J-A32026-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.J.C. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: R.S. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1166 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s):
85400
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JANUARY 17, 2018
Appellant, R.S. (“Father”) appeals from the June 22, 2017 Order
involuntarily terminating his parental rights to C.J.C. (“Child”) pursuant to
the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a) and (b). After careful review, we
affirm.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Father and D.S. (“Mother”) began a relationship in the Summer of
2013. Mother learned she was pregnant in July 2013. Mother ended her
relationship with Father approximately one month later when she caught him
dealing drugs at his place of employment and learned that he had an
extensive history of heroin and marijuana use. Mother testified that Child
was born in March 2014. Father was not present at Child’s birth and did not
have contact with Child for the first three months of Child’s life.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Father initiated a custody action and in June 2014, upon agreement of
the parties, the orphans’ court granted Father joint physical custody of 3-
month-old Child and the parties agreed that Father would have physical
custody 50 percent of the time. Father lived with his parents, Paternal
Grandparents, during this time.
Mother and Father followed this custody arrangement for
approximately 15 months, until December 2015, when Father relapsed,
which resulted in his incarceration.
In February 2016, Paternal Grandparents filed a Petition to Intervene
in the custody action. In March 2016, the orphans’ court entered a
Temporary Custody Order, which granted Mother primary physical custody of
Child and granted Paternal Grandparents visitation with Child on alternating
weekends. The court required Father to submit to weekly drug screens, and
permitted Father to have supervised visits with Child at Paternal
Grandparents home if his drug screens were negative. Although five of
Father’s drug screens were negative, the remainder of the screens were
diluted or positive for opiates and marijuana.
On May 19, 2016, the orphans’ court entered a Final Custody Order,
which maintained the status quo concerning custody and visitation, and once
again clarified that Father was not to have any physical contact with Child if
Father tested positive for drugs. Two days later, Father testified positive for
drugs.
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In June 2016, Mother filed a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) Petition.
The court granted a Temporary PFA Order against Father, prohibiting contact
between Father and Child. After a hearing, the court dismissed the PFA
Petition without prejudice and declined to enter a Final PFA Order because
the current custody order already prohibited contact between Father and
Child when Father was rendering positive drug screens.
On March 27, 2017, Mother filed a Petition for Involuntary Termination
of Parental Rights (“TPR Petition”) seeking to involuntarily terminate Father’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(1), (2), and (b).
Father continually had positive drug screens until entering drug rehab
for the eighth time in April 2017.1 Father has only had physical contact with
Child one time since May 2016, which was a court-ordered family counseling
session that occurred at Father’s current rehab facility.2
The orphans’ court held a hearing on June 22, 2017, and heard
testimony from Mother, Mother’s husband L.S. (“Stepfather”), Father,
Paternal Grandmother, and Paternal Grandfather.
Mother resides with Stepfather, Child, and Child’s 18-month-old half-
sibling. Mother testified that during the 15 months that Mother and Father
shared physical custody of Child, Paternal Grandparents were the primary
____________________________________________
1We note that Father entered this rehab facility after Mother filed the instant
TPR Petition.
2 We note that this visit occurred after Mother filed the instant TPR Petition.
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caretaker for Child. During that time, Mother had concerns about Child
being underfed, Child not receiving prescription medications, and Father
smoking around Child when Child was visiting Paternal Grandparents’ home.
Mother testified that while Child has been in her custody, Father has
never attempted to speak with Child over the phone, Father has not sent
any cards, letters, or gifts to Child, Father has not contacted Mother to ask
about Child’s health and well-being, and Father has missed at least four
holiday visits with Child without notice or explanation. Mother testified that
Child does not recognize Father in pictures, even though Child does
recognize other individuals.
Mother also testified that Father was court-ordered to pay $107.00 per
month in child support but Mother had only received two payments. She
stated that the court had issued at least three bench warrants for Father’s
failure to pay child support and failure to appear at court for contempt
proceedings and support conferences. Mother testified further that Father
would often check himself into drug rehab instead of appearing in court and
facing the consequences of his actions. When Father did appear in court, he
was often late or high on drugs. See N.T., 7/22/17, at 10-15, 18-20, 23-42,
50-52, 55-56, 58.
Mother described the relationship between Child and Father by stating:
“There is no relationship . . . I don’t feel there is any bond.” Id. at 26.
Mother opined that Child’s relationship with Father is not beneficial to Child,
stating, “I don’t feel that it benefits [Child] in any way due to the fact that
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[Father] has put drugs, alcohol, and crime before [Child.] He does not
watch out, again, for his wellbeing, safety, his health, his future.” Id. at 27.
