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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-14515
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:04-cr-00263-CG-D-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PERCY MCCLINTON SNOW,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(January 4, 2018)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Percy Snow appeals the district court’s imposition of a six-month term of
imprisonment after the revocation of his supervised release. He contends the court
clearly erred in finding he violated the terms of his supervised release by failing to
report a change of residence. In addition, Snow argues that his sentence was
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After review, 1 we affirm in part and
remand in part for resentencing.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Violation of Supervised Release
By statute, a district court is authorized to revoke a term of supervised
release where the supervisee violates a condition of the release. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3). To do so, the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the violation occurred. Id.; United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1107
(11th Cir. 2006). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Snow
changed his residence without properly informing his probation officer. Snow told
the officer only that he would be staying in a motel for a few days, but did not
notify him that he remained there more than one month later. Moreover, Snow’s
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A district court’s revocation of supervised release is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir.
2008). We accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they were clearly erroneous. United
States v. Holland, 874 F.2d 1470, 1473 (11th Cir. 1989).
We review the sentence imposed by the district court upon revocation of supervised
release for reasonableness, applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir.
2014).
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own testimony showed that he did not intend to remain at his prior residence;
Snow freely admitted that he planned to buy a house and move there directly from
the motel where he was staying. Furthermore, Snow’s stepmother told the officer
that he had moved away, and his power and phone service were disconnected. On
these facts, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Snow had changed
his residence without notice in violation of the conditions of his supervised release.
See United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding
that a factual finding is clearly erroneous when we are “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” after reviewing all of the
evidence).
B. Sentencing
Pursuant to § 3583(e), upon finding that the defendant violated a condition
of supervised release, a district court may revoke the term of supervised release
and impose a term of imprisonment after considering certain specific factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. § 3583(e)(3). In reviewing whether a sentence is
reasonable, we must first ensure that the district court did not commit a significant
procedural error, such as “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors . . . or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. At the time of
sentencing, the district court must state the reasons for its imposition of a particular
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); see United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1090
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(11th Cir. 2008). “[T]he sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v.
Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Snow contends the district court failed to identify the § 3553(a) factors upon
which it relied and that it neglected to explain its sentence. We agree. The district
court made no mention of the § 3553(a) factors at all and only briefly referenced
the applicable Guidelines range before summarily handing down Snow’s sentence.
The entirety of the court’s deliberation reads as follows:
I have examined and reviewed the chapter seven provisions. I do find
them to be appropriate. They are six to 12 months. I hereby sentence
you to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be
imprisoned for a term of six months. Following that, 54 months of
supervised release will be reimposed, with all the previously imposed
terms to be reimposed, and remain in full force and effect.
The court sentenced Snow without any explanation of its decision, and with
no indication as to whether it considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Snow
presented evidence that he had passed all of his drug tests since his release, and
that he had maintained steady and diligent employment as a result of vocational
training he received while incarcerated. Given its limited discussion, we are not
satisfied that the court considered Snow’s arguments and how they might relate to
the factors it was required to weigh, such as the “nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” the need “to afford
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adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” or “to protect the public from further
crimes,” or to “provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D); see also id. § 3583(e)(3)
(requiring the court to consider these factors).
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s finding that Snow violated the
condition of his supervised release requiring him to notify his probation officer of a
change in residence. However, we conclude Snow’s sentence was procedurally
unreasonable, so we VACATE his sentence and REMAND to the district court for
resentencing.
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