J-S84029-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RANDELL LAMAR PETERSON :
:
Appellant : No. 1319 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 30, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-41-CR-0001367-2014
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 08, 2018
Randell Lamar Peterson appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, after he entered an open
guilty plea to numerous drug-related charges at docket number CR-1367-
2014 (the “2014 charges”).1 Upon careful review, we affirm.
The charges in this matter arise from Peterson’s sale of cocaine to a
confidential informant. After his arrest, law enforcement officers searched
Peterson’s apartment and discovered heroin and cocaine, packaged for sale.
On July 18, 2016, Peterson entered an open guilty plea to the 2014 charges,
as well as charges related to docket number CR-652-2015 (the “2015
____________________________________________
1 Peterson pled guilty to three counts of possession with intent to deliver, 35
P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); two counts each of possession of a controlled
substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), and possession of drug paraphernalia,
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32); and one count of delivery of a controlled substance,
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
J-S84029-17
charges”). Under the plea agreement with respect to the 2015 charges, the
Commonwealth had agreed to a sentence of 2 to 5 years’ incarceration, in
exchange for Peterson’s agreement to waive eligibility for the Recidivism Risk
Reduction Incentive (“RRRI”) program and boot camp, enter an open plea to
the 2014 charges, and serve his sentence on the 2015 charges consecutively
to that on his 2014 charges.
On September 27, 2016, Peterson appeared for sentencing. After the
court pronounced sentence on the 2015 charges, Peterson stated that he did
not understand that the plea agreement did not encompass the 2014 charges
and asked to withdraw his plea at that docket. However, on March 20, 2017,
the date set for argument on Peterson’s motion to withdraw his plea, he
agreed to be sentenced on the 2014 charges. As a result, Peterson received
an aggregate sentence of 45 to 96 months’ incarceration, consecutive to his
sentence on the 2015 charges. The court made Peterson RRRI eligible at a
minimum of 37 months and fifteen days. Peterson filed post-sentence
motions, which were denied. Peterson filed a timely notice of appeal on
August 17, 2017. Both Peterson and the trial court have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Peterson claims that his sentence is “manifestly excessive
and unduly harsh” because the court did not give meaningful consideration to
all the sentencing factors, including Peterson’s personal situation. This claim
raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of Peterson’s sentence. Such
-2-
J-S84029-17
a claim does not entitle an appellant to review as a matter of right.
Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 2015). Rather,
before this Court can address such a discretionary challenge, an appellant
must comply with the following requirements:
An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has
a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa. Super.
2011).
Here, Peterson filed a post-sentence motion raising his sentencing claim,
followed by a timely notice of appeal to this Court. He has also included in his
brief a concise statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f). Accordingly, we must now determine whether he has raised a
substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
the Sentencing Code.
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825,
828 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question exists only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
-3-
J-S84029-17
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Peterson asserts that his sentence is
unreasonable because the sentencing court failed to consider all relevant
factors, such as Peterson’s learning disability, addiction recovery and time
already spent in prison. This issue, that the sentencing court failed to consider
all mitigating factors, does not raise a substantial question. See
Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[T]his
Court has held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate
consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for
our review.”); see also Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (“[W]e have held that a claim that a court did not weigh the
factors as an appellant wishes does not raise a substantial question.”).
Accordingly, we do not address the merits of Peterson’s claim.
Even if we were to determine that Peterson’s claim raised a substantial
question, he would be entitled to no relief. Peterson, who had a prior record
score of 5, was sentenced at the low end of the standard range of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Peterson could have been subject to a maximum
sentence of 35 years; he received a maximum of 8 years. The court was in
possession of a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) and cited extensively
to the PSI – including acknowledging Peterson’s learning disability, his
-4-
J-S84029-17
previous time spent in prison and his addiction issues – at Peterson’s
sentencing hearing. See N.T. Sentencing, 3/30/17, at 5-8. Where the court
has the benefit of a PSI, we may assume it “was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12,
18 (Pa. 1988). Moreover, where the sentencing court imposed a standard-
range sentence with the benefit of a PSI, we will not consider the sentence
excessive. Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Peterson also made an extensive statement to the court in which he
repeatedly noted his learning disability and his efforts to obtain treatment and
change his life. In sum, the court considered all the mitigating factors noted
by Peterson on appeal and imposed a sentence that was not excessive under
the circumstances. Peterson is entitled to no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 02/08/2018
-5-