United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 27, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-60335
Summary Calendar
CHARLIE TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ETHEL CARLIZE, Disciplinary Chairperson; HENRY MAXWELL, Captain;
TOMMY ROSS, Warden - Deputy; MICHAEL A. WILSON, Superintendent;
CHRISTOPHER EPPS, Commissioner; JEAN SANDERS JOHNSON, Case Worker;
CHARLES BAILEY, Associate Warden - Classification Director; LINDA
THOMPSON, Commanding Officer IV; REBECCA BLOUNT, Lieutenant;
MATILDA BROWN, Commanding Officer IV; RICHARD PENNINGTON, Law
Library Director; EARNEST LEE, Warden; S. GREEN, Supervisor 29 -
Kitchen,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:04-CV-24
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Charlie Taylor, Mississippi prisoner # R6798, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his pro se civil rights compliant
against various Mississippi Department of Corrections officials for
*
Pursuant to the 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
failure to state a claim1 and for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.2
Taylor argues on appeal that he exhausted his administrative
remedies as to all of the claims alleged in his complaint. The
record indicates that Taylor exhausted his challenge to being
housed in unit 29-L and to his reclassification as a field worker.
However, this claim lacks merit because Taylor does not have a
liberty interest in his work or housing assignment.3 Accordingly,
the district court did not err in dismissing the claim.4
Taylor argues that the rules violation report (RVR), received
for hanging a sheet in front of himself while using the bathroom,
was not based on any prison rule; he contends that he “has the
liberty right to not have false evidence intentionally presented
against him in official proceedings by those acting under color of
law.” However, since Taylor does not assert that he was restrained
in any way due to this RVR and since he concedes that he was found
1
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A dismissal under § 1915A is reviewed de novo.
Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998).
2
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This court reviews de novo a dismissal under
§ 1997e(a). Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 866 (5th Cir. 2003).
3
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (stating that the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not endow a prisoner with a protected
liberty interest in the location of his confinement); Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d
1235, 1250 (5th Cir 1989) (stating that prison inmates have no constitutionally
protected liberty interest in their job assignments).
4
See Sojouner T v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that
this Court may affirm the district court’s judgment on any ground supported by
the record).
2
not guilty at a hearing concerning the RVR, he has not asserted a
constitutional deprivation.5 Furthermore, a rule preventing an
inmate from obscuring prison officials’ view is “reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests.”6 Accordingly, the district
court did not err in dismissing Taylor’s claim for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.7
Taylor argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
complaint before summonses were served on the defendants. However,
service is not required before dismissal.8
Taylor asserts for the first time on appeal that his housing
in segregated confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment,
rendered in retaliation for his filing of grievances against prison
officials. However, we need not consider issues raised for the
first time on appeal.9
AFFIRMED.
5
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
6
See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
7
See Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999).
8
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d
Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (noting that § 1915A “clearly does not require that
process be served...before dismissal”).
9
See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir.
1999) (per curiam) (stating that this “Court will not allow a party to raise an
issue for the first time on appeal merely because a party believes that he might
prevail if given the opportunity to try a case again on a different theory”).
3