NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 26 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEE KENT HEMPFLING; SUESIE KENT No. 17-16329
HEMPFLING,
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-03213-ESW
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM**
KENT VOLKMER*; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Eileen S. Willett, Magistrate Judge, Presiding***
Submitted December 18, 2017****
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Lee Kent Hempfling and Suesie Kent Hempfling appeal pro se from the
*
Kent Volkmer has been substituted for his predecessor, M. Lando
Voyles, as Pinal County Attorney under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
***
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
****
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court’s judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due
process violations in connection with prior state court proceedings. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the Hempflings’ action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it
constituted a prohibited “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment and raised
a claim that was “inextricably intertwined” with that state court judgment. See id.
at 1163-65 (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see
also Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-Feldman
precludes adjudication where “the only redress [plaintiffs] seek is an ‘undoing’ of
the prior state-court judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Hempflings’
motion for reconsideration because the Hempflings failed to state any grounds
warranting relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5
F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60).
2 17-16329
We do not consider issues raised by the Hempflings in their brief that are not
supported by argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir.
1992).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-16329