following therapy, Je.J. and Ju.J. “saw vast improvement.” Id. FCM
Scatterfield testified that, after the Children left Maternal Aunt’s home in
September 2014, they went to a foster home and remained in that same home
during the course of the proceedings. Once the case was transferred to FCM
Matern, FCM Scatterfield did not see the Children again until Christmas Eve in
December 2015, when she, along with the guardian ad litem and the foster
mother, took the Children to the hospital to see Mother before she died. Id. at
45. FCM Scatterfield characterized it as “extremely traumatic” for the
Children, but necessary “to say that final goodbye.” Id. During her time as
FCM on the case, Scatterfield arranged some visitations with Mother during
2015. She said that H.L.R. did not have any visitations with the Children
during her time as FCM. Id. at 47.
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[9] FCM Matern, who assumed responsibility on the case in or around September
2015, also testified. He indicated that the Children were “doing well” in their
current foster placement, where they had been for over two years. Id. at 73. He
stated that the boys, Je.J. and Ju.J., had been having visits during weekends,
generally for five hours or so, with H.L.R. for approximately a year, but that
Ja.J. was not willing to participate in those visits. FCM Matern opined that
termination, not the proposed guardianship, was in the Children’s best interests
because (1) Ja.J. does not want to visit with H.L.R., and (2) DCS had concern
about having the Children return to the same area “where everything went
down[,]” referring to the drug activity, arrest of their Father, and removal from
his home. Id. at 72. DCS wanted the Children to have a “fresh start in a
different place or with a new family.” Id.
[10] DCS also called as witnesses Sherry Moore (“Moore”), who was the Children’s
therapist at Life Springs, and Melanie Young (“Young”), who was the
Children’s case manager at Life Springs. Moore began seeing the Children in
November 2014. When she first saw them, they had “[a] lot of trauma which
presented with anger. They would shut down a lot. [Ja.J] especially was
angry.” Id. at 49. She elaborated:
Their trauma was considered chronic because of the exposure to
drugs, witnessing drug use, witnessing people in and out of the
house, seeing you know drugs being sold, the death of their
stepmother was another issue that they were dealing with,
incarceration of their father, removal of the home, they had two
placements — they were with their aunt, then they went into
foster care[.]
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Id. Moore also noted that their foster father died from cancer sometime in
2016. Moore testified that Ja.J. still experienced anxiety, worrying about what
was going to happen to her and her brothers, and that because she was the
caregiver for her brothers for so long, she struggled with being a sister and not a
mother. Moore said that Ja.J. had indicated “on numerous occasions” that she
wanted a home “with a mom and a dad,” so that she could be a kid like others
her age and not a mother. Id. at 55. The brothers had been diagnosed with
ADHD and oppositional defiant disorder, which includes aggression and
inability to regulate emotions. Moore stated that Je.J. internalizes everything
and had made less progress because “he holds everything in.” Id. at 51. Ju.J.
also has RAD, caused by not having his needs met when he was younger, so he
experienced difficulty getting along with people in social situations and had
been hospitalized on four occasions due to outbursts and behavior issues. Id. at
52.
[11] Moore said that H.L.R. had participated in some of the Children’s therapy
sessions, but that Ja.J. did not always want to be in the session if H.L.R. was
there, and Ja.J. refused to go to his house for visits. Ja.J. expressed to Moore
that returning to the same county, school, and area where she lived with Father
would be “re-traumatizing to her all over again.” Id. at 56. According to
Moore, the Children rarely spoke about Father. Moore was aware of a possible
adoptive family, consisting of a mother and father and children, and that the
Children had told her that they “loved going over there” and “wish[ed] they
could be adopted by that family.” Id. at 58.
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[12] Young explained that, in her job as a case manager at Life Springs, she helped
to teach social skills and coping skills. She went to the Children’s schools and
also saw the Children outside of school hours in the community to work on
social skills and getting along with others. She began working with Ju.J. in
November 2014 and with Ja.J. and Je.J. in July 2015. Young taught skills and
gave prompts to assist the Children not to get into physical and verbal
altercations with peers and teachers. She said Ja.J. was doing well and that
Je.J. was struggling, but had improved. Young shared that Ju.J. was “back to
full days at school,” as he had been only attending partial days due to disruptive
behaviors in the classroom. Id. at 63. She testified, “They absolutely need to
continue services,” having made gains but needing continued reinforcement.
