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Appellate Court Date: 2017.12.12
10:04:31 -06'00'
Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Bochenek, 2017 IL App (1st) 170277
Appellate Court ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Caption Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WOJCIECH BOCHENEK, Defendant-
Appellant.
District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-17-0277
Filed September 29, 2017
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-CH-10462; the
Review Hon. Kathleen M. Pantle, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Walter Z. Rywak, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appeal
Dean Haritos and Cynthia Ramirez, of Morse Bolduc & Dinos, LLC,
of Chicago, for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Neville and Justice Mason concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Wojciech Bochenek was crossing the street with his wife, Barbara, and daughter when
Barbara was struck and seriously injured by a hit and run driver. Barbara filed a claim with her
insurer, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, which paid her $100,000, the limit on
her uninsured motorist coverage. Wojciech, who was fortunate to avoid being hit, also filed a
claim under the policy for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and its physical
manifestations, which he experienced after the accident. Allstate filed a declaratory judgment
action against Wojciech seeking a declaration that he was not entitled to uninsured motorist
benefits because he was not physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle, the $100,000 per
person policy limit payable under the policy’s uninsured motorist provision had been met, and
he did not qualify as an insured person for medical payments coverage under the policy. The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Allstate’s motion
and denied Wojciech’s motion.
¶2 Wojciech has appealed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment against him. We
conclude that the trial court correctly found that the absence of physical contact between
Wojciech and the hit and run vehicle precluded his recovery under the uninsured motorist
provision of the policy and affirm on that basis.
¶3 Background
¶4 On the evening of February 24, 2015, Wojciech Bochenek, his wife Barbara Bochenek,
and their daughter were crossing Harlem Avenue in Chicago. Barbara entered the intersection
first and was struck by a hit and run driver traveling at a high rate of speed. Barbara was thrown
into the air and landed on the sidewalk. Wojciech, walking behind Barbara, was not struck and
suffered no actual physical injury.
¶5 Barbara filed an uninsured motorist claim with Allstate, which paid her $100,000, the
uninsured policy limits for her claim. Wojciech also made a claim with Allstate seeking
uninsured motorist benefits and medical payments for the PTSD and accompanying
symptoms, including shortness of breath, heart palpitations, dizziness, and loss of sleep that he
experienced after the accident.
¶6 At the time of the accident, Barbara and the couple’s daughter had an automobile insurance
policy with Allstate. The policy included uninsured motorist coverage. Under the policy, an
uninsured auto included a hit and run vehicle that causes “bodily injury to an insured person by
physical contact with the insured person or with a vehicle occupied by that person.” The policy
defines an insured person as the policyholder, a “resident relative” of the policy holder, and
any person who is legally entitled to recover because of bodily injury to the policyholder, a
resident relative, or an occupant of the insured auto with permission. Allstate concedes
Wojciech was an insured person under the policy.
¶7 Allstate, which denied it owed Wojciech uninsured motorist benefits or medical payments
under the policy, filed a three count complaint for declaratory judgment. Allstate sought a
declaration that (i) only Barbara sustained a bodily injury as a result of the accident, that
Wojciech’s emotional damages claim was derivative of his wife’s bodily injury, and the
$100,000 per person policy limit payable under the policy’s uninsured motorist provision had
been met (count I); (ii) Wojciech was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under the
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policy because he was not was physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle (count II); and
(iii) Wojciech did not qualify as an insured person for medical payments coverage under the
policy as he was not in, getting into or out, occupying, or operating an automobile at the time of
the accident and was not struck (count III).
¶8 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary
judgment for Allstate and against Wojciech, finding (i) the insurance policy to be clear and
unambiguous, (ii) Wojciech’s PTSD and accompanying physical symptoms did not fall within
the definition of “bodily injury” under the policy or Illinois law, (iii) the insurance policy and
Illinois law provides uninsured motorist compensation only if the insured was physically
contacted by the hit and run vehicle, and Wojciech was not, and (iv) the uninsured motorist
coverage for the accident was exhausted by the payment of the limits of the policy to Barbara.
The trial court also determined that Wojciech did not qualify as an insured person for purposes
of medical payments coverage under the policy. Wojciech has abandoned this claim on appeal.
¶9 Proceeding only on the issues related to his uninsured motorist claim, Wojciech argues (i)
Illinois law does not require physical contact between the insured and the uninsured vehicle in
a hit and run accident, (ii) the physical contact requirement is intended to prevent fraudulent
claims, which is not an issue because Barbara was hit by the uninsured vehicle, (iii) his injuries
were caused by indirect contact with the uninsured vehicle, which is compensable under
Illinois law, (iv) he was in the “zone of danger” when his wife was hit and should be able to
recover for his injuries, and (iv) his injuries fall within the policy definition of “bodily injury.”
¶ 10 Analysis
¶ 11 Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern
Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556 (2007). In an insurance coverage case,
cross-motions for summary judgment indicate the parties agree that no genuine of issues of
material fact exist but dispute issues of law regarding the construction of the insurance policy.
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 363 Ill. App. 3d
335, 338-39 (2005). Our review is de novo. Virginia Surety Co., 224 Ill. 2d at 556.
¶ 12 In construing an insurance policy, the primary function of the court is to ascertain and
enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in the policy. Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108 (1992). A court must afford unambiguous
words their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Stringfield, 292
Ill. App. 3d 471, 473-74 (1997).
¶ 13 Wojciech’s primary contention is that Illinois law does not require physical contact
between the insured and the uninsured vehicle in a hit and run accident.
¶ 14 Part 5 of the policy provides, in pertinent part, “We will pay those damages an insured
person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto because of
bodily injury sustained by an injured person.” An uninsured auto under the policy includes “a
hit and run vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured person by physical contact with the
insured person or with the vehicle occupied by that person.”