Mother testified further that she has never seen Child express love towards
Father, despite the fact that Child frequently expresses love to others.
Mother stated that she wanted the court to terminate Father’s parental
rights because she, “strongly believe[s] that it is in the best – in the best
interests of [her] son, his well[-]being, and his future.” Id. at 30.
Stepfather testified that he has a very strong bond with Child and
Child calls Stepfather “Dad.” Stepfather has been involved in Child’s life
since before Child was born. Stepfather does not believe that a bond exists
between Child and Father and explained, “[t]he little interaction that has
been going on, hasn’t seen him since last year of May, how can any infant
have any relationship with anybody?” Id. at 65. Stepfather testified that he
loves Child and intends to adopt Child if the court terminates Father’s
parental rights. Stepfather further testified that he does not believe that
there would be a detrimental effect to Child if the court terminated Father’s
parental rights.
Father testified on his own behalf.3 Father testified that he was
currently residing in a long-term treatment facility for drug and alcohol
rehabilitation, which he entered in April 2017. At the time of the hearing,
____________________________________________
3 Father’s testimony can be found on pages 67-122 of the Notes of
Testimony, 7/22/17.
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Father had completed 70 days of the prescribed stay of 90 days. Father
testified that after 90 days, he would move to transitional housing.
Father also testified that he was twenty-five years old and that he has
had a drug problem since he was eighteen. Father stated that he primarily
abuses heroin and marijuana but admitted that he has tested positive on
numerous occasions for opiates, morphine, and oxycodone as well. Father
has completed high school and one year of college.
Father testified that when he had shared custody of Child for 15
months, he was Child’s primary caretaker, and stated that, “[t]he only time
my parents would really help me is if I needed to take care of something
else or work or whatever.” Id. at 72. Father testified that Child was healthy
and well cared for while in his care and that Child was always happy to see
him, would give him hugs and kisses, and called him “Daddy.”
Father admitted that his shared custody of Child ended because of his
drug use and that the court had reduced his interaction with Child to
supervised visits at Paternal Grandparents home every other weekend.
Father further testified that after he failed several drug tests, the court
prohibited Father from visiting with Child at Paternal Grandparents’ house.
Father stated that he continued to have contact with Child through phone
calls and video chats when Child was staying with Paternal Grandparents on
alternating weekends. However, Father did not ever contact Mother to
speak with Child while Child was in Mother’s physical custody. Father
testified that he would call at least once, but often twice, on alternating
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weekends when Child was visiting with Paternal Grandparents, and Child
would show Father his toys and tell Father what he was doing.
Father acknowledged that the drug rehab facility only granted him one
telephone call per week and he could not utilize video chat. Father also
testified that he never contacted Child when he was actively using drugs.
Nevertheless, Father maintains that he has had constant contact with Child
except during the period that the Temporary PFA Order was in effect.
Father conceded that he did not pay child support consistently, but
stated that he paid when he could. Father also admitted that the court
continued more than one of his support contempt hearings because he had
entered drug rehab directly before the hearings.
When asked if he has been able to maintain his sobriety, Father
testified, “I’ve had periods of clean time. But overall success, no.” Id. at
104. Father admitted that his history of being in and out of drug rehab does
not provide stability for Child, but asserted that his current rehab facility is
different, and more effective, than his treatment has been in the past.
Nevertheless, Father admits that he has had limited success with rehab
programs. Counsel inquired, “[y]ou can’t guarantee that you won’t end up
back in rehab, can you?” Id. at 101. Father responded, “I guess not.” Id.
With respect to Child’s bond with him, Father testified that would
borrow money or perform side jobs so he could regularly give Child gifts on
Child’s birthday and on Christmas. Father stated that he has a very strong
bond with Child, and the bond is the same now as when he had shared
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physical custody. Father asserted that terminating his parental rights would
have a negative effect on Child because, “he wouldn’t have a chance to
know his real father.” Id. at 85.
Paternal Grandmother testified that when Father had shared physical
custody of Child, he was the primary caretaker. She also testified that since
May 2016, Father had consistent contact with Child via telephone or video
chat on alternating weekends when Child was visiting with Paternal
Grandparents. Paternal Grandmother admitted there were periods where
she did not know Father’s whereabouts, but maintains that he always called
Child consistently. Paternal Grandmother stated that Father would work for
her to get money to buy Child toys. Both Paternal Grandparents testified
that Father has a loving bond with Child and that Child recognizes Father as
his parent. See id. at 122-153.
