NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 29 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KEITH L. NASH, No. 17-35537
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-05851-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GARRY E. LUCAS,
Defendant,
and
RICHARD J. BISHOP, sued in his
individual and official capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 16, 2018**
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Keith L. Nash appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging denial of access to the courts while he was a
pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo. Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). We may
affirm on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055,
1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nash’s claim
regarding the denial of a public notary because Nash failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendants deprived him of an opportunity to
challenge his sentence or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 355 (1996) (prison officials must provide an inmate the tools to challenge his
sentence or conditions of confinement, but the loss of any other litigating capacity
is constitutional).
Summary judgment on Nash’s claim regarding the denial of access to the
law library and legal supplies was proper because Nash was represented by court-
appointed counsel in his state court proceeding at the time of the alleged
deprivations. See Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)
(availability of court-appointed counsel satisfies the constitutional obligation to
provide meaningful access to the courts).
2 17-35537
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nash’s motion for
reconsideration because Nash failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist.
No. 1J Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993)
(setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)).
We reject as meritless Nash’s contentions regarding the district court’s
treatment of his complaint and denial of his motions to file a surreply, for an
extension of time, to compel, and to amend his complaint.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-35537