¶ 15 Wojciech does not contend that the policy is ambiguous as to whether the uninsured
motorist clause requires physical contact but argues that the Illinois Insurance Code (Code)
(215 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2016)) does not require physical impact between the uninsured
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vehicle and the insured and that a physical contact requirement is against public policy. See
215 ILCS 5/143a (West 2016) (“Uninsured and hit and run motor vehicle coverage”). In the
seminal case, Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 58 Ill. 2d 109, 111
(1974), our supreme court held that physical contact was required under the Code to collect
uninsured motorist coverage. In Ferega, while the plaintiff was driving at night on a two-lane
highway, he turned his vehicle to the right to avoid an oncoming vehicle in his own lane of
travel and struck a culvert. Id. at 110. Plaintiff tried to collect for his injuries under his policy’s
uninsured motorist clause, which defined a “ ‘hit-and-run motor vehicle’ ” as a vehicle
“ ‘which cause[d] bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle
with the insured or with a vehicle which the insured [was] occupying at the time of the
accident.’ ” Id. The lower courts denied recovery because there had been no physical contact
between the plaintiff’s vehicle and the unknown hit-and-run motor vehicle as required under
the policy.
¶ 16 In its ruling, the supreme court affirmed the lower courts and denied plaintiff’s suggestion
that the plain language of the statute and the policy should be judicially modified by altering
the meaning of the word “hit” so that the element of physical contact was eliminated. Id. at
111. In support, the supreme court quoted the opinion in Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., 82 Ill.
App. 2d 457, 461 (1967), which stated that the Code “ ‘was not intended to include
unidentified cars that may be present at the scene of an occurrence of bodily injury without a
physical contact of the unidentified motor vehicle with the insured or an automobile occupied
by the insured.’ ” Ferega, 58 Ill. 2d at 111 (quoting Prosk, 82 Ill. App. 2d at 461). The supreme
court also observed that the statute was “aimed at the avoidance of fraudulent claims.” Id.
¶ 17 The supreme court reaffirmed Ferega in Lemke v. Kenilworth Insurance Co., 109 Ill. 2d
350, 354 (1985) (noting legislature had amended section 143a eight times since Ferega, and
thus, “legislative inaction subsequent to Ferega indicate[d] approval of the reasoning and
holding in that case”). But the appellate courts in Illinois are divided about whether the
supreme court intended a physical contact requirement to be permissible in a policy or required
by the Code itself. For instance, in Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 116 Ill. App. 3d
1067, 1069 (1983), the First District noted that “[i]t [was] well established in Illinois that an
insured cannot recover under the hit-and-run provision of the uninsured motorist coverage
unless there [was] a physical contact of the unidentified motor vehicle with the insured or an
automobile occupied by the insured.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.). Similarly, in Kannel
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 222 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1016 (1991), the
Second District determined that “our supreme court ha[d] upheld the validity of insurance
policies affording coverage for personal injuries in accidents caused by hit-and-run drivers
only where the unknown vehicle makes physical contact with the insured or his vehicle.”
¶ 18 But, the Third District, as Wojciech notes, has rejected the argument that an insured must
be contacted by the hit and run vehicle to recover uninsured motorists benefits. In Groshans v.
Dairyland Insurance Co., 311 Ill. App. 3d 876, 879 (2000), the Third District “found that
Illinois law [did] not require actual physical contact but merely permit[ted] an insurance policy
to require such contact.” See also Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Prichett, 2015 IL App (3d)
130809, ¶ 20 (reaffirming Groshans and noting that legislature amended the Code after
Groshans was issued and did not invalidate Groshans or clarify that coverage applies only in
cases of physical contact).
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¶ 19 Wojciech suggests Groshans and Pritchett support his argument that he may recover under
the uninsured motorist provision of the policy even though he was not physically contacted by
the hit and run automobile. The assertion is misplaced. Even if we were to adopt the rationale
of Groshans and Pritchett (which we do not), Wojciech still is not entitled to uninsured
motorist benefits under the policy—the policy explicitly requires physical contact between an
insured and the hit and run vehicle. While both Groshans and Pritchett conclude that Illinois
law does not require actual physical contact, they find that it is a permissible requirement in an
insurance policy. Under the plain and unambiguous language of the Allstate policy, an insured
must have been physically contacted by the hit and run vehicle. Wojciech was not and thus
may not recover.
¶ 20 Wojciech argues that one of the primary purposes of the physical contact requirement, as
noted in Ferega, is to prevent fraud, which is not an issue because it is undisputed that the hit
and run driver ran into his wife, causing serious injuries. We agree. But that does not negate the
policy’s express requirement that there be physical contact to recover under the uninsured
motorist provision.
¶ 21 Wojciech also notes that Illinois courts allow recovery for indirect physical contact when
either an actual physical object from the hit-and-run vehicle indirectly strikes the insured’s
vehicle or the indirect contact is a result of a chain of events. See Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. LeJeune, 114 Ill. 2d 54, 59 (1986) (supreme court declined “to require that the
‘hit’ be direct” when hit-and-run vehicle hit a third car, which then hit the insured’s car);
Palmer, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 1068, 1071 (where physical contact requirement was satisfied when
lug nut flew off hit-and-run vehicle and hit insured’s car). While Wojciech asks us to find his
case analogous to Hartford and Palmer, there simply was no contact, direct or indirect,
between him and the hit and run driver. Thus, he cannot recover under the uninsured motorist
provision of the policy.
¶ 22 Because we find that Wojciech’s claim is barred by the physical contact requirement of the
policy, we need not address his contention that his physical and emotional injuries after the
accident amount to “bodily injury” under the policy.
¶ 23 Affirmed.
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