Id.
[13] Although Young had not been present at any visits between the boys and
H.L.R., she indicated that she had concerns about placing the Children with
him due to the fact that there would not be a mother in the house, stating that
both Ja.J., as well as the brothers, “need a strong female role model” in the
house. Id. at 64. Moore was aware of a possible family that might be
interesting in adopting the Children and that the Children had visited with the
family.
[14] After DCS rested its case, H.L.R. and his former wife, who was the Children’s
maternal grandmother, K.R. (“Grandmother”), testified. H.L.R. was then fifty-
one years old, lived alone at that time, and had no criminal convictions. For
the year preceding the hearing, he had been having visits during most weekends
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for five hours or so with the boys, Je.J. and Ju.J. His visits with Ja.J. “stopped
a good while back,” but he said he did not know why, stating, “I have no idea,
she doesn’t act like the same [Ja.J.].” Id. at 84, 89. He presented pictures of his
home, bunk beds for the Children, and a van he purchased so that he could
easily transport the Children. H.L.R. testified to attending the Children’s
activities and sporting events. He said that, if he were to be awarded
guardianship, he would want the Children to stay in the same school that they
were currently attending, that he would move his residence to that county, and
that Grandmother would babysit them while he was at work.
[15] Grandmother stated that she had gone to H.L.R.’s house on some occasions
when he had the boys, to visit with them, and that Ja.J. came for a few visits,
but then stopped coming. Grandmother did not know why Ja.J. did not want
to go for visits at his home. When asked if she had any concerns with H.L.R.
getting guardianship over the Children, she said “Yeah I do[,]” and said that
sometimes there is yelling and arguing at his home, which sometimes is
between her and H.L.R., but sometimes the boys get into it as well. Id. at 97-
98. She opined, “[T]hey’ve been around enough of the yelling and arguing”
and “I don’t think they need to be associated with any of that.” Id. at 99.
Grandmother testified that in her opinion the Children “should stay together”
and not be separated through any guardianship or adoption. Id. at 100, 102.
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[16] The juvenile court took the matter under advisement,3 and on May 18, 2017, it
issued its Order Terminating Parental Rights of Father (“Order”). The juvenile
court’s Order found that it was in the Children’s best interests that the Father’s
parental rights be terminated, and it thereafter concluded, among other things:
4. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the minor [C]hildren’s removal will not be remedied.
5. There is a reasonable probability that the reasons for
placement outside the home of Father will not be remedied.
6. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
minor [C]hildren.
7. Termination of the parent child relationship is in the best
interests of the minor [C]hildren.
8. DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
minor [C]hildren, which is adoption.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 44. Father now appeals.
3
At the conclusion of the evidence, the juvenile court indicated that it would be speaking to the Children in
camera and was in the process of arranging a date and time to do so, when the guardian ad litem noted to the
court that, in her opinion, it would not be in the boys’ best interests to be interviewed by the court, due to
maturity and other issues. The juvenile court thus arranged to meet only with Ja.J. Tr. Vol. II at 104. The
record does not indicate whether the court did so.
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Discussion and Decision
[17] As our Supreme Court has recently reiterated, “Decisions to terminate parental
rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make.
They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great
deference to the trial courts[.]” E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636,
640 (Ind. 2014). While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and
raise his child, and thus parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the
law allows for the termination of those rights when a parent is unable or
unwilling to meet his responsibility as a parent. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005); In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766,
773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. That is, parental rights are not absolute
and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining the appropriate
disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Lang v.
Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007), trans. denied.
[18] When reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145,
149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence and
reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover,
in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will
set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is
clearly erroneous. Id. at 148-49. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the
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legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of
fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d
874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[19] Where, as here, the juvenile court entered specific findings and conclusions, we
apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008), trans. denied. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the
findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.
