NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 28 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES G. KINNEY, No. 16-56162
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-03279-PSG-JC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MICHELE R. CLARK; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Charles G. Kinney appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing
his action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. We have jurisdiction under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kinney’s request for oral
argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a
claim. Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm
on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP,
534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
Dismissal of Kinney’s action was proper under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
because Kinney’s claims constitute a “de facto appeal” of prior state court
judgments, or are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. See Noel v.
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609,
616 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred claim for
injunction based on allegedly erroneous and “void” state court judgment because
“[g]ranting the injunction would require the district court to determine that the
state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint
without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper
when amendment would be futile).
We reject as without merit Kinney’s challenges to the district court orders
regarding venue, transfer, relation of cases, recusal, and the striking of
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electronically filed documents.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Appellees’ requests for sanctions and for leave to file a motion for a
vexatious litigant pre-filing review order against Kinney, set forth in the answering
brief, are denied.
Kinney’s request for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 22) is granted.
Appellees’ requests for judicial notice (Docket Entry Nos. 11, 26 & 30) are
granted.
AFFIRMED.
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