FILED
Jan 25 2018, 10:49 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John D. Plascak Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Rensselaer, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Robert V. Monfort Laura R. Anderson
Rensselaer, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Billy J. Burden, January 25, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
66A03-1706-CR-1298
v. Appeal from the
Pulaski Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Michael Anthony Shurn, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
66C01-1510-F6-93
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 66A03-1706-CR-1298 | January 25, 2018 Page 1 of 10
[1] Following a jury trial, Billy J. Burden (“Burden”) was convicted of neglect of a
dependent1 as a Level 6 felony. On appeal, Burden raises two issues, the
following of which we find dispositive: whether the State presented sufficient
evidence to support the element of neglect, requiring that Burden knowingly
placed the dependent in a position that endangered her life or health.2
[2] We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In the fall of 2015, Burden and a woman named Christina were in a
relationship and lived together with Christina’s two young children B.E. and
K.E. Christina believed that Burden was the father of four-month old K.E.; yet,
she wanted Burden to provide no care for either child, explaining, “I was their
mother.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 40. Christina testified that she provided “clothing,
shelter, and all of the necessities” for K.E., and when it came to medical care,
Christina’s decision was the “rule of the day.” Id. K.E. was born with various
health issues, and in the summer of 2015, she had heart surgery.
[4] On September 28, 2015, Burden was the front-seat passenger in a car driven
along a Pulaski County road by his sister, Tiffany. Tiffany’s child, A.K., was in
the back, buckled into a car seat. Christina, B.E., and K.E. were also in the
1
See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1).
2
Burden also contends that the State’s voir dire questions pertaining to a father’s duty toward his injured
child constituted prosecutorial misconduct that rose to the level of fundamental error. Because we reverse
Burden’s conviction on other grounds, we need not address this issue.
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back seat. B.E. sat in the middle, with his seatbelt fastened, and Christina sat
next to B.E. Christina held a car seat on her lap, and K.E. was buckled into the
car seat. The six individuals were driving to a grocery store when Tiffany,
“show[ing] off her [new] car,” began to speed. Tr. Vol. 3 at 8. Reaching speeds
of more than 100 miles per hour, Tiffany drove over a small hill, swerved to
avoid an oncoming vehicle, swerved again to avoid a telephone pole, and lost
control of the car. Tiffany’s car began to skid, went off the road into a
cornfield, and rolled over several times before landing on its roof.
[5] Christina testified that, as a result of the accident, she, B.E., K.E., and A.K.
were ejected from the car. She said that she was thrown twenty feet from the
car, and K.E., still in her car seat, landed seven feet from Christina. Id. at 11-
12. Hearing K.E.’s cries, Christina rushed to her side and unbuckled K.E. from
her car seat. From inside the car, Burden, asking about K.E., repeatedly yelled,
“Where’s the f***ing baby at.” Id. 3 at 14. Christina responded, “She’s right
f***ing here in my arms.” Id. When Burden extricated himself from the car, he
went up to Christina and, again, asked about K.E. Id. at 15. Christina told
Burden that K.E. was in her arms. Id. It was at that time that Burden asked if
everyone was okay, and Christina said, “Yeah, everybody’s fine.” Id. That
was the last time Christina saw Burden at the scene of the accident.
[6] Dewain Davis (“Davis”), the driver of the car that Tiffany almost hit, testified
that he saw the accident and called 911 to report it. Tr. Vol. 2 at 183. After
Davis got off the phone, he approached the crash site and saw six individuals
outside the wrecked car—two adult females, three children, and a male, later
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identified as Burden. Davis asked if everyone was okay, and he was assured
that no one else was in the wreck. Davis saw Burden ask a passing driver if she
would take him to get help. Id. at 188. When she refused, Burden asked
whether Davis would give him a ride to get help. Id. at 186. Davis also
refused, explaining that he had called 911 and “help was on the way.” Id.
Davis testified that Burden “asked another gentleman there if he would take
him to the house down the way to get help and that gentleman[, Michael Hartle
(“Hartle”),] did take [Burden].” Id. at 187.
