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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-10469
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A097-192-099
FNU MULYADI,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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(January 10, 2018)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Fnu Mulyadi, a native and citizen of Indonesia who was ordered removed
from the United States in 2009, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
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Appeal’s (“BIA”) denial of his third motion to reopen removal proceedings.
Mulyadi, who acknowledges that his motion to reopen was both number and time-
barred, argues that the BIA should have granted his motion pursuant to an
exception to those bars because conditions for Christians of Chinese ethnicity in
Indonesia have materially changed since he was ordered removed in 2009.
Specifically, Mulyadi contends that radical Islam is on the rise in Indonesia, and,
as a result, Christians of Chinese ethnicity in Indonesia face violence and other
forms of abuse. After thorough review, we deny the petition.
We review the denial of a motion to reopen an immigration petition for
abuse of discretion. Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.
2009). “Our review is limited to determining whether the BIA exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Id. The moving party bears a
heavy burden, Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 813 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam), since motions to reopen are disfavored, especially in removal
proceedings. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256.
A party may only file one motion to reopen removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). That motion “shall state the new facts
that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be
supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B).
A “motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final
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administrative order of removal,” subject to certain exceptions. 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). However, the time and number limitations do not apply if the
motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of
nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is
material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at
the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). We’ve held that, at a
minimum, the BIA may deny a motion to reopen on the following three grounds:
(1) failure to establish a prima facie case; (2) failure to introduce evidence that was
material and previously unavailable; or (3) a determination that an alien is not
entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion despite statutory eligibility for relief.
Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001).
Here, Mulyadi cannot demonstrate that the BIA acted arbitrarily or
capriciously when it denied his untimely, number-barred, third motion to reopen,
because Mulyadi has failed to show that country conditions with respect to
Christians of Chinese ethnicity residing in Indonesia have materially changed since
his 2009 order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). As the record reveals,
the BIA considered the new information submitted by Mulyadi, compared it with
that which Mulyadi had submitted during his 2009 removal proceedings and in his
prior two motions to reopen, and came to a reasonable conclusion that the relevant
country conditions had not materially changed since he was ordered removed in
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2009. For example, while Mulyadi submitted reports regarding one attempted and
one completed terrorist attack in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2016, the information he
submitted in previous proceedings showed that very similar attacks had previously
occurred. Moreover, as the BIA noted, none of those reports indicated that those
terrorist attacks were directed at Christians of Chinese ethnicity. Additionally,
although Mulyadi submitted evidence regarding the recent imposition of Sharia
law to non-Muslims in Indonesia’s Aceh province, the BIA appropriately declined
to consider those circumstances as being material. Indeed, Mulyadi was not from
that province, nor did he show that he would be required to relocate there upon his
return to Indonesia.
In short, the evidence Mulyadi submitted along with his third motion to
reopen showed that circumstances for Christians of Chinese ethnicity residing in
Indonesia have not materially changed since he was ordered removed from the
United States in 2009. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying
his untimely, number-barred, third motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);
Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1302.
PETITION DENIED.
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