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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: M.M., FATHER : No. 960 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree February 22, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos: CP-51-AP-0000065-2017,
CP-51-DP-0001567-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2018
M.M. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered February 22, 2017, in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which involuntarily
terminated his parental rights to his minor daughter, C.M.M. (“Child”), born in
July 2003.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The record reveals that the Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) filed a dependency petition with respect to Child on July 1, 2014.
DHS averred that it filed the petition due to Child’s truancy issues. DHS
recommended that Child be adjudicated dependent, while remaining in the
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1The trial court entered a separate decree that same day, terminating the
parental rights of D.D. (“Mother”). Mother filed an appeal at Superior Court
docket number 991 EDA 2017, which is assigned to a different panel of this
Court.
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home of Father and Mother. The trial court adjudicated Child dependent on
September 3, 2014.
On January 9, 2015, DHS filed an application for order of protective
custody. DHS averred that Father left Child in the care of her paternal
grandmother while he checked himself into a drug rehabilitation program, and
that the paternal grandmother was unable to care for Child. In addition, DHS
averred that Mother was unable to care for Child due to her own drug issues
and lack of suitable housing. The trial court entered an order of protective
custody, directing that Child be temporarily committed to DHS. However, on
January 12, 2015, the court entered a shelter care order withdrawing the order
of protective custody and discharging Child’s temporary commitment. The
shelter care order indicated that Father absconded with Child, that her
whereabouts were unknown, and that DHS should apply for an order of
protective custody once Child is located. The dependency docket indicates
that the court also terminated court supervision, ending Child’s adjudication
of dependency. DHS filed a second dependency petition on January 14, 2015.
On January 21, 2015, DHS filed an additional application for order of
protective custody. DHS averred that Father and Mother contacted DHS and
agreed to have Child placed in foster care. The court entered an order of
protective custody that same day, followed by a shelter care order on January
23, 2015. DHS filed a third dependency petition on January 30, 2015. For
reasons that are not entirely clear from the record, the court continued the
case several times and deferred adjudication for nearly a year. The court
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entered an order adjudicating Child dependent for a second time on November
19, 2015.
On January 18, 2017, DHS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental
rights to Child involuntarily. The trial court conducted a termination hearing
on December 22, 2017.2 Following the hearing, the court entered a decree
terminating Father’s parental rights. Father timely filed a notice of appeal on
March 17, 2017, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal.
Father now raises the following issue for our review.
Whether [t]he trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
entering an order on February 22, 2017 involuntarily terminating
the parental rights of Father where there was a bond between the
father and the child that will be detrimental to the child to
terminate?
Father’s Brief at 5.3
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2 The Honorable Vincent L. Johnson presided over Child’s initial dependency
proceedings. The Honorable Lyris F. Younge presided over the termination
proceedings.
3 In his notice of appeal, Father indicated that he also wished to challenge the
February 22, 2017 permanency review order, changing Child’s permanent
placement goal to adoption. However, Father did not include a challenge to
the goal change order in his concise statement, in his statement of questions
involved, or in the argument section of his brief. Thus, we conclude that
Father waived any challenge to the goal change order. See Krebs v. United
Refining Co. of Pa., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted)
(“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or
suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions involved, and any
issue not raised in a statement of matters complained of on appeal is deemed
waived.”); In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.
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We review Father’s issue mindful of our well-settled standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
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Super. 2010)) (“‘[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of
a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any
other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”’).
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parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which provides as follows.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
***
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) (2), (5), (8), and (b).
On appeal, Father makes no effort to challenge the trial court’s findings
with respect to Section 2511(a). Thus, we need only consider whether the
court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(b). The requisite analysis is as follows.
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained,
Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and
the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
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[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
that the trial court should consider the importance of
continuity of relationships and whether any existing
parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court found that terminating Father’s parental
rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. Trial Court Opinion,
7/12/17, at 6-7. The court reasoned that Child is in a pre-adoptive foster
home, and that Child wants to be adopted by her foster mother. Id.
Father argues that Child is bonded to him, and that ending this bond
would be detrimental to Child. Father’s Brief at 8-10. Father argues that he
believed he was not allowed to visit with Child without the approval of Child’s
therapist, but that he maintained regular phone contact with Child, and that
Child lived with him for many years before she entered foster care. Id. at 9-
10.