[7] Hartle testified that he came upon the accident and saw a couple of farmers he
knew at the scene. Hartle and the farmers tried to call 911, but were
unsuccessful because they were in a cellular dead zone. Id. at 207. Burden,
“cut up and injured,” approached Hartle, who asked Burden if he or anyone
else needed medical attention. Id. at 206. Burden explained that he had gone
through the windshield of the car, was the only one injured, and no one else
needed medical assistance, but continued that he had children in the car and
needed to call his mother-in-law to come to the scene to pick them up. Id. at
206, 208. Burden said his phone did not work, explained that his house was
down the road, and asked Hartle to take him there so he could call the police.
Understanding that his own phone did not work, Hartle believed Burden and
drove him home. Burden left the scene before the deputies arrived. Deputies
later determined that Burden never called anyone for help after he left the scene.
Pulaski County Sheriff’s Deputy Aaron Himes, who was one of the first to
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respond to the scene, testified that he believed Burden left the scene because
there was “a warrant out for him.” Id. at 165.
[8] Diana Lynn Farris (“Farris”), one of the paramedics who responded to the
scene, testified about the heightened suspicion of injury for victims who have
been ejected from a vehicle. Id. at 220. Farris was the paramedic overseeing
K.E.’s care. She testified, “I listened to the baby’s breath sounds, looked at the
color, did like a quick assessment. . . . Her heart rate was good, her lung
sounds were good. . . . [S]o she looked fine at that point without having x-ray
vision.” Id. at 221. Farris qualified her assessment, saying, “I suspect the worst
in every kid . . . . They look fine one minute, and they’re dead the next. That’s
how . . . we are taught to look for and treat trauma children because that’s what
they do. Adults tend to slowly decline and decline . . ., but kids are the total
opposite. They look fine, they compensate, they compensate, they compensate,
and then they drop off the cliff.” Id. at 223. K.E. was taken by helicopter to a
facility with a trauma center, as protocol directed. Id. at 225.
[9] On October 8, 2015, the State charged Burden with Level 6 felony neglect of a
dependent. On February 21-22, 2017, a jury trial was held, at the conclusion of
which, the jury found Burden guilty as charged. The trial court imposed a two-
year sentence. Burden now appeals, arguing that there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction.
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Discussion and Decision
[10] Our standard of review upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
well established: we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
witnesses. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We examine
only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom that support
the conviction. Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012). “[W]e affirm if
there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the
crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind.
2004).
[11] To obtain a conviction for Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, pursuant to
Indiana Code section 35-46-1-4(a)(1) (“the Neglect Statute”), the State had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Burden: (1) had the care of a dependent,
K.E.; and (2) knowingly or intentionally placed K.E. in a situation that
endangered her life or health. On appeal, both parties argue extensively about
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that K.E. was a dependent in
Burden’s care. However, we need not resolve that issue to decide the instant
appeal, because there is a second element that must be proven. Assuming,
without deciding, that there was sufficient evidence that K.E. was a dependent
in Burden’s care, the key evidentiary question under the Neglect Statute was
whether Burden knowingly placed K.E. in a situation that endangered her life
or health.
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[12] “A person engages in conduct knowingly if, ‘when he engages in the conduct,
he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.’” Villagrana v. State, 954
N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b)). The
mens rea under the Neglect Statute, requires the defendant to have a
“‘subjective [ ] aware[ness] of a high probability that he placed the dependent in
a dangerous situation.’” Perryman v. State, 80 N.E.3d 234, 250 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017) (quoting Gross v. State, 817 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Our
court has repeatedly held that the Neglect Statute “must be read as applying
only to situations that expose a dependent to an ‘actual and appreciable’ danger
to life or health.” Scruggs v. State, 883 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(citing Gross, 817 N.E.2d at 308 (citing State v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121, 123
(Ind. 1985))), trans. denied. In Scruggs, we reiterated:
[T]hat to be an “actual and appreciable” danger for purposes of
the neglect statute when children are concerned, the child must
be exposed to some risk of physical or mental harm that goes
substantially beyond the normal risk of bumps, bruises, or even
worse that accompany the activities of the average child. This is
consistent with a “knowing” mens rea, which requires subjective
awareness of a “high probability” that a dependent has been
placed in a dangerous situation, not just any probability.
