In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 16‐3463
ROBERT MCCOY, et al.,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
v.
CHICAGO HEIGHTS ELECTION
COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 87 C 5112 and 88 C 9800 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2017 — DECIDED JANUARY 22, 2018
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK,
Circuit Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs‐appellants Robert McCoy
and Kevin Perkins (“Appellants”) appeal from the district
court’s order approving as constitutional a reapportioned map
of aldermanic districts in the City of Chicago Heights (“the
2 No. 16‐3463
City”). The City redrew the ward boundaries pursuant to a
consent decree entered in 2010, after decades of litigation. After
an evidentiary hearing, the district court ruled that the City
had sufficiently justified the population deviations in its
proposed map. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case began in 1987, when a class of African‐American
plaintiffs filed suits against the City and the Chicago Heights
Park District, alleging dilution of voting opportunity and
challenging the methods for electing representatives to the
City Council and the Park District Board. We will briefly
summarize the relevant facts, but the long history of this
litigation has been well documented through numerous
written opinions. See Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d
593, 596 (7th Cir. 2000) (summarizing and listing previous
decisions).
Early in the litigation, the election practices at issue were
found to violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1971, et seq. (currently cited as 52 U.S.C. § 10101). That
finding set in motion an arduous process of attempting to
remedy the violation through the establishment of a consent
decree, which included a number of appeals and remands.
Appellants split from the other class plaintiffs in 1994, and
objected to the entry of the first consent decree. Since that time,
they have remained as the main opposition to the proposed
remedies for the violation.
In November 2010, the district court entered the most
recent consent decree (“the Decree”), which, despite its goal of
settling all outstanding disputes, forms the basis for this
No. 16‐3463 3
appeal. The Decree established a seven‐ward, single alder‐
manic form of government, and included a ward map that
complied with the applicable constitutional requirements. The
Decree also contained a provision requiring the City to
reapportion the wards as the population changed.
After the Decree was entered, the 2010 census results
showed that the wards’ populations had changed such that the
map required reapportionment. Accordingly, the City endeav‐
ored to redraw the wards to comply with the Decree. On
June 20, 2014, after a public comment process, the City passed
an ordinance approving its redrawn ward map. Then, on
October 22, 2014, the City filed a motion in the district court
seeking approval of its redrawn map as constitutional. Appel‐
lants responded, objecting to the City’s proposed map and
seeking leave to file their own ward map for approval and
implementation by the court.
As an initial matter, the court held that the Decree did not
allow for Appellants to propose their own ward map. Instead,
it found that the Decree gave the City the exclusive right to
reapportion the wards. Therefore, the court only considered
the City’s proposed map.
The City’s map still contained seven wards, each with an
individual population deviation of less than ten percent.
However, the overall deviation of the proposed map was
12.65%. Therefore, the court denied without prejudice the
City’s motion to approve the new map. The court gave the City
the option of either submitting justification for the deviation or
proposing a new map that would bring the overall deviation
under ten percent. The City elected to submit a supplemental
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brief providing its justifications, and the court held an eviden‐
tiary hearing to determine whether those were sufficient to
support the overall population deviation.
Ultimately, the court found that the City had presented
sufficient justification and had made a good faith effort to
reapportion the map with the smallest population deviations
practicable. It found that the City used legitimate and nondis‐
criminatory objectives in reapportioning the wards, such as
maintaining historical and natural boundary lines where
possible, and easing voter confusion by redrawing unusual
boundaries. For those reasons, the court held that the City had
complied with the Decree, and it approved the City’s proposed
map as constitutional.
II. DISCUSSION
This appeal presents two distinct issues. The first is
whether the district court erred in determining that the Decree
gave the City the exclusive right to propose a reapportioned
ward map. The second is whether the court was correct in
determining that the City’s proposed map was constitutionally
valid. We address each in turn.
A. Interpretation of the Decree
A consent decree is a form of contract, the interpretation of
which is typically subject to de novo review. Goluba v. Sch. Dist.
of Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035, 1037–38 (7th Cir. 1995). We have
recognized an exception to that rule, however, and have given
deference to the district court’s interpretation where the judge
who interprets the decree had involvement in its creation and
oversaw the litigation for an extended period of time. See, e.g.,
No. 16‐3463 5
id. at 1038; see also South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 n.4 (7th Cir.
1985).
This case began more than 30 years ago, but it has been
overseen by four different district judges. District Judge Coar
had the case for nearly 15 years before approving the Decree in
2010. The case was then reassigned to District Judge
Gettleman. Judge Gettleman made the rulings that formed the
basis of this appeal, but he did not oversee in the negotiation
of the Decree, nor did he approve it. Therefore, we will review
Judge Gettleman’s interpretation of the Decree de novo.
Appellants argue that they were entitled to submit their
own map for the court’s consideration and approval based on
the second to last sentence of the Decree, which states: “After
the publication of the 2010 census, the parties will, within
reasonable dispatch, reapportion the voting districts, if
necessary, in time for the next election following that date.”
The reference to “the parties,” Appellants contend, indicates
that both they and the City were allowed to submit maps, and
the court was to decide which represented the better remedy.
However, a clause that appears earlier in the Decree, and
on which the district court relied for its ruling, contradicts that
notion. It states that after the elections scheduled in February
and April of 2011, “the Defendants shall reapportion the
aldermanic ward boundary lines in accordance with the
provisions of Illinois and federal law.”