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. During the
termination hearing, DHS presented the testimony of Community Umbrella
Agency (“CUA”) case manager, Dominique Johnson. Ms. Johnson testified
that Father’s reunification objectives included participating in drug and alcohol
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treatment, participating in services at the Achieving Reunification Center
(“ARC”), obtaining housing, and visiting with Child. N.T., 2/22/17, at 42.
Concerning Father’s compliance with these objectives, Ms. Johnson
testified that Father has never completed, or participated in, drug and alcohol
treatment. Id. CUA referred Father for parenting services at ARC, but Father
failed to complete the services. Id. at 45. CUA also referred Father to ARC
for assistance in finding employment. Id. While Father reports being
employed, he has never provided documentation to support this claim. Id.
Finally, Father remains without suitable housing. Id. at 44.
With respect to visitation, Ms. Johnson testified that Father has failed to
visit with Child on a consistent basis since the trial court removed her from
his home. Id. at 44. Father has not visited with Child at all since Ms. Johnson
began working on this case in January 2016. Id. at 14, 43. Despite Father’s
failure to attend visits, Ms. Johnson testified that Father speaks with Child on
the phone approximately “every two of three weeks[.]” Id. at 43, 48-49.
Concerning Child’s current placement, Ms. Johnson testified that Child
is “doing great” in her foster home. Id. at 23. Ms. Johnson explained that
Child has “a genuine bond” with her foster mother. Id. at 24. “[Child] takes
direction well from [her foster mother]. You know, she blends in with the
family. [The foster mother] has two -- has other children in the home, and
she treats her no differently than the children that are in the home.” Id.
Child’s foster mother has stated that she is willing to adopt Child, and Child
has stated that she wants to be adopted. Id. at 23, 25.
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Ultimately, Ms. Johnson opined that terminating Father’s parental rights
would be in Child’s best interest. Id. at 46. Ms. Johnson explained that Child
is settled in a stable home where she has made “lifelong bonds[,]” and that
Child’s foster mother is open to allowing ongoing contact between Child and
Father. Id. Ms. Johnson did not believe that Child would suffer irreparable
harm. Id.
Thus, the record confirms that terminating Father’s parental rights will
best serve Child’s needs and welfare. The trial court removed Child from
Father’s care in January 2015. Since that time, Father has done seemingly
nothing to comply with his objectives and achieve reunification. This Court
will not leave Child to languish in foster care while Father ignores his parental
responsibilities. As we have stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super.
2006).
Moreover, it is clear that whatever relationship Child maintains with
Father should not prevent the termination of his parental rights. By the time
of the termination hearing in February 2017, Child had not visited with Father
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in over a year.4 Meanwhile, Child has been doing well in the care of her pre-
adoptive foster mother. The record demonstrates that Child wants to be
adopted by her foster mother, and that terminating Father’s parental rights
will allow Child to enjoy the benefits of a permanent and stable home.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not
abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights.
Therefore, we affirm the court’s February 22, 2017 decree.
Decree affirmed.
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4 The record supports Father’s argument that his lack of visits with Child may
not have been entirely within his control. The record contains permanency
review orders entered in March and June 2016, providing Father with visits
only at the discretion of Child and/or her therapist. See Master’s
Recommendation – Permanency Review, 3/14/16 (“At the recommendation of
child’s therapist, mother and father to have supervised visits the agency [sic]
–at the child’s discretion.”); Permanency Review Order, 6/6/16 (providing that
Father is entitled to visits “[i]f Father avails himself . . . at the agency at the
discretion of the child. . . . All visits, including sibling[,] to be at the discretion
of the therapist.”). In addition, while Ms. Johnson seemed to testify that
Child’s therapist recommended visits with Father, her statements on this issue
were less than clear. See N.T., 2/22/2017, at 40 (“Only [Child] -- therapist
at the time at Nueva Vida, with father, because he was the one that actually
-- he asked me -- [Father]. But then it didn’t work out for his work schedule,
he stated.”). Nonetheless, even assuming for the sake of argument that Child
and/or her therapist refused to allow visits with Father, this does not overcome
Father’s complete failure to address his reunification objectives, nor does it
overcome Child’s desire to be adopted by her foster mother.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/11/18
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