J-A26030-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SCE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ERIC & CHRISTINE SPATT, : No. 283 MDA 2017
Appellees
Appeal from the Order Entered January 13, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at
No(s): 2015-CV-30062
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and RANSOM, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 04, 2018
Appellant, SCE Environmental Group, Inc., appeals from the order
entered on January 13, 2017, which sustained the preliminary objections
filed by Eric and Christine Spatt (hereinafter, collectively, “the Defendants”)
and dismissed Appellant’s complaint without prejudice. We quash this
appeal.
The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts and procedural
posture of this appeal. As the trial court explained:
On May 26, 2015, [Appellant] filed a [Mechanics’] Lien
claim[,] in the amount of [$371,424.79, against the
Defendants]. Thereafter, on May 3, 2016, [Appellant] filed
[a complaint] pursuant to the Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963,
49 P.S. § 1101, et seq. . . . Therein, [Appellant] alleged
that a fire occurred on June 27, 2014, at a property located
at 1264 Mid Valley Drive, in Jessup, [Pennsylvania
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(hereinafter “the Property”)]. According to [Appellant], the
Property was previously owned by both [of the Defendants],
but was later transferred solely to Defendant Eric Spatt.
[Appellant] alleged that[,] at the time, the Property was
occupied by Scranton Cooperage, Inc., a Pennsylvania
corporation with its [principal] address listed at 1264 Mid
Valley Drive, in Jessup, [Pennsylvania], otherwise known as
the Property. . . .
[Appellant] asserted that it entered into a Master Services
Agreement for Emergency Services with Scranton
Cooperage on July 3, 2014 for work on the Property. The
Master Services Agreement specifically lists the scope of
work as “Emergency Response Work.” [Appellant] also
attached a July 11, 2014 signed proposal[,] further detailing
the scope and type of work to be performed. [In this signed
proposal,] the scope of work is described as “stabilization of
the site as well as the management of the potential soil
impact along the northeast swale along the Equilibrium
property.” The signed proposal additionally describes the
work as management of the soil and stormwater, as well as
soil contaminants.
[Appellant] further asserted that Scranton Cooperage
contacted [Appellant] in March 2015 for a proposal
regarding the disposal, cleaning[,] and removal of a frac
[tank] on the property, work estimated at $17,276.93.
[Appellant] alleged that work was performed from [October
2014 to May 2015] according to the agreement and
subsequent proposal and sent an invoice to the
[Defendants] totaling $371,424.79.
[Appellant] claimed that the [Defendants have] not paid
[Appellant] for any of the work performed. [Appellant]
asserts that it is a contractor as defined under the
Mechanics’ Lien Law. As such[, Appellant] filed a Mechanics’
Lien claim in the amount of [$371,424.79]. [Appellant]
claims that[,] at the time the claim was filed, the
Defendants were the owners of the property to which
[Appellant’s] mechanics’ lien attached. As such, [Appellant]
demanded judgment against the Defendants in the sum of
$371,424.79, plus interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees[,]
and costs.
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On July 22, 2016, Defendant Eric Spatt filed [] preliminary
objections [to Appellant’s complaint. The preliminary
objections were] in the nature of a demurrer under
[Pa.R.C.P.] 1028(a)(4), a motion to strike pursuant to
[Pa.R.C.P.] 1028(a)(3) and [Pa.R.C.P.] 1019(a) for lack of
specificity, and a motion to strike pursuant to [Pa.R.C.P.]
1028(a)(3) on the basis of an agreement for alternative
dispute resolution contained in the contract. . . .
[Later, on November 4, 2016, Defendant Christine Spatt
filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s complaint.
Defendant Christine Spatt’s preliminary objections were
substantively identical to the preliminary objections filed by
Defendant Eric Spatt.]
[Following oral argument,] on January 13, 2017, [the trial]
court entered an order [that sustained the Defendants’
preliminary objections and dismissed Appellant’s] complaint
[against Defendants], without prejudice, for failure to meet
the requirements of the Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963, 49
P.S. § 1101, et seq. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/17, at 1-3 (some internal capitalization and
citations omitted).