Id. A finding is clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts or
inferences drawn therefrom that support it. Id. If the evidence and inferences
support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
[20] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is
required to allege and prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
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(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these
allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In
re H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 149. Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a
petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate
the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).
[21] Father argues that DCS failed to prove the required elements for termination by
clear and convincing evidence and asserts that the juvenile court’s judgment
was clearly erroneous.4 Specifically, he claims that DCS did not prove that (1)
the conditions that resulted in the Children being removed or the reasons for
their placement outside the home would not be remedied, (2) the continuation
of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being, (3)
termination was in the Children’s best interests, and (4) there was a satisfactory
permanency plan in place for the Children.
4
To the extent that Father claims that the juvenile court’s Order did not actually terminate Father’s rights,
but instead merely contained findings leading to that conclusion, Appellant’s Br. at 9, we reject that argument.
The Order was entitled “Order Terminating Parental Rights of Father,” and, further, the findings and
conclusions outline why it was doing so. To find that the Order did not terminate Father’s rights because it
did not expressly state at the end the words that it was terminating Father’s rights, would put form over
substance.
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Remediation of Conditions
[22] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
led to a child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home would
not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, we must ascertain what
conditions led to the child’s placement and retention in foster care, and, second,
we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions
will not be remedied. Id. In the second step, the trial court must judge a
parent’s fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into
consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent’s recent
improvements against “‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether
there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’” E.M., 4
N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Pursuant to this rule,
“trial courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal
history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support,
and lack of adequate housing and employment.” A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of
Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
[23] In making the argument that DCS failed to establish that the conditions that led
to the Children’s removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied,
Father does not suggest that the conditions have been or will be remedied.
Rather, Father offers that he has, while incarcerated, availed himself of a
variety of programs and services, had a good relationship with the Children
before being incarcerated, and still hopes to continue to be “part of their lives.”
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Appellant’s Br. at 13. We recognize Father’s efforts at self-improvement while
incarcerated and his wish to remain connected to the Children. However, the
inquiry for us is to, first, examine what conditions led to the Children’s
placement and retention in foster care and, second, determine whether there is a
reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989
N.E.2d at 1231.
[24] Here, the Children were removed on allegations of domestic battery and illegal
drug use, after Father provided illegal and potent drugs to his then-wife, the
Children’s Stepmother, who was hospitalized as a result and died within days.
Father was incarcerated, first in Kentucky, and then transferred to federal
custody in another state, where he remained throughout the CHINS and
termination proceedings. He was charged with federal drug crimes and
convicted following a jury trial on two counts and sentenced to two life
sentences, to run concurrently. The convictions and sentences were on appeal
at the time of the termination hearing and, prior to this appeal, were affirmed.
Mother died in January 2016, prior to the termination hearing. Although
Father testified to completing services, and his willingness to continue to do so,
this court has found, “[e]ven assuming that [father] will eventually develop into
a suitable parent, we must ask how much longer [the child] should have to wait
to enjoy the permanency that is essential to her development and overall well-
being.” Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 375 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006), trans. denied. Indiana courts have recognized, “Individuals who
pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop
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positive and meaningful relationships with their children.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d
at 1235-36; C.T. v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 896 N.E.2d 571, 585 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Based on the evidence presented, we cannot say
that the juvenile court clearly erred in concluding that there was a reasonable
probability that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal and
continued placement outside Father’s home would not be remedied.5
Best Interests
[25] Father also argues that insufficient evidence was presented to prove that
termination was in the best interests of the Children. In determining what is in
the best interests of the child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of
the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re
D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed.
In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those
of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper
where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing
In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). The trial
court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her
5
Father also suggests DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable
probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the
Children. We need not address the challenge to the juvenile court’s conclusion that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(B) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the juvenile court
need only find that one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans.
denied.
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physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before
terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for
permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a
child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d
185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). Testimony of the service providers, such as
recommendations of the case manager and guardian ad litem, in addition to
evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are
sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied.
[26] The record before us reflects that the Children suffer from chronic trauma and,
as result of all that they have been through, each suffers from psychological
issues, including anxiety, PTSD, oppositional defiance disorder, and RAD.
