NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWARD LEE JONES, Jr., No. 17-15509
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-03986-DJH-JZB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
H. RICHARDSON, Appeals Unit
Administrator; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 16, 2018**
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Edward Lee Jones, Jr., appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1915A); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007)
(dismissal based on the applicable statute of limitations). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Jones’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim arising from an erroneous entry in Jones’s disciplinary record
because, even with the benefit of tolling during the pendency of the administrative
exhaustion process, Jones failed to file his claim within the applicable statute of
limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542 (two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury claims); Canatella, 486 F.3d at 1132-33 (forum state’s personal
injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions; federal law
determines when a civil rights claim accrues, which is “when the plaintiff knows or
has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir.
2005) (the statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner completes the
administrative exhaustion process).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
2 17-15509