On June 22, 2017, the orphans’ court granted Mother’s TPR Petition
and involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights. Father timely
appealed. Both Father and the orphans’ court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Father raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the [orphans’ court] err in granting Mother’s [TPR
Petition] despite the only evidence being contested testimony
and despite a showing by Father that a relationship existed
and had been maintained with [Child]?
2. Did the [orphans’ court] err failing to perform its mandatory
analysis of whether there was a bond between [Child] and
Father and the analysis of the impact of severing such a
bond?
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3. Did the [orphans’ court] err in denying Father’s request for a
bonding evaluation in light of the contested testimony on the
presence of a bond between [Child] and Father, after Father’s
presentation of evidence of a bond between [Child] and
himself and his actions to maintain it?
Father’s Brief at 2.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In his first two issues on appeal, Father avers that the orphans’ court
erred in granting Mother’s TPR petition and involuntarily terminating Father’s
parental rights. Id. Father argues that, because there was conflicting
testimony, Mother failed to meet her burden of presenting clear and
convincing evidence that Father’s parental rights should be involuntarily
terminated. Id. at 9. Father also asserts that the orphans’ court failed to
properly analyze whether a bond existed between Father and Child, and the
impact of severing that bond. Id. at 13-15.
When we review a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights,
“we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is
supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error
of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the
decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(citation and quotation omitted). We may reverse a decision based on an
abuse of discretion “only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa.
2013) (citation and quotation omitted). We may not reverse, however,
“merely because the record would support a different result.” Id. (citation
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omitted). We give great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-
hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id.
Moreover, “[t]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility
determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d
68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation and quotation omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs
termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162
A.3d 1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and quotation omitted). “The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a).” Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
Provided that the court determines the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights, the court then engages in “the
second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of
the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
As stated above, the burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., supra at 276. We
have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
In addition, in order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court
need only agree with any one subsection under Section 2511(a). See In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant
case, we will analyze Section 2511(a)(1).
Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(a)
Section 2511(a)(1) provides that the trial court may terminate
parental rights if the Petitioner establishes that “the parent by conduct
continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.”
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1). The focus of the TPR hearing is on the conduct of
the parent and whether that conduct justifies a termination of parental
rights. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001). Although the
statute focuses on an analysis of the six months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition, “the court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.” In re
K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and quotation
omitted). Rather, “[t]he court must examine the individual circumstances
of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing
termination of his parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.”
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Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Finally, a court “may not consider any
effort by the parent to remedy the conditions described in subsections
(a)(1), (a)(6) or (a)(8) if that remedy was initiated after the parent was
given notice that the termination petition had been filed.” In re D.W., 856
A.2d 1231, 1234 (Pa. Super. 2004). See 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b).
This Court has repeatedly defined “parental duties” in general as the
affirmative obligation to provide consistently for the physical and emotional
needs of a child:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this Court has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance. This affirmative duty . . . requires
continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to
maintain communication and association with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental
duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and
maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations and internal
paragraph breaks omitted).
Moreover, “[p]arental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively
with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her ability,
even in difficult circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). “A parent must
utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must
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exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship.” Id. (citation omitted). And most
importantly, “[p]arental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more
suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.” Id.
(citation omitted).
Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s determination
that, because Father has refused or failed to perform parental duties for
more than six months prior to the filing of the petition in order to preserve
the parent-child relationship, Mother met her burden under 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(1). Father has neither cared for nor provided financial support for
Child since Child was eighteen months old. The orphans’ court opined:
During Child’s entire life, Father has not been able to hold a job,
he has not had money to buy gifts or provide support for Child,
and he has not properly cared for Child. Father has not been
able to exercise custody rights because he had not been able to
stay off drugs. Father is unable to provide a stable and secure
environment for Child. . . . Father acknowledged that his being
in and out of rehab has not been fair to Child and has not
provided stability for him. Although Father seems to think things
will be different in a few months, he does not have the right to
wait for a more suitable time to be a parent. Child is three years
of age. So far, Father has not been there for him and has not
provided the essential parental care necessary for Child’s
physical or mental well-being, and the [c]ourt does not believe
Father can remedy his failures in the foreseeable future.
Orphans’ Ct. Op., dated 8/9/17, at 6.
Significantly, after relapsing and losing shared custody of Child, Father
has had limited contact with Child, only via phone calls and video chats twice
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a month. Because of his positive drug screens, Father has only physically
seen Child one time since May 2016, at a court-ordered family therapy
session in his current drug rehab facility.4 Father has failed to contact
Mother to inquire about Child’s well-being and has failed to send Child gifts,
letters, and cards while Child is in Mother’s custody. While Father testified
that he sent gifts to Child at Paternal Grandparents home, the orphans’ court
did not find that testimony to be credible. Instead, the orphans’ court
concluded “[Paternal Grandparents] are the ones who have provided care
and gifts for Child when he has not been in the custody of Mother.”