The Children were removed after their Stepmother consumed drugs provided
by Father and died. Father was arrested and was never released. The Children
were initially placed with Maternal Aunt until September 2014, when she could
no longer care for them due to other family responsibilities, and they were then
placed with a foster family, where they remained during the course of the
proceedings. The Children exercised some visitations with their Mother during
the proceedings, but her commitment to visitation was sporadic, and she
relapsed into drug abuse and would disappear for periods of time. She was ill
and hospitalized for several weeks in December 2015, and FCM Scatterfield,
the foster mother, and the guardian ad litem took the Children to the hospital
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1706-JT-1276 | December 20, 2017 Page 18 of 21
for final goodbyes, and Mother died in January 2016. Later in 2016, the foster
father died from cancer. In March 2016, Father was convicted after a jury trial
of two federal drug offenses and sentenced to two concurrent life sentences.
The Children attended therapy, weekly at first, with Moore, and she testified
that the therapy must continue. Moore indicated that the Children rarely spoke
of Father and that, while he had written to them and she provided the Children
with the letters, the Children to her knowledge had not written back to Father,
and Ja.J. sometimes left Father’s letters at Moore’s office rather than taking
them with her.
[27] H.L.R. sometimes joined the Children at therapy sessions, but Ja.J. generally
did not want to participate if he was present. Ja.J. told Moore that she desired
an adoptive home with a mother and a father, and Moore had observed the
Children with the foster family and stated that Ja.J. was “less parent-like” with
the foster family. Tr. Vol. II at 56. Ja.J. told Moore that she did not want to
return to the same neighborhood, area, and schools where they had lived with
their Father, and where H.L.R. still lived, as this would re-traumatize her.
Although the boys had had visitation with H.L.R. for some hours during most
weekends over the year preceding the termination hearing, Ja.J. did not want to
visit with him and did not go to his home. H.L.R. and Grandmother each
stated that they did not know why Ja.J. felt this way and refused to go to
H.L.R.’s house. Young, the Children’s case manager at Life Springs, testified
that she had concerns about placing the Children with H.L.R. due to the fact
that Ja.J., as well as the brothers would be well served to have “a strong female
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role model” in the house. Tr. Vol. II at 64. FCM Matern testified that he was
aware of the pending guardianship, but believed termination of Father’s
parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. Id. at 72.
[28] Based upon the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the evidence
supported the juvenile court’s determination that termination of Father’s
parental rights was in the Children’s best interests.
Satisfactory Plan
[29] Father also asserts that, while DCS had “explored adoption as a permanency
plan,” it had failed to establish that it has a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of the Children. Appellant’s Br. at 13. We have held that for a plan to
be “satisfactory,” for purposes of the statute, it “need not be detailed, so long as
it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the
parent-child relationship is terminated.” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374. A DCS plan
is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the
children. Id. In other words, there need not be a guarantee that a suitable
adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive
parent. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007.
[30] Here, FCM Matern testified that DCS’s goals were to terminate Father’s
parental rights “and move forward with adoption.” Tr. Vol. II at 72. He
preferred adoption to the proposed guardianship with H.L.R., noting that Ja.J.
did not want to visit with H.L.R., and he stated that DCS was “looking for . . .
a fresh new start in a different place or with a new family.” Id. Evidence was
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presented that a possible adoptive family had been identified, and the Children
had shared with their therapist, Moore, that they “loved going over there” and
“wish[ed] they could be adopted by that family.” Id. at 58. We conclude that
the juvenile court did not err in determining that DCS had a satisfactory plan
for the Children’s care and treatment.
[31] We will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of “clear
error” – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Based
on the record before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of
Father’s parental rights to the Children was clearly erroneous. We, therefore,
affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
[32] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Brown, J., concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 40A04-1706-JT-1276 | December 20, 2017 Page 21 of 21
In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.R.J., Sr., Father, and Ja.R.J., Je.R.J. and Ju.J., Minor Children, J.R.J., Sr. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec)
Combined Opinion