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear,
reapportionment of voting districts is, first and foremost, the
responsibility of the local government. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507
U.S. 146, 156 (1993) (“Time and again, we have emphasized
6 No. 16‐3463
that reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility
of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of
a federal court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Wise v. Lipscomb, 434 U.S. 1329, 1332 (1977) (citing
cases that indicate “municipal election plans are entitled to the
same respect accorded those of state legislatures”). Typically,
a federal court should not involve itself in the reapportionment
process unless the governing body fails to put forth a plan that
complies with constitutional requirements. Wise, 434 U.S. at
1331–32 (explaining that a government’s “decisions as to the
most effective reconciling of traditional policies should not be
restricted beyond the commands of the Equal Protection
Clause”).
Those underlying principles support a reading of the
Decree that gives the City alone the responsibility to put forth
a reapportioned map. Reading the Decree to allow Appellants
to put forth their own map for the district court’s approval
would surely contradict the Supreme Court’s admonitions
explained above. Doing so would allow Appellants, and the
district court, to impermissibly bypass the City’s legislative
process, which is to be given primacy in these disputes. Id; see
also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) (“[J]udicial relief
becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to
reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a
timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do
so.”). Therefore, the Decree’s explicit instruction that “the
Defendants shall reapportion the aldermanic ward boundary
lines” is controlling.
We agree with Appellants that the Decree’s later reference
to the “parties” entitled Appellants to a role in the process. We
No. 16‐3463 7
disagree, however, with their assertion that they were denied
that role by virtue of the fact that the court did not consider
their map.
The City engaged in an open legislative process to create
the new map. At the evidentiary hearing, the City established
that notice of the proposed map was published in a local
newspaper, as well as on the City’s website. The City also
made displays of the current and proposed maps available at
City Hall for public review and comment. The meeting at
which the map was presented to the City Council for approval
was also open for public comments. Appellants had the ability
during that process to propose their own suggestions and
improvements for the new ward map. Moreover, their status
as parties in this lawsuit afforded them the opportunity to
challenge the map and point out its weaknesses to the court.
However, when read within the context of the underlying
legal principles set forth above, the Decree indicates that it was
the City’s sole responsibility to reapportion the ward map.
Therefore, the district court did not err in ruling that
Appellants were not entitled to submit their own ward map for
approval by the court.
B. Constitutionality of Proposed Map
Having established that it was the City’s responsibility to
reapportion the wards, we are left only to determine whether
the City’s proposed map meets the relevant constitutional
standards. “The Equal Protection Clause principle of ‘one
person, one vote’ requires that officials be elected from voting
districts with substantially equal populations.” League of
Women Voters of Chi. v. City of Chi., 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir.
8 No. 16‐3463
2014) (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577). Though it does not
require exact mathematical precision, the Constitution does
require a government to “make an honest and good‐faith effort
to construct its districts as nearly of equal population as is
practicable.” Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743 (1973)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A maximum
population deviation between voting districts of less than ten
percent is presumptively constitutional. League of Women
Voters, 757 F.3d at 725. However, when the maximum
deviation is greater than ten percent, the government must
present justifications for the variance. Id.
Because their proposed map had an overall deviation of just
over 12%, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the variance was justified. The City, and in turn the
court, relied heavily on the testimony of Thomas Somer, the
City’s corporation counsel. Somer was the City official
primarily responsible for reapportioning the map, which he
did with the help of a cartographer. He testified that his goal
in redrawing the map was to change the configuration of the
existing wards as little as possible, so as to maintain their
historical configuration and their configuration as drawn for
the map used in the Decree. To ensure that certain wards had
sufficient populations, he used the natural boundaries of major
thoroughfares as the dividing lines. He testified that these new
boundaries also increased the wards’ compactness and eased
voter confusion that existed due to certain wards’ unusual
shape in the previous map.
These are all legitimate objectives that, absent the use of
discriminatory criteria, could justify a variance in population
between wards. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983)
No. 16‐3463 9
(specifically recognizing “making districts compact, respecting
municipal boundaries, [and] preserving the cores of prior
districts” as goals that can justify population deviations).
Somer also explained how redrawing the map with those goals
in mind resulted in the specific deviations present. See id. at 741
(“The [government] must, however, show with some
specificity that a particular objective required the specific
deviations in its plan, rather than simply relying on general
assertions.”). The district court found his explanation credible,
and we find no reason to quarrel with that determination.
Appellants have failed to present evidence, either in the
district court or on appeal, that the City employed any
discriminatory criteria or methods in its reapportionment.
Instead, their arguments can generally can be boiled down to
comparisons between the City’s proposal and their own, which
they deem to be more equitable. As we established above,
however, neither the Decree, nor the underlying legal
principles contemplate that the district court should review
competing plans and choose between them.
At this stage in the litigation, all that was left for the district
court to determine, and therefore for us to review, was
whether the City’s proposal met the constitutional requisites.
Based on the evidence and testimony the City presented at
the hearing, we agree with the district court that the City made
a good‐faith effort to reapportion the wards, adhering to the
Decree and minimizing the population deviations as much as
was practicable. Therefore, the district court was correct to
conclude that the City’s proposed map satisfies the
constitutional principle of one person, one vote.
10 No. 16‐3463
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.