Orphans’ Ct. Op., dated 8/9/17, at 6.
While Father argues that contested testimony cannot meet the clear
and convincing burden, he fails to cite any case law to support this.
Contrary to his assertion, “[t]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility
determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., supra at
73-74 (citation and quotation omitted).
In light of the evidence, the orphans’ court properly concluded that
Father failed to perform his parental duties for more than six months
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4 This visit occurred after Mother filed the TPR Petition and, consequently,
the orphans’ court is barred from considering this effort. See In re D.W.,
supra at 1234; 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b).
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preceding the filing of the TRP Petition. Accordingly, the orphans’ court
properly exercised its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).
Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(b)
We agree with the orphans’ court’s determination that the Mother met
her burden under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), and that terminating Father’s
parental rights is in the best interest of Child.
With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis shifts focus from
parental actions in fulfilling parental duties to the effect that terminating the
parental bond will have on the child. Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether
termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991
A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that “[i]ntangibles such
as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs
and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super.
2005) (citation omitted). This Court has emphasized that although a
parent’s emotional bond with her child is a “major aspect of the subsection
2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to
be considered by the trial court when determining what is in the best
interest of the child.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). Finally, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
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exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., supra at 762–63.
The orphans’ court opined:
Turning to the best interests of the Child, it is clear that
termination of Father’s parental rights is appropriate. . . . Mother
said that she never saw Child express love for Father and that
Child does not recognize him in photographs. Child does not ask
about Father and does not talk about him after visits with
Paternal Grandparents. Mother believes neither Child nor Father
has shown much interest in the other, that there is no
relationship between Father and Child, and that no bond exists.
Father has been and is unable to meet the Child’s developmental
and emotional needs. On the other hand, Child recognizes
[Stepfather] as his daddy and gets fatherly support from him.
Father and [Mother] naturally disagree that Child is not bonded
to Father and that Child does not remember him. Child’s counsel
was of the opinion that there was no significant relationship
between Child and Father. . . . Counsel was of the opinion that
there would be no lasting negative effect on Child if Father’s
parental rights were terminated. The Court agreed with
Counsel, finding that throughout the hearing Mother’s testimony
was more credible than that presented by Father and [Paternal
Grandmother].
Orphans’ Ct. Op., dated 8/9/17, at 7-8. Our review of the record supports
the orphans’ court’s conclusions.
Father argues that the orphans’ court erred when it failed to consider
and analyze Father’s testimony regarding the bond that exists between
Father and Child. On the contrary, the orphans’ court did consider Father’s
testimony, but did not find that testimony to be credible. It is the orphans’
court role to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
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evidence. In re M.G., supra at 73-74. The orphans’ court’s failure to
analyze testimony that it deemed not credible does not constitute error.
Bonding Evaluation
In his last issue, Father avers that the orphans’ court erred in denying
his request for a bonding evaluation in light of conflicting testimony on the
presence of a bond between Child and Father. See Father’s Brief at 2. He
asserts that a bonding evaluation was particularly appropriate in light of
Father and Paternal Grandmother’s testimony regarding the existence of a
bond between Father and Child. See id. This issue lacks merit.
This Court has concluded, “[i]n analyzing the parent-child bond, the
orphans' court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal
bonding evaluation be performed by an expert.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d
529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). Moreover, as stated above, in cases where
there is no evidence of a bond, it is reasonable for a court to infer that no
bond exists. In re K.Z.S., supra at 762-63. “The extent of any bond
analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the
particular case.” Id. at 763.
Instantly, Father has had extremely limited telephone and video chat
contact with child twice a month since May 2016. While Father and Paternal
Grandmother testified that a bond existed between Father and Child, the
orphans’ court did not find this testimony to be credible. In light of the
limited contact between Father and Child, it was reasonable for the court to
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infer that no bond exists and the court was not required to order a formal
bonding evaluation. Accordingly, we find no error.
Moreover, we agree with the orphans’ court that it was disingenuous
for Father’s counsel to request a bonding evaluation at the conclusion of the
TPR hearing. The orphans’ court opined, “[t]he [c]ourt viewed the request
as nothing more than a delay tactic, contrary to Child’s right to fulfillment of
his potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment with proper
parenting.” Orphans’ Ct. Op., dated 8/9/17, at 8. We agree.
CONCLUSION
In sum, our review of the record reveals that Mother provided clear
and convincing evidence to support the termination of Father’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/17/2018
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