Scruggs, 883 N.E.2d at 191 (quoting Gross, 817 N.E.2d at 308). The purpose of
the Neglect Statute “is ‘to authorize the intervention of the police power to
prevent harmful consequences and injury to dependents’ without having to wait
for actual loss of life or limb.” Gross, 817 N.E.2d at 309 (quoting Downey, 476
N.E.2d at 123). “‘Because such a finding requires one to resort to inferential
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reasoning to ascertain the defendant’s mental state, the appellate courts must
look to all the surrounding circumstances of a case to determine if a guilty
verdict is proper.’” Id. (quoting McMichael v. State, 471 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied).
[13] Here, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated the following. On September
28, 2015, Tiffany was driving Christina, Burden, and the three children to the
grocery store. Burden sat in the passenger seat, and Christina sat in the back
seat. K.E. was buckled into a car seat, which Christina held on her lap. Tiffany
wanted to “show off” her new car and began driving faster. Tr. Vol. 3 at 8.
Reaching a speed in excess of 100 miles per hour, Tiffany crested a small hill,
swerved to avoid an oncoming car, and swerved again to avoid a telephone
pole. Tiffany’s car began to skid, went off the road into a cornfield, and rolled
over several times landing on its roof. During the rollover, Christina, B.E.,
K.E., and A.K. were ejected from the car.
[14] The above circumstances did not factor into the State’s decision to bring neglect
of a dependent charges against Burden. Instead, it was Burden’s act of leaving
the scene of the accident that was the basis for the State’s decision to bring
charges against Burden. Specifically, the State contends that by leaving the
scene of the car accident, Burden placed K.E. in a situation that endangered her
life or health. Appellee’s Br. at 32. The State argues that Burden should have
known he was leaving K.E. in appreciable danger because she had been ejected
from Tiffany’s car during a high-speed crash, a situation compounded by the
fact that K.E. had recently undergone surgery. Id. at 35. The State asserts that
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Burden should not have left K.E. with Christina, who had shown her parenting
deficiencies by failing to properly secure K.E. into the car. Id. at 36. The State
also points to the fact that K.E. could have sustained internal injuries, which
would have required immediate attention. Id. at 15.
[15] Burden responds that these facts and inferences do not support a finding that he
had a subjective awareness of a “high probability” that K.E. was placed in a
dangerous situation by his act of leaving the scene. Appellant’s Br. at 35 (citing
Gross, 817 N.E.2d at 308). We agree. The evidence before the trial court
revealed that, after the accident, Burden repeatedly inquired as to the
whereabouts of K.E. Id. at 14. Christina responded, at least twice, that K.E.
was in her arms. Id. There was no evidence that Burden had ever received first
aid training. Furthermore, Burden’s ability to care for K.E. was limited because
Christina, by her own admission, did not allow Burden to provide care for
K.E., and when it came to medical care for K.E., Christina’s decision was the
“rule of the day.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 40. Before Burden left the scene, Christina told
him that everyone was fine, and Davis informed Burden that 911 had been
called and assistance was on the way. Moreover, K.E. and the other occupants
of the car, with the exception of B.E.,3 appeared uninjured4 and, in fact, did
“not have any serious injuries.” Id. at 24. Finding no evidence to support the
3
Here, the State had charged Burden with neglect of a dependent only as to K.E. B.E.’s condition at the
scene was irrelevant to the evidence necessary to convict Burden of neglect of dependent.
4
Davis testified that, while he had no way of examining the folks at the scene, it “looked like everybody was
okay.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 197.
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element that Burden had a subjective awareness of a high probability that, by
leaving the scene, he had placed K.E. in a situation that endangered her life or
health, we reverse Burden’s conviction for Level 6 felony neglect of a
dependent.5
[16] Reversed.
Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
5
Here, some of the evidence pertaining to Burden’s role as a father could have been seen as unflattering, and
the State contends that Burden fled the scene in order to avoid arrest on a pending warrant. Notwithstanding
that evidence, we note that even a self-serving motive for leaving the scene is irrelevant where that evidence is
insufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Burden was subjectively aware of a high
probability that by leaving the scene, he had placed his dependent, K.E., in a situation that created an actual
and appreciable danger to her.
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