Xiu v. Sessions

16-3108 Xiu v. Sessions BIA Poczter, IJ A206 364 234 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4 9th day of February, two thousand eighteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 8 ROBERT D. SACK, 9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 ZHANG MEI XIU, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 16-3108 17 NAC 18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Zhen Liang Li, New York, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 26 Attorney General; Edward E. Wiggers, 27 Senior Litigation Counsel; Michael 28 C. Heyse, Trial Attorney, Office of 29 Immigration Litigation, United 30 States Department of Justice, 31 Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 4 DENIED. 5 Petitioner Zhang Mei Xiu, a native and citizen of the 6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 8, 2016, 7 decision of the BIA affirming an August 6, 2015, decision of 8 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Xiu’s application for 9 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhang Mei Xiu, No. A 206 364 234 11 (B.I.A. Aug. 8, 2016), aff’g No. A 206 364 234 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. 12 City Aug. 6, 2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with 13 the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 15 the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” 16 Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 17 2006). The applicable standards of review are well 18 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. 19 Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 20 The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 21 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on asylum 2 1 applicant’s “demeanor, candor or responsiveness,” the inherent 2 plausibility of her account, and any inconsistencies and 3 omissions in her testimony, application, and documentary 4 evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia 5 Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64, 167. “We defer . . . to an IJ’s 6 credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no 7 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 8 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Substantial evidence 9 supports the agency’s determination that Xiu was not credible. 10 The agency reasonably relied on discrepancies between 11 Xiu’s application, testimony, and her father’s letter regarding 12 how long Xiu attended her underground church in China before 13 she was arrested, how many times the police visited her home 14 and summoned her to the station, whether police suspected her 15 involvement in distributing religious leaflets, and whether she 16 was kicked during her beatings in detention. 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67 18 (explaining that adverse credibility determination may be 19 supported by either material or non-material inconsistencies, 20 so long as the totality of the circumstances supports the 21 determination). The record supports the agency’s conclusion 3 1 that the record included discrepancies and exaggeration. 2 Although Xiu attended church in China only three 3 times—October 1, 8, and 10, 2013—her application stated that 4 she “went to the family church almost every week and studied 5 the Bible very hard.” Similarly, Xiu’s application stated that 6 the police visited her home or summoned her to the station every 7 three to five days and she “could not lead a normal life under 8 their constant harassment,” but she testified that the police 9 summoned her to the station only once and visited her home only 10 once. A letter from Xiu’s father stated that the police 11 separately investigated Xiu for distributing religious 12 leaflets and that this further motivated Xiu to flee China, but 13 Xiu testified that she had “no idea” whether the police 14 investigated her for distribution of religious leaflets. And 15 Xiu stated that the police slapped, punched, and hit her, but 16 her father’s letter added that Xiu was kicked. The agency 17 reasonably relied on these discrepancies, including those in 18 the letter because that letter was Xiu’s only evidence to 19 corroborate events in China. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 20 166-67; Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) 21 (recognizing that “[a]n applicant’s failure to corroborate his 4 1 . . . testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence 2 of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to 3 rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into 4 question”). 5 Xiu argues that her application and testimony were 6 technically consistent as to her church attendance. While her 7 statement that she attended church every week is true to the 8 extent that she attended church twice in a two-week period, her 9 statement that she “went to the family church almost every week 10 and studied the Bible very hard” implies a much more substantial 11 involvement with Christianity. Accordingly, the IJ did not err 12 in finding this was an attempt to exaggerate her claim. See 13 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (noting that lack of candor may 14 ground adverse credibility determination); cf. Majidi v. 15 Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must 16 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent 17 statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a 18 reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his 19 testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). 20 In sum, Xiu’s lack of consistency and exaggeration 21 regarding her church attendance, the frequency and number of 5 1 police visits and summonses, whether the police were 2 investigating her for distributing religious leaflets, and her 3 beating in detention provide substantial evidence for the 4 adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. 5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166-67. That 6 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, 7 and CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same 8 factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 9 (2d Cir. 2006). 10 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 11 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 12 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 13 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 14 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 15 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 16 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 17 34.1(b). 18 FOR THE COURT: 19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6