On February 8, 2017, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court’s January 13, 2017 order. We now quash this appeal.
As we have explained, this Court is obligated to “first ascertain
whether the [order appealed from] is properly appealable, because the
question of appealability implicates the jurisdiction of this [C]ourt.”
Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 159 (Pa. Super. 1997). “The
general rule is that, unless otherwise permitted by statute, only appeals
from final orders are subject to appellate review.” Commonwealth v.
Sartin, 708 A.2d 121, 122 (Pa. Super. 1998). In relevant part,
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines a “final order” as any
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order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
Further, as this Court has held, “for finality to occur, the trial court must
dismiss with prejudice the complaint in full.” Mier v. Stewart, 683 A.2d
930, 930 (Pa. Super. 1996) (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the trial court sustained the Defendants’
preliminary objections and dismissed Appellant’s complaint without
prejudice. The dismissal of Appellant’s complaint without prejudice
implicitly granted Appellant 20 days in which to file an amended complaint –
indeed, the words “without prejudice” have no contextual meaning unless
they denote that Appellant was granted leave to amend the complaint. See
Pa.R.C.P. 1028(e).
Yet, Appellant did not file an amended complaint and Appellant did not
do what was required to create a final, appealable order in this case, such as
filing a praecipe to dismiss its complaint with prejudice. See Hionis v.
Concord Twp., 973 A.2d 1030, 1035–1036 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (explaining
procedure to obtain a final order where the trial court dismisses a complaint
without prejudice, but where the plaintiff either does not wish to or does not
timely comply with the trial court's order to amend the complaint);
Chamberlain v. Altoona Hosp., 567 A.2d 1067, 1069–1070 (Pa. Super.
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1989) (same). Instead, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court’s interlocutory, January 13, 2017 order.1
Further, while interlocutory orders are appealable in certain
circumstances, none of those circumstances applies to the case at bar. Our
Supreme Court has explained:
in addition to an appeal from final orders of the Court of
Common Pleas, our rules provide the Superior Court with
jurisdiction in the following situations: interlocutory appeals
that may be taken as of right, Pa.R.A.P. 311; interlocutory
appeals that may be taken by permission, Pa.R.A.P. [312];
appeals that may be taken from a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P.
313; and appeals that may be taken from certain
distribution orders by the Orphans' Court Division, Pa.R.A.P.
342.
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 43 A.3d 470, 478 n.7 (Pa. 2012) (internal
quotations omitted), quoting McCutcheon v. Phila. Elec. Co., 788 A.2d
345, 349 n.6 (Pa. 2002).
____________________________________________
1 We note that the interlocutory nature of the trial court’s order is not
altered by the fact that the 20-day time-frame granted to Appellant to file an
amended complaint has expired. See Hionis, 973 A.2d at 1036 (“It should
be noted that an order sustaining preliminary objections often grants the
plaintiff leave to amend within a time certain or suffer dismissal. Such an
order is interlocutory and never will become appealable, because it is a mere
direction that an order be entered at some time in the future,
unaccompanied by actual entry of the specified order in the docket. In order
to appeal such an order, the plaintiff must allow the period for amendment
specified in the lower court's order to expire, and then praecipe the lower
court clerk to enter an order dismissing the complaint”) (quoting 20 G.
RONALD DARLINGTON, ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA APPELLATE PRACTICE § 301:19 (2008-
2009)) (emphasis omitted).
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Here, the challenged order is not defined as appealable as of right (per
Pa.R.A.P. 311), Appellant did not ask for or receive permission to appeal the
interlocutory order (per Pa.R.A.P. 312), and Appellant has not provided this
Court with any argument as to whether—or how—the order could satisfy the
collateral order doctrine (per Pa.R.A.P. 313). Thus, since we do not have
jurisdiction over this appeal, we are required to quash Appellant’s appeal.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742.
Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